PS2-154 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3743
___________
JERMAINE GILKES,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A043-870-524)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 6, 2015
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 13, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se petitioner Jermaine Gilkes petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal. We will deny the petition.
I.
Gilkes is a native and citizen of Guyana who entered the United States in 1993,
when he was 11 years old. He has resided in the United States as a legal permanent
resident (“LPR”) since 1995. In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), stating that Gilkes was in the United States without
legal status and was inadmissible because he had been convicted of robbery. It appears
that Gilkes did not appear before an immigration judge (“IJ”) until January 2013, when
he was in DHS detention. Gilkes contested removability, and the IJ terminated the
proceedings without prejudice because the NTA had been improvidently issued due to the
error regarding Gilkes’ immigration status.
A second NTA was issued on January 25, 2013. The new NTA acknowledged
Gilkes’ status as an LPR, but charged him as removable for being convicted of an
aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and a firearms offense, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(C). These charges were based on Gilkes’ alleged 2007 convictions in New
Jersey state court for robbery and conspiracy (NTA Factual Allegation 5), his alleged 10-
year sentence of imprisonment (NTA Factual Allegation 6), and his conviction for
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (NTA Factual Allegation 7). The IJ
denied Gilkes’ motion to terminate the proceedings based on the doctrines of res judicata
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and collateral estoppel.
During a May 2013 hearing, Gilkes denied Factual Allegations 5 and 6, but he
seemed to admit Factual Allegation 7. The IJ declined to sustain the charges of
removability based on Factual Allegations 5 and 6 because DHS did not authenticate the
record of conviction or the indictment as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41. Then, after
some dispute, the IJ determined that Gilkes did not intend to admit Factual Allegation 7
and allowed him to re-plead. In October 2013, Gilkes stated that he would neither admit
nor deny Factual Allegation 7, so the IJ denied it on his behalf.
To establish Factual Allegation 7, DHS again submitted the record of conviction
and the indictment, along with a declaration from an Enforcement Removal Assistant
(“ERA”). The IJ rejected Gilkes’ objections based on res judicata and collateral estoppel
to the admission of these documents. The IJ also rejected Gilkes’ objection concerning
the documents’ authentication, determining that the ERA’s declaration set forth the chain
of custody by which DHS obtained the documents, which laid an adequate foundation for
their admission. The IJ then determined that Gilkes had pleaded guilty to possession of a
weapon (a handgun) for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4a,
and had been sentenced to 10 years in prison for this offense. However, the IJ declined to
sustain the charge of removability under § 1227(a)(2)(C), concluding that § 2C:39-4a’s
definition of “handgun” is “much broader” than the definition of “firearm” used for
immigration purposes. (IJ Op. 10.)
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The Government immediately submitted a Form I-261, which contained an
additional charge of removability based on Gilkes’ conviction under N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:39-4a. The Form I-261 charged Gilkes as removable for having been convicted of an
aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Under that section, a
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony if it is a “crime of violence” as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 16, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. After rejecting
Gilkes’ objection to the lodging of the new charge, the IJ determined that this conviction
did constitute a “crime of violence” under § 16. Accordingly, and because Gilkes’ term
of imprisonment for that conviction exceeded one year, the IJ determined that Gilkes was
removable on this charge. Because the IJ also determined that the crime was
“particularly serious,” Gilkes was rendered ineligible for all relief except for deferral of
removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
Gilkes’ application for CAT relief asserted that he was likely to be tortured or
killed in Guyana because he believed that the government of Guyana had authorized a
vigilante group to crack down on crime. Gilkes introduced evidence that in 2004 his
cousin was executed by the vigilante death squad for being an informant. Another of
Gilkes’ cousins, who had been a police officer in Guyana, immigrated to the United
States in 2005 because he refused to be part of the death squad. Gilkes believes that he
will be killed by the death squad if he returns to Guyana. He also believes that he will be
targeted as a criminal deportee and that, upon arrival, he will be indefinitely detained and
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tortured. Gilkes’ mother, testifying on his behalf, said that although Gilkes’ cousin’s
killers have not been caught, she does not believe that the death squad still exists. She
does believe, however, that criminal deportees are blamed for the increase in crime in
Guyana, and that if no one picks up Gilkes from the airport, he will be detained.
