FIRST DIVISION
DOYLE, C. J.,
PHIPPS, P. J., and BOGGS, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/
July 8, 2015
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A15A0279. STATE v. ZILKE.
BOGGS, Judge.
The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Bajrodin Zilke’s motion
to suppress. Because the trial court erred in finding that Zilke was arrested without
authority, we reverse.
“[W]here the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the
credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to
undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Citation, punctuation and
footnote omitted.) Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga. App. 114 (706 SE2d 618) (2011). The
relevant facts are not in dispute here. The evidence shows that Decari Mason is a
POST-certified police officer employed at Kennesaw State University (“KSU”). At
approximately 1:42 a.m. on May 5, 2013, Mason was returning to KSU after
delivering an arrestee to the Cobb County Adult Detention Center. It was dark and
raining heavily at the time.
While traveling down Powder Springs Road in Cobb County, Mason observed
Zilke driving without activated headlights or taillights and “severely failing to
maintain lane.” Mason initiated a traffic stop and approached Zilke, who smelled of
alcohol, had bloodshot, watery eyes, was unsteady on his feet, and admitted to
consuming two beers. At Mason’s request, Zilke blew into an Alco-sensor, which
registered positive for alcohol. Concluding that Zilke was under the influence of
alcohol to the extent he was less safe to drive, Mason arrested him. Zilke submitted
to a state-administered chemical breath test on the Intoxilyzer 5000 at 3:16 a.m.
which revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.08.
Zilke was charged with two counts of driving under the influence, failing to
maintain lane, and operating a vehicle without headlights. He subsequently moved
to suppress evidence of the breath test, arguing that Mason lacked jurisdiction to
arrest him because, without dispute, the traffic stop did not occur on or near KSU
property. The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, the State argues that Mason was authorized to arrest Zilke based on
the traffic offenses committed in his presence. We agree.
2
Generally, a police officer has the power to arrest “only in the territory of the
governmental unit by which [the officer] was appointed.” (Punctuation omitted.)
Sullivan, supra, 308 Ga. App. at 115-116 (1). An exception arises, however, when the
officer witnesses a moving traffic violation. Id. Under OCGA § 17-4-23 (a), “[a] law
enforcement officer may arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance
governing the operation . . . of motor vehicles by the issuance of a citation, provided
the offense is committed in his presence.” As we have explained in cases not
involving campus police officers, this exception authorizes an arrest “regardless of
territorial limitations.” (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Gehris, 242 Ga. App. 384, 386
(528 SE2d 300) (2000). See also State v. Heredia, 252 Ga. App. 89, 90 (1) (555 SE2d
91) (2001) (Cobb County police officer authorized to arrest defendant for DUI and
failure to maintain lane within Kennesaw city limits).
Likewise, we have determined that a POST-certified campus police officer has
authority to arrest, outside of the territorial limits for campus officers, for traffic
violations committed in his presence on campus. Sullivan, supra, 308 Ga. App. at
115-116 (1). In so holding, we stated that POST-certified campus police officers fall
within the ambit of OCGA § 17-4-23. Id.
3
Here, we must determine for the first time whether OCGA § 17-4-23 also
authorizes a POST-certified campus police officer to arrest for a traffic offense
committed in his presence beyond the territorial limits prescribed for campus police
officers. In its suppression ruling, the trial court concluded that OCGA § 20-3-72
precludes a POST-certified campus police officer from making an arrest for offenses
committed more than 500 yards from campus. That Code section provides:
The campus policemen and other security personnel of the university
system who are regular employees of the system shall have the power to
make arrests for offenses committed upon any property under the
jurisdiction of the board of regents and for offenses committed upon any
public or private property within 500 yards of any property under the
jurisdiction of the board.
A basic rule of statutory construction requires that “statutes relating to the same
subject matter [be] construed together and harmonized wherever possible. [Cit.]”
Gibson v. Casto, 271 Ga. 667, 668 (523 SE2d 564) (1999). Based upon this principle,
we conclude that POST-certified campus police officers fall within the scope of
OCGA § 17-4-23 and may arrest for moving traffic offenses committed in their
presence more than 500 yards from campus. See Sullivan, supra, 308 Ga. App. at 116;
4
State v. Durr, 274 Ga. App. 438, 442 (2) (618 SE2d 117) (2005) (physical precedent
only).1 Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Zilke’s motion to suppress.
Judgment reversed. Doyle, C. J. and Phipps, P. J., concur in the judgment only.
1
Our decision in Hill v. State, 193 Ga. App. 280 (387 SE2d 582) (1989),
overruled in part, State v. Harber, 198 Ga. App. 170 (401 SE2d 57) (1990), does not
require a different result. In Hill, we addressed only whether campus police officers
have authority to obtain and execute search warrants more than 500 yards off campus.
In Harber, we overruled the portion of Hill concluding that campus police officers
lacked the authority to obtain an extra-territorial search warrant. We also noted that
“campus police officers are essentially no different from county and municipal police
officers whose authority to make an arrest may otherwise be subject to similar
territorial restrictions.” (Emphasis omitted.) 198 Ga. App. at 171 (1).
5