J-S41038-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MARTY MOHOSKI,
Appellant No. 2180 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 10, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-06-CR-0000712-2007
BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2015
Appellant, Marty Mohoski, appeals, pro se, from the court’s dismissal
of his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows:
On January 29, 2007 [Appellant] was involved in a verbal
argument with Rita Osieki, his landlord and sometimes
paramour, from whom he rented a room at 1044 Moss Street in
the city of Reading, Pennsylvania. The verbal argument
eventually escalated into Appellant’s protracted, vicious physical
attack on Ms. Osieki that only ended when neighbors called the
police and Appellant fled the scene.
. . . After several years and various court-appointed
lawyers, along with delays caused by Appellant’s filing of
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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meritless motions and an interlocutory appeal, the case
proceeded to trial on October 19, 2009. Appellant represented
himself throughout the two-day jury trial, with the assistance of
standby counsel. [On October 20, 2009, the jury convicted
Appellant of aggravated assault, unlawful restraint, reckless
endangerment, and two counts of simple assault, and the judge
convicted Appellant of summary harassment.1 The court
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of not less than eight
and one-half nor more than twenty-five years’ incarceration.]
On October 2[7], 2009, Appellant was appointed appellate
counsel, who filed an appeal on behalf of Appellant on or around
November 17, 2009. Counsel for Appellant failed to file a brief,
and accordingly the appeal was dismissed on January 13, 2011.
Appellant filed an application for reconsideration of the dismissal
with the Superior Court, which was denied on April 11, 2011.
On May 17, 2011 [the trial] court granted Appellant’s petition
[for allowance of appeal] and allowed him to appeal nunc pro
[tunc], granted his request to proceed in forma pauperis, and
appointed new appellate counsel. New appellate counsel filed a
[n]otice of [a]ppeal on June 7, 2011.
On January 23, 2012 Appellant’s judgment of sentence
was affirmed and on February 9, 2012 Appellant filed a pro se
[PCRA petition]. Accordingly, [the PCRA] court appointed PCRA
counsel Osmer Deming to assist Appellant in the disposition of
his PCRA petition. . . .
(PCRA Court Opinion, 3/04/15, at 1-2).
On August 30, 2013, PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw as
counsel with a supporting Turner/Finley2 no merit letter. The PCRA court
granted counsel’s petition to withdraw on October 24, 2014.
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2902(a)(1), 2705, 2701(a)(1) and (3), and
2709(a)(1), respectively.
2
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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On November 5, 2014, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its
intention to dismiss his PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).
Appellant filed a pro se response on November 18, 2014.
The PCRA court dismissed the petition on December 10, 2014.3
Appellant timely appealed on December 26, 2014.4
Appellant raises nine issues for our review:5
[1.] Did the trial court err in permitting Appellant to be tried
without having the benefit of adequate time for preparation and
subpoenaing of witnesses, with full knowledge that Appellant had
received discovery information and casefile only [five] days prior
to trial?
[2.] Did the trial court err in permitting highly prejudicial
inferences by Commonwealth witnesses in front of the jury
without giving cautionary/curative instruction?
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3
We note that at the time Appellant filed his notice of appeal, the PCRA
court’s December 10, 2014 order had not been docketed. (See Per Curiam
Order, 1/13/15, at 1). On February 3, 2015, this Court directed the PCRA
court to enter the December 10, 2014 order on its docket. (See Per Curiam
Order, 2/03/15, at 1). The PCRA court complied and “the January 13, 2015
show-cause order [was] discharged.” (Per Curiam Order, 2/13/15, at 1)
(emphasis and capitalization omitted). Therefore, we will deem the PCRA
court’s December 10, 2014 order as filed on that day. (See Docket, at 24);
see also Pa.R.A.P. 905(5).
4
Pursuant to the PCRA court’s order, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b)
statement on January 14, 2015. The court entered its Rule 1925(a) opinion
on March 4, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
5
We have renumbered Appellant’s issues for ease of analysis and
disposition.
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[3.] Did the Commonwealth’s attorney commit instances of
misconduct in the form of presenting false testimony, mis-
stating [sic] facts, and urging the jury to draw inferences not
supported by evidence at trial, and was Appellant prejudiced by
these actions?