The IJ denied Gilkes’ application for CAT relief, determining that he had not
established that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured. The IJ noted that,
although conditions are poor and criminal deportees often have a difficult time
readjusting to life in Guyana, there was no evidence that criminal deportees were tortured
or routinely detained. Additionally, even assuming that Gilkes’ cousin had been
murdered by the vigilante group, it was not relevant to Gilkes’ claim, as he had testified
that the murder occurred because his cousin was an informant, not a criminal deportee.
The evidence also suggested that the vigilante group no longer existed, and even if it did,
the group targeted only gang members.
On August 7, 2014, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, specifically
addressing the many arguments that Gilkes had raised on appeal, most of which involved
procedural matters. The BIA rejected Gilkes’ arguments that collateral estoppel and res
judicata prevented DHS from issuing a second NTA or from adding a new charge of
removability. The BIA then agreed that the IJ had properly determined that the records
of Gilkes’ conviction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4a were properly authenticated
within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41. The BIA also agreed that Gilkes’ conviction
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constituted a crime of violence and was thus an aggravated felony. The BIA rejected
Gilkes’ remaining arguments, and affirmed the IJ’s determination that Gilkes did not
establish his eligibility for protection under the CAT.
Gilkes has now filed a petition for review, which the Government opposes and
seeks to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
A. Jurisdiction
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1252. The Government correctly contends that, with the exception of constitutional
claims and questions of law, we lack jurisdiction over Gilkes’ petition for review because
he was found to be removable as an aggravated felon. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).
However, the Government incorrectly contends that Gilkes has not raised any questions
of law or constitutional issues.
Gilkes challenges, among other things, the determination that his conviction
constitutes an aggravated felony, as well as the application of res judicata and collateral
estoppel to his case. These issues are questions of law over which the Court has
jurisdiction. See Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010) (aggravated
felony); Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir.
2006) (res judicata); Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
6
(collateral estoppel).1 Accordingly, the Government’s motion to dismiss is denied.
B. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Many of Gilkes’ claims concern the BIA’s rejection of his arguments as to the
applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata, or claim preclusion,
applies where the party invoking it establishes: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a
prior suit involving (2) the same parties . . . and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same
cause of action.” Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation
marks omitted). Res judicata “bars not only claims that were brought . . . , but also
claims that could have been brought.” Id. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
applies where “(1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was
actually litigated; (3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision; and (4)
the party being precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented in the prior
action.” Cospito, 539 F.3d at 171 (quotation marks omitted). Although Gilkes correctly
states that those doctrines do apply to agency decisions, see Mayorga v. Att’y Gen., 757
F.3d 126, 131 n.10 (3d Cir. 2014), they do not apply in his case.
Gilkes asserts that res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded DHS from issuing
the second NTA. The first NTA was dismissed without prejudice by the IJ after it was
determined to be “improvidently issued” because it incorrectly identified Gilkes as being
1
A constitutional or legal claim must be “colorable” to trigger this Court’s jurisdiction.
See Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010). Although Gilkes’ claims
ultimately lack sufficient merit, they meet this threshold.
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in the United States without legal status. See 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) (providing for
dismissal of NTA as improvidently issued, and stating that such a dismissal is without
prejudice to the alien or DHS). Dismissal of the first NTA without prejudice did not
constitute a “final adjudication on the merits” as required to trigger res judicata. Cf.
Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 759-61 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that newly filed
claims were not barred by res judicata where the dismissal of the previous action without
prejudice was not “inadvertent”); see also Aguilar-Aguilar v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 1238,
1243 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the IJ’s grant of DHS’s motion to terminate
removal proceedings did not constitute a final order of removal). Further, collateral
estoppel did not preclude the issuance of the second NTA, as the only issue that was
decided in the first proceeding was whether Gilkes was in the United States without legal
status.
Gilkes also asserts that res judicata and collateral estoppel prohibited DHS from
using his judgment of conviction and the indictment to prove his conviction under N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4a (Factual Allegation 7) because that evidence had already been
presented in an attempt to prove Factual Allegations 5 and 6. The IJ correctly explained
that the argument was meritless because she “did not re-adjudicate an issue it had already
decided but rather adjudicated the new issue of whether DHS could meet its burden to
prove the truthfulness of factual allegation 7 based on the new evidence at Exhibit 5.”
