NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-3115
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
EARL J. CRAYTON,
Appellant
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On Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cr-00138-001)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 28, 2015
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 14, 2015)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Earl J. Crayton appeals his final judgment of sentence, arguing that the District
Court committed procedural error by failing to meaningfully consider arguments he made
in favor of a reduced sentence. We will affirm.
I.
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary
to our analysis.
On September 23, 2013, Crayton pled guilty to a charge of possession of material
depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
Before sentencing, the Probation Office issued a Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”), which calculated Crayton’s total offense level as 28 with a criminal history
category I, yielding an advisory Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment.
Rather than objecting to the Probation Office’s Guidelines calculation, Crayton instead
argued for a downward variance for several policy-based reasons. Of most relevance to
this appeal, Crayton challenged the application of three enhancements to his Guidelines
calculations: (1) a two-level enhancement for use of a computer under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2(b)(6), (2) a five-level enhancement because the offense involved 600 or more
images under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D), and (3) a four-level enhancement because the
offense involved materials that portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct or other
2
depictions of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). Crayton argued that these
enhancements either applied in every child pornography case and resulted in double
counting or otherwise lacked empirical support because they did not reasonably
approximate the seriousness of the offense.
Crayton also sought a non-incarceration sentence by referencing instances where
courts in the Western District of Pennsylvania and across the country had imposed non-
incarceration sentences or otherwise varied substantially downward in child pornography
cases. Given these other cases, Crayton contended that a downward variance was
necessary to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
At sentencing, the District Court rejected all but one of Crayton’s arguments. The
District Court agreed with Crayton that the two-level computer enhancement was
unreasonable because it applied in almost every child pornography case. Without the
two-level computer enhancement, the District Court noted that Crayton’s Guidelines
range would be 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment. The District Court then sentenced
Crayton to 78 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised release. Crayton filed
this timely appeal.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review a sentence’s procedural and
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substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion.1 In reviewing a sentence’s procedural
reasonableness, we ensure that the district court (1) correctly calculated the defendant’s
Guidelines range, (2) considered and ruled on motions for departure under the
Guidelines, and (3) exercised its discretion by meaningfully considering the sentencing
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), regardless of whether the court actually varies
from the Guidelines sentence.2 The third step requires district courts to “acknowledge and
respond to any properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit
and a factual basis.”3 If a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then review it for
substantive reasonableness, reversing “only where no reasonable sentencing court would
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district
court provided.”4
III.
Crayton argues on appeal that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because
the District Court failed to meaningfully consider both his argument for a variance to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities in child pornography cases and his policy
arguments against application of the aforementioned sentencing enhancements. As
explained below, Crayton’s arguments are unpersuasive.
1
United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 335 (3d Cir. 2014).
2
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).
3
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
4
Freeman, 763 F.3d at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4
A.
Crayton first contends that the District Court failed to meaningfully consider his
argument that a significant downward variance was necessary in this case to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities. In his sentencing memorandum, Crayton cited a
series of cases from the Western District of Pennsylvania and across the country where
district courts imposed non-incarceration sentences or otherwise varied significantly
downward in child pornography possession cases. According to Crayton, the District
Court failed to consider this argument because its only express reference to disparities
related to a different argument about Crayton’s need to care for his infirm parents.
This argument is belied by the record. At a general level, the District Court
recognized Crayton’s policy-based arguments, which included his argument that the
Guidelines were unduly harsh in child pornography possession cases, but concluded they
were “generally unpersuasive.”5 The District Court also specifically addressed the
substance of Crayton’s sentencing-disparities argument, stating:
[E]ven if I were to disregard the [G]uideline[s] range for this offense, as some
courts have done, I believe the 78-month sentence imposed here is sufficient but
not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of [§] 3553 and that this
sentence accounts for all the information contained in the record and reflects the
very serious nature of Defendant’s conduct and the needs for just punishment,
public protection, deterrence, and rehabilitation.6
5
App. 189.
6
App. 190 (emphasis added).
5
In other words, the District Court acknowledged Crayton’s argument for disregarding the
Guidelines range entirely and imposing a non-incarceration or significantly reduced
sentence and noted that other courts in other cases have followed this approach. The
District Court simply rejected the argument based on the facts of Crayton’s case and its
assessment of the other § 3553(a) factors.
Additionally, by correctly calculating and reviewing the Guidelines range, the
District Court “necessarily gave significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities.”7 Although the District Court might have said more, its
conclusion that a within-Guidelines sentence was appropriate here despite examples of
below-Guidelines sentences in other cases was legally sufficient.8
Finally, Crayton provided minimal information about the other cases he relied on
in making his disparities argument. He merely included the defendants’ convictions of
child pornography crimes, their Guidelines ranges, and their sentences. In so doing,
Crayton did not provide enough information to allow the District Court to conclude that
these other defendants’ offenses and histories were sufficiently similar to Crayton’s
offense and history to warrant a downward variance under § 3553(a)(6). For example,
none of the cases Crayton cited appear to involve a defendant like himself who either
accessed and produced child pornography or engaged in conduct “so dangerously close to
7
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007).
8
See United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A] reviewing
court’s concern about unwarranted disparities is at a minimum when a sentence is within
the Guidelines range.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the line” while on bond,9 but still received a below-Guidelines sentence. It is therefore
unsurprising that the District Court’s discussion of this argument was brief.
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court meaningfully considered
Crayton’s sentencing disparity argument and did not abuse its discretion by rejecting it.
B.
Crayton next argues that the District Court imposed a procedurally unreasonable
sentence because it failed to meaningfully consider his policy-based attacks on the five-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) for an offense involving over 600
images and the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) for an offense
involving materials portraying sadistic, masochistic, or violent conduct.
Crayton’s argument misses the mark again. There is no doubt the District Court
recognized its authority to vary downward based on a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines—the Court rejected the two-level computer enhancement for this reason. For
the other enhancements, however, the District Court found Crayton’s policy-based
attacks “generally unpersuasive” and, because there was no factual dispute regarding
whether the enhancement applied, incorporated the enhancements into the Guidelines
calculation. Nothing more was required of the District Court to justify its decision to
adhere to the policy decisions underlying the enhancements that are incorporated into the
Guidelines. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion on this ground.
9
App. 186.
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IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
sentence.
8