This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-2156
Peter Loren Martel, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed July 13, 2015
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-13-83
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, Connor Chapman (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Annie P. Claesson-Huseby, Beltrami County Attorney, Katherine D. Galler, Assistant
County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.*
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s award of restitution for medical expenses
incurred by the victim of his indecent exposure, arguing that the expenses were not
medically necessary and not directly caused by appellant’s crime. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2013, appellant Peter Martell exposed his partially-erect penis to A.V.,
a high school acquaintance of appellant’s, at A.V.’s workplace. Appellant was charged
with and convicted of misdemeanor indecent exposure, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 617.23, subd. 1(1) (2012).
After the incident, A.V. had problems that seemed to result from appellant’s
crime, including anxiety and diarrhea. Her doctor ordered a colonoscopy to determine if
A.V.’s diarrhea had an organic cause. The colonoscopy was “unremarkable,” suggesting
that A.V.’s symptoms were in fact caused by the anxiety she had about appellant’s crime.
Before the sentencing hearing, A.V. submitted documents supporting her request for
$2,353.84 in restitution arising from the colonoscopy procedure.
At sentencing, a victim’s advocate read A.V.’s victim impact statement. A.V.
stated that she “used to feel comfortable at [her] workplace, but not anymore” and that
she did “not feel comfortable around male customers at work.” Additionally, A.V. “spent
a lot of time wondering if I am the first victim of this man, or one of many.” A.V. had
“taken time off work to go to the doctor multiple times . . . been tested and diagnosed
with anxiety . . . [and] incurred medical expenses.” She requested restitution for her
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medical expenses. The district court sentenced appellant, including a restitution
obligation, and set a separate hearing for arguments concerning the amount of restitution.
Before the restitution hearing, appellant filed an affidavit challenging the propriety
of a restitution award for the colonoscopy expenses. He argued that there was “no basis
or support” for the restitution, that the request does not “specify any reason justifying
certain amounts of restitution claimed,” and that “the request for restitution does not
adequately identify how, what, when, or why the restitution request is made for the
amount requested.”
At the restitution hearing, the state rested on the restitution certificate form and
accompanying exhibits, which included a letter from appellant’s doctor to the district
court. The doctor’s letter stated:
[A.V.] is a patient of mine. She was significantly traumatized
by an event of indecent exposure. Shortly after that, she
developed some significant diarrhea. It would seem to be
exacerbated anytime there is some involvement with this
court case. She ended up needing a colonoscopy which
fortunately was found to be unremarkable, therefore, even
more so contributing to the fact that the stress and anxiety of
the assailant [sic] had caused had caused [sic] her symptoms.
Appellant’s counsel offered no additional affidavits, exhibits, testimony or evidence. The
district court ordered restitution in the full amount requested by A.V., stating that there
could “be no argument that her diarrhea was a physical manifestation of the distress she
suffered as a result of that assault.” The district court stated that “A.V.’s diarrhea was a
direct result of [appellant’s] actions” and “A.V.’s decision to follow her doctor’s
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recommendation for a colonoscopy was reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances.”
Appellant subsequently moved the district court to modify his sentence. Appellant
sought to introduce information related to diarrhea and colonoscopies as part of this
motion. The district court construed the motion as one for postconviction relief, denied
the motion, and affirmed its earlier restitution award. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant raises two arguments to support his position that the restitution order
should be reversed and vacated. He first argues that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that appellant’s colonoscopy, ordered due to her diarrhea symptoms, was a direct
result of the offense he committed. He also argues that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that the colonoscopy was necessary and compensable.
Crime victims have a “right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a
criminal charge.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). They “are entitled to
restitution for losses they incur from the crime.” State v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474, 477
(Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2014).
District courts have significant discretion in awarding restitution. State v.
Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1999). We review the district court’s restitution
determination for an abuse of its discretion. Id. at 672. However, whether an item is
compensable under the restitution statute is a legal question we review de novo. State v.
Ramsay, 789 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn. App. 2010).
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The district court record “must provide a factual basis for [a restitution] award.”
State v. Keehn, 554 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17,
1996). The state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the amount of loss
sustained by a victim [is] a result of the offense” and a particular expense’s
“appropriateness.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2012). In challenging a
restitution award, a convicted defendant has a burden of production that “must include a
detailed sworn affidavit of the offender setting forth all challenges to the restitution or
items of restitution, and specifying all reasons justifying dollar amounts of restitution
which differ from the amounts requested by the victim or victims.” Id.
The restitution statute’s “broad language gives the [district] court significant
discretion to award restitution for a victim’s expenses,” Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 671,
and provides that an award includes, “but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses
resulting from the crime,” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). Restitution can be awarded
“only for losses the defendant directly caused by the conduct that led to his conviction.”
Miller, 842 N.W.2d at 477 (quotation omitted). Restitution requests “must describe the
items or elements of loss, itemize the total dollar amounts of restitution claimed, and
specify the reasons justifying these amounts.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). The
primary purpose of restitution is “to compensate the crime victim for losses by restoring
the victim’s original financial condition.” State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn.