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(IJ Op. 8.)2
Gilkes’ argument that res judicata prohibited DHS from lodging an additional
charge of removability in the Form I-261 also fails. The regulations permit DHS to lodge
additional charges at any time during the removal proceedings, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e),
as “there is no requirement that the DHS advance every conceivable basis for
removability in the [NTA].” Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 73 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks omitted).
C. Aggravated Felony
Gilkes asserts that his conviction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4a is not an
aggravated felony because it is not a crime of violence. The BIA determined that, under
18 U.S.C. § 16(b), a “crime of violence” is an offense that “by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense.” (BIA Op. 5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).) It also
explained that, to sustain a conviction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4a,
the defendant must possess a firearm and intend to use it
unlawfully against the person or property of another. As
such, [Gilkes’] conviction necessarily involved an intent to
use the firearm in his possession. We conclude that in the
ordinary course of committing the offense, there is a
substantial risk that violent physical force will be used, where
an individual intends to use a firearm in his possession for an
2
Gilkes also asserts that the judgment of conviction and the indictment were not properly
authenticated the second time they were submitted by DHS. However, for the reasons
explained by the IJ and BIA, this claim lacks merit. (See IJ Op. 7-9; BIA Op. 3-4.)
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unlawful purpose.
(Id. (citation omitted).)
The statute under which Gilkes was convicted provides that “[a]ny person who has
in his possession any firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or
property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-
4a. It clearly does not cover non-intentional conduct, see State v. Villar, 696 A.2d 674,
677 (N.J. 1997), and the BIA properly concluded that, “where an individual intends to
use a firearm in his possession for an unlawful purpose,” “there is a substantial risk that
violent physical force will be used.” (BIA Op. 5.) See Henry v. Bureau of Immig. &
Customs Enforcement, 493 F.3d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the New York
crime of possessing a weapon “with intent to use the same unlawfully against another”
constitutes a § 16(b) “crime of violence” because it involves “a substantial risk that the
actor will intentionally use physical force in committing his crime”). Accordingly, the
BIA did not err by determining that Gilkes’ conviction constituted an aggravated felony.
D. Due Process
Gilkes claims that his proceedings violated due process for several reasons. To
succeed on his claims, Gilkes must show “(1) that he was prevented from reasonably
presenting his case and (2) that substantial prejudice resulted.” Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488
F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, due process
guarantees “factfinding based on a record produced before the decisionmaker and
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disclosed to [the alien],” the right to “make arguments on [the alien’s] own behalf,” and
the “right to an individualized determination of [the alien’s] interests.” Kamara v. Att’y
Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
The IJ provided Gilkes every opportunity to litigate his claims and objections,
granting several of his motions. And despite Gilkes’ arguments, there is nothing in the
record that reflects bias or improper conduct so as to support the conclusion that the IJ
abandoned her role as a neutral fact-finder. See Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267-
70 (3d Cir. 2005). Further, that Gilkes disagreed with the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions does
not equate to a due process violation.
Neither does Gilkes succeed on his argument that that the BIA’s review violated
his due process rights. The BIA engaged in an in-depth analysis of Gilkes’ arguments. It
applied the proper standards of review and repeatedly cited to specific evidence and the
IJ’s analysis. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (setting forth BIA’s standards of review);
Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549-50 (3d Cir. 2001) (setting forth due process
requirements).
E. Application for CAT Relief
Finally, Gilkes asserts that the IJ erred by determining that his evidence was
insufficient to establish his claim for CAT relief. As noted above, because Gilkes was
found to be removable as an aggravated felon, we review only constitutional claims and
questions of law, including “issues of application of law to fact, where the facts are
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undisputed and not the subject of challenge.” Kamara, 420 F.3d at 211 (quotation marks
omitted). Here, while Gilkes alleges that the IJ failed to properly consider the evidence
he submitted, most of his arguments challenge the determination that he is not likely to be
tortured upon his return to Guyana—a factual finding over which we lack jurisdiction, as
it does not implicate the legal issue of whether the potential mistreatment rises to the
level of torture. See Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 603 F.3d 260, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2010).
However, to the extent that Gilkes does present a legal question, the IJ and BIA did not
err in denying his application for relief, as there is no indication that the BIA or IJ
improperly applied the law to the facts in the record. See Kamara, 420 F.3d at 211.
We therefore deny the petition for review.
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