[4.] Did the [PCRA] court err in failing to appoint counsel on
appeal from the [December 10, 2014] order [] dismissing
Appellant’s PCRA petition?
[5.] Did the [PCRA] court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing?
[6.] Was pre-trial and standby counsel William Bispels
ineffective in failing to adequately meet and consult with
Appellant, in failing to explore potential trial defenses, in failing
to file any pre-trial motions, in ignoring exculpatory evidence, in
failing to contact witnesses whose testimony would have been
exculpatory in nature, in failing to request that the
Commonwealth produce any evidence of record that Appellant
had waived his [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 600
rights at Appellant’s Rule 600 hearing, and, as stanby [sic]
counsel, failing to act as advocate and advise Appellant on
requested points of law during trial?
[7.] Was appellate counsel Jay M. Nigrini ineffective in failing to
raise and argue requested meritorious issues on appeal?
[8.] Was PCRA counsel ineffective in failing to comply with the
standards set forth in Finley?
[9.] Was PCRA counsel ineffective in failing to investigate and
develop the claims raised in Appellant’s PCRA petition?
(Appellant’s Brief, at vii-viii) (most capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review is well-settled:
When reviewing the propriety of an order granting or
denying PCRA relief, this Court is limited to determining whether
the evidence of record supports the determination of the PCRA
court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Great
deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these
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findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the
certified record.
Commonwealth v. Rachak, 62 A.3d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).
In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must demonstrate
that the issues raised in his PCRA petition have not been previously litigated
or waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).
. . . An issue is previously litigated if the highest appellate
court in which appellant could have had review as a matter of
right has ruled on the merits of the issue. An issue is waived if
appellant could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at
trial, . . . on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction
proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803-04 (Pa. 2014) (citations and
quotation marks omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and 9544.
Furthermore, a PCRA petitioner is eligible for relief if the claim is
cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543. Cognizable claims
include constitutional violations and ineffectiveness of counsel that
undermine the truth-determining process. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i)
and (ii).
We also note that a PCRA petitioner is not automatically
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We review the PCRA court’s
decision dismissing a petition without a hearing for an abuse of
discretion.
[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-
conviction petition is not absolute. It is within the
PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a hearing if
the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no
support either in the record or other evidence. It is
the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to
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examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in
light of the record certified before it in order to
determine if the PCRA court erred in its
determination that there were no genuine issues of
material fact in controversy and in denying relief
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
omitted).
In the first issue, Appellant claims that “the trial court err[ed] in
permitting [him] to be tried without having the benefit of adequate time for
preparation[.]” (Appellant’s Brief, at 22) (most capitalization omitted).
Specifically, he asserts that he was “denied his constitutional right to due
process in that he was not afforded adequate time to prepare a defense and
subpoena available witnesses . . . .” (Id. at 24). This issue is waived.
The record reflects that Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed
to allow him adequate time to prepare for trial was not included in his direct
appeal of his judgment of sentence. (See Commonwealth v. Mohoski,
1016 MDA 2011, unpublished memorandum at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 23,
2012) (identifying two issues on appeal: sufficiency of evidence and
limitation on cross-examination of victim)). Accordingly, the first issue is
waived. See Fears, supra at 803-04; 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and
9544.
Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.
The PCRA court found that:
On October 14, 2009 Appellant indicated to the [trial]
court that, despite his frustrations with the process and with not
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receiving discovery, he was ready to proceed to trial. The issue
of inadequate preparation time does not appear to have been
properly preserved by way of objection at the time of trial, and
moreover it was not raised on direct appeal. . . . Appellant failed
to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the case proceeding to
trial on [October] 19, 2009 . . . .
(PCRA Ct. Op., at 6; see also N.T. Hearing, 10/14/09, at 2-19). Upon
review, we agree and conclude that the record supports the court’s
determination that “Appellant failed to raise a colorable claim [for PCRA]
relief . . . .” (PCRA Ct. Op., at 6). Accordingly, we would find no abuse of
discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of this claim even were it not
waived.
