REVISED AUGUST 1, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-30378
DAVID DREW CLIFFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
RON GIBBS, Etc., Et Al.,
Defendants,
JACK STRAIN, in his official and private capacity;
GREG LONGINO, Captain, Assistant