App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2011).
Here, the state was required to prove that A.V.’s colonoscopy was more likely
than not caused by appellant’s behavior and was required to prove the amount of the
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restitution. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (stating losses include “medical and
therapy costs”); Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (stating “the proper amount or type of
restitution must be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence”); State v.
Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1984) (stating loss to a sexual assault victim “would
include the cost of necessary treatment and related expenses”).
Appellant mischaracterizes the holding in Fader, as supporting the proposition
that “[m]edical treatment and related expenses can be claimed under restitution only
when necessary.” In Fader, the supreme court observed that victims of sexual assault
may have losses “difficult to quantify” and followed this observation by stating “[i]t
would include the cost of necessary treatment and related expenses, but beyond that, one
gets into the realm of speculation.” 358 N.W.2d at 48. Fader does not stand for the
proposition that only necessary treatment and expenses are compensable under the statute
for any victim. Minnesota courts have permitted restitution for damages suffered by
victims in a wide variety of situations, including awards for expenses beyond strictly
necessary medical expenses. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2015 WL
2185004, at *5 (Minn. App. May 11, 2015) (stating that because the victim suffered
psychological trauma as a result of the offense, and moving expenses were directly linked
to that trauma, it was within the district court’s discretion to award restitution for those
expenses); Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 672 (affirming restitution awarded for a Hmong Hu
Plig healing ceremony); State v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995) (concluding
that expenses relating to counter-abduction operation was compensable as restitution);
Keehn, 554 N.W.2d at 408-09 (affirming award to Department of Human Services, as an
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insurer, for expenses incurred when providing the victim’s child with psychological
services and counseling).
The district court concluded that the letter from A.V.’s doctor demonstrates that
“A.V.’s diarrhea was a direct result of [appellant’s] actions” and “A.V.’s decision to
follow her doctor’s recommendation for a colonoscopy was reasonable and appropriate
under the circumstances.” Appellant offered no evidence to support his arguments.1
There is ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s restitution
award. The record supports a conclusion that appellant’s conduct was more likely than
not the direct cause for A.V.’s symptoms, which in turn necessitated a diagnostic
procedure to determine the source of her symptoms and her treatment.
Appellant correctly notes that the doctor’s letter does not explicitly state that
A.V.’s symptoms were directly caused by appellant’s conduct. But a common-sense
reading of that letter makes evident that the “unremarkable” results of the colonoscopy
support the conclusion that A.V.’s diarrhea symptoms were more likely than not caused
by appellant’s crime. The procedure ruled out organic causes for A.V.’s symptoms. The
district court was well within its broad discretion in drawing the reasonable inference that
the cause of the colonoscopy expense was appellant’s crime (and not some other medical
condition that would have been discovered by the colonoscopy). Because the
colonoscopy was reasonably required to determine the cause of A.V.’s symptoms and the
1
In the postconviction order denying vacation of the restitution award, the district court
observed that information appellant submitted with his postconviction petition constituted
an improper attempt to supplement the record with additional information that was not in
the record at the time of sentencing.
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potential treatment, and because crime victims are entitled to restitution for costs they
incurred because of a crime, Miller, 842 N.W.2d at 477, the district court did not err in
concluding that the costs of A.V.’s colonoscopy were appropriately included as
restitution in appellant’s sentence. See also State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662 (Minn
2007) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution to
a murder victim’s adult children for their personal expenses resulting from the murder,
including expenses for their voluntary attendance at the trial).
Appellant also argues that the colonoscopy is “too attenuated” to be a direct result
of appellant’s criminal conduct, and that it is not the sort of procedure or expense
typically resulting from indecent exposure. The colonoscopy procedure was intended to
rule out other possible causes of A.V.’s symptoms. A.V.’s doctor stated that her
symptoms started after appellant’s crime and were exacerbated whenever there was
“some involvement with this court case.” The restitution statute explicitly provides that
medical expenses are properly compensable costs for crime victims, stating that
“restitution may include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses resulting from the
crime, including medical . . . costs.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that the cost of the colonoscopy was $2,353.84. While a colonoscopy
may not be a medical test typically required for victims in indecent exposure cases, the
particular facts before us are that A.V. was “significantly traumatized” by the incident
and she suffered from “significant diarrhea.” Her doctor also stated that she “ended up
needing a colonoscopy” to rule out other causes of the diarrhea. The particular facts of
this case establish a link between the crime and A.V.’s medical procedure and resulting
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expenses. Moreover, the goal of restitution is to restore the victim to her “original
financial condition” had the incident not occurred. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d at 852. The
district court’s restitution award served that purpose.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
restitution for the costs of A.V.’s colonoscopy. Because A.V. suffered trauma resulting
in “significant diarrhea” as a result of appellant’s criminal conduct, and the cost of this
procedure was directly linked to ruling out other diseases as the source of A.V.’s
symptoms, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in awarding
restitution of $2,353.84.
Affirmed.
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Peter Loren Martel v. State of Minnesota
Combined Opinion