In the second issue, Appellant claims that “the trial court err[ed] in
permitting highly prejudicial inferences [of his criminal record] by
Commonwealth witness[, Police Officer Christopher Cortazzo,] in front of the
jury without giving [a] cautionary [or] curative instruction[.]” (Appellant’s
Brief, at 24) (most capitalization omitted). This issue is waived.
The record reflects that Appellant’s assertion that the trial court
permitted Officer Cortazzo to testify about Appellant’s prior criminal record
without giving a cautionary or curative jury instruction was not included in
his direct appeal of his judgment of sentence. (See Mohoski, supra at *5).
Accordingly, the second issue is waived. See Fears, supra at 803-04; 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and 9544.
Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.
The PCRA court found that:
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. . . The issue[] of . . . improper witness statements . . .
was [not] raised in his [direct] appeal (and [is] therefore
waived) and . . . [was] not properly raised in his PCRA [p]etition.
. . . [T]he proper issue in the PCRA would have been whether
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
complained-of behavior[]. Because Appellant represented
himself at the trial, he is barred from asserting his own
ineffectiveness. . . . Appellant failed to establish that he was
prejudiced . . . by any inferences from witness statements.
(PCRA Ct. Op., at 7) (footnote omitted). Upon review, we agree and
conclude that the record supports the court’s determination that Appellant’s
claim of improper witness statements is not properly the subject of a PCRA
petition. Accordingly, we would find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA
court’s dismissal of this claim even were it not waived.
In the third issue, Appellant claims “prosecutorial misconduct,”
(Appellant’s Brief, at 25), for “permitting false testimony, mis-stating [sic]
facts not supported by the record, and overreaching at trial . . . .” (Id. at
26). This issue is waived.
The record reflects that Appellant’s assertion of prosecutorial
misconduct was not included in his direct appeal of his judgment of
sentence. (See Mohoski, supra at *5). Accordingly, the third issue is
waived. See Fears, supra at 803-04; 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and
9544.
Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.
The PCRA court found that:
. . . The issue[] of prosecutorial misconduct . . . was [not]
raised in his [direct] appeal (and [is] therefore waived) and . . .
[was] not properly raised in his PCRA [p]etition. . . . [T]he
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proper issue in the PCRA would have been whether trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to the complained-of
behavior[]. Because Appellant represented himself at the trial,
he is barred from asserting his own ineffectiveness. . . .
Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by any of the
alleged prosecutorial misconduct . . . .
(PCRA Ct. Op., at 7 (footnote omitted); see also Rule 907 Notice, 11/05/14,
at 7-8 (finding no prosecutorial misconduct)). Upon review, we agree and
conclude that the record supports the court’s determination that Appellant’s
claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not properly the subject of a PCRA
petition. Accordingly, we would find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA
court’s dismissal of this claim even were it not waived.
In the fourth issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in not
appointing counsel for the instant appeal “and, as a result, [he] is forced to
proceed pro se or waive his appellate rights.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 1). This
issue lacks merit.
It is well-settled that:
[W]hen counsel has been appointed to represent a
petitioner in post-conviction proceedings as a matter of right
under the rules of criminal procedure and when that right has
been fully vindicated by counsel being permitted to withdraw
under the procedure authorized in Turner, new counsel shall not
be appointed and the petitioner, or appellant, must thereafter
look to his or her own resources for whatever further
proceedings there might be.
Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Maple,
559 A.2d 953, 956 (Pa. Super. 1989)).
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Here, the record reflects that the PCRA court appointed counsel to
assist Appellant with his first pro se PCRA petition on February 16, 2012. On
August 30, 2013, PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw as counsel with a
supporting Turner/Finley no merit letter. The PCRA court granted
counsel’s petition to withdraw on October 24, 2014. Accordingly, because
Appellant is not entitled to appointed counsel for the instant appeal, we
conclude that the PCRA court properly denied Appellant’s request for
representation. See Rykard, supra at 1183. This issue lacks merit.
In the fifth issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in
dismissing his petition without a hearing because the other eight issues have
merit. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 2-8). We disagree.
