UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4910
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SABINO DUQUE-DIAZ, a/k/a Jorge Ivan Medina, a/k/a Saul
Gomez-Duval,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00118-BR-1)
Submitted: June 19, 2015 Decided: July 10, 2015
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curium opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G.
Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne
V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sabino Duque-Diaz was convicted of unlawful reentry into
the United States after previous removal for an aggregated
felony, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Because
Duque-Diaz had been deported to Mexico in 2006 following a
felony drug trafficking conviction carrying a sentence of
greater than thirteen months, the district court applied a
sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), and imposed a sentence of 64 months’
incarceration. On appeal, Duque-Diaz argues that this within-
Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. Finding no
error, we affirm.
“[A]ppellate courts examine sentencing determinations under
an abuse-of-discretion standard, which translates to review for
‘reasonableness.’” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d
212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 261–62 (2005)). “A sentence within the Guidelines
range is presumed on appeal to be substantively reasonable.”
United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 2015).
“Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295,
306 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Applying this presumption of reasonableness to Duque-Diaz’s
sentence, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion. The district court noted that it “considered [the
Guidelines] range as well as the other relevant factors set
forth in the advisory sentencing guidelines and those set forth
in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a)” before imposing the sentence.
Further, the district court found Duque-Diaz’s criminal history
was serious and indicated an increased risk to the public, in
direct alignment with two of the 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness of offense); id. § 3553(a)(2)(C)
(need to protect public). Duque-Diaz has not shown that his
sentence is unreasonable under any of the § 3553(a) factors. We
therefore conclude that Duque-Diaz’s within-Guidelines sentence
is substantively reasonable.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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