The record reflects that the PCRA court certified that it reviewed the
record and agreed with counsel’s no-merit letter. (See Rule 907 Notice,
11/05/14, at 1, 3; PCRA Ct. Op., at 5). Furthermore, the court issued its
own substantive opinion on each issue. (See Rule 907 Notice, 11/05/14, at
1-8; PCRA Ct. Op., at 4-7). Accordingly, on our independent review of the
record, we conclude that there is no support for the claims and the PCRA
court properly determined that Appellant is not entitled to a hearing. See
Miller, supra at 992. This issue lacks merit.
Appellant claims in the remaining four issues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Appellant’s Brief at 8-22, 29-31).
We disagree.
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It is well-settled that “[a] criminal defendant has the right to effective
counsel . . . .” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 369 (Pa. Super.
2006) (citation omitted). Counsel is presumed effective, and an appellant
bears the burden to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57
A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 2012). A PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Pennsylvania
has further refined the Strickland test into a three-prong inquiry. An
appellant must demonstrate that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable
merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or
inaction; and (3) the appellant suffered actual prejudice as a result. See
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). A failure to
satisfy any prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test will require
rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311
(Pa. 2014).
In the sixth issue, Appellant claims that:
. . . [P]re-trial and standby counsel William Bispels [was]
ineffective in failing to adequately meet and consult with [him], .
. . explore potential trial witnesses, . . . contact witnesses whose
testimony would have been exculpatory, . . . request that the
Commonwealth produce any evidece [sic] of record that
Appellant had waived his Rule 600 rights[,] . . . and . . . act as
advocate and advise Appellant . . . during trial[.]
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(Appellant’s Brief, at 19) (most capitalization omitted).6 We disagree.
“A criminal defendant who knowingly and intelligently waives his right
to counsel so that he may represent himself at trial may not later rely upon
his own lack of legal expertise as a ground for a new trial.”
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 736 (Pa. 2004) (citations
omitted). Further, “[t]he law prohibits a defendant who chooses to
represent himself from alleging his own ineffectiveness. The fact that
standby counsel was appointed to assist Appellant does not alter this
conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 773 (Pa. 2009)
(citations omitted).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant “went through a series of
lawyers, but ultimately represented himself at trial[,]” (Rule 907 Notice,
11/05/14, at 2). On May 13, 2009, the trial court appointed Attorney
Bispels as conflict counsel. On July 10, 2009, Appellant waived his right to
counsel. (See Waiver of Counsel, 7/13/09, at 1-2; Order, 7/14/09, at 1).
Thereafter, Appellant proceeded to represent himself at trial and sentencing
with Attorney Bispels as standby counsel. (See Appellant’s Brief, at ix, xi-
xii, 2, 21; PCRA Ct. Op., at 2, 6; N.T. Trial, 10/19/09, at 1; N.T. Sentencing
Hearing, 10/22/09, at 1). We note, Appellant acknowledges that “he is well
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6
We note that Appellant has abandoned his claim of Attorney Bispels’
ineffectiveness for “failing to file any pre-trial motions[.]” (Appellant’s Brief,
at vii; see id. at 19-22).
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aware that he cannot raise claims of his own ineffectiveness[.]” (Appellant’s
Brief, at 11; see id. at 16).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that:
Because appellant waived his right to counsel and asserted his
right to self-representation, which was honored after a colloquy,
he may not rely upon his own lack of expertise as a ground for
relief, and consequently, we will not consider any ineffectiveness
claims that arise from the period of self-representation.
Bryant, supra at 737 (citations omitted). Therefore, Appellant is not
entitled to relief for any issues that implicate his self-representation. See
id. at 739.
However, Attorney Bispels represented Appellant for two months as
conflicts counsel. Thus, Appellant’s assertion that Attorney Bispels was
ineffective for failing to request evidence of his Rule 600 waiver does not
implicate his self-representation and is reviewable. See id.
The record reflects that Attorney Bispels filed a Rule 600 motion on
July 7, 2009. (See Rule 600 Motion, 7/07/09). On July 10, 2009, Appellant
waived his Rule 600 “speedy trial rights[.]” (Order, 7/13/09, at 1).
Furthermore, Appellant acknowledges that a hearing was held on July 10,
2009 and he “waived his Rule 600 rights . . . .” (Appellant’s Brief, at 21).
Because the record confirms that Appellant acknowledges that he waived his
Rule 600 rights, Attorney Bispels could not be ineffective for failure to
request evidence of his Rule 600 waiver.
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Accordingly, Appellant has failed to meet the arguable merit prong of
the Pierce test and we find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s
dismissal of this claim. This issue lacks merit.
In the seventh issue, Appellant claims ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel, Jay M. Nigrini, in failing to raise all his requested issues on direct
appeal. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 29-31). Specifically, he asserts that
appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the following requested
issues: sufficiency of the evidence for aggravated assault, Rule 600 motion
denial, inadequate preparation time, prosecutorial misconduct, and the
cumulative effect of the issues. (See id. at 30). We disagree.
The record reflects that appellate counsel raised sufficiency of the
evidence in Appellant’s direct appeal. (See Commonwealth v. Mohoski,
1016 MDA 2011, unpublished memorandum at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 23,
2012) (finding sufficient evidence to sustain aggravated assault conviction)).
Therefore, this claim was previously litigated. In the instant appeal, we
have found no merit to Appellant’s claims of the Rule 600 motion denial,
inadequate preparation, and prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, his claim
of cumulative error fails. See Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398,
411 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding cumulative claim lacks merit where defective
individual assertions).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant has failed to meet
the arguable merit prong of the Pierce test and we find no abuse of
discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of this claim. This issue lacks merit.
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In the eighth issue, Appellant claims ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel
because he “fail[ed] to comply with the standards set forth under Finley[.]”
(Appellant’s Brief, at 8) (most capitalization omitted). Specifically, he
asserts that “PCRA counsel clearly failed to list and address each of the []
allegations [raised in the PCRA petition] in his ‘no merit’ letter . . . .” (Id.).
This issue is waived.
It is well-settled that:
If a Rule 1925(b) statement is too vague, the trial judge may
find waiver and disregard any argument. . . .
When a court has to guess what issues an
appellant is appealing, that is not enough for
meaningful review. When an appellant fails
adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues
sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is
impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is
pertinent to those issues. In other words, a
[c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the
court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the
functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at
all.
Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 919 A.2d 956 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement
asserts that “PCRA counsel [was] ineffective in failing to comply with the
standards set forth in Finley[.]” (Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/14/15, at 1 ¶
3) (most capitalization omitted).
The PCRA court properly found that “[w]ithout [] a more specific
assertion of error we are unable to meaningfully address this issue.” (PCRA
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Ct. Op., at 6); see also Reeves, supra at 2. Therefore, this issue is
waived.
Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.
The record reflects that PCRA counsel filed a proper Turner/Finley no
merit letter addressing each of Appellant’s claims on August 30, 2013. (See
No-Merit Letter, 8/30/13, at 3-22). Accordingly, there is no arguable merit
to Appellant’s ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim. Therefore, Appellant
has failed to meet the arguable merit prong of the Pierce test and we would
find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of this claim even
were it not waived.
In the final issue, Appellant claims ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel “in
failing to investigate and develop Appellant’s claims raised in his PCRA
petition[.]” (Appellant’s Brief, at 9) (most capitalization omitted).
Specifically, he asserts that “PCRA counsel fail[ed] to discern why the claims
lack merit.” (Id. at 10). This issue is waived.
The record reflects that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement asserts
that “PCRA counsel [was] ineffective in failing to investigate and develop the
claims raised in [his] PCRA petition[.]” (Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/14/15,
at 1 ¶ 4) (most capitalization omitted).
The PCRA court properly found that “[w]ithout [] a more specific
assertion of error we are unable to meaningfully address this issue.” (PCRA
Ct. Op., at 6); see also Reeves, supra at 2. Therefore, this issue is
waived.
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Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.
The record reflects that PCRA counsel filed a proper Turner/Finley no
merit letter addressing each of Appellant’s claims on August 30, 2013. (See
No-Merit Letter, 8/30/13, at 3-22). Accordingly, there is no arguable merit
to Appellant’s ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim. Therefore, Appellant
has failed to meet the arguable merit prong of the Pierce test and we would
find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of this issue even
were it not waived.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/10/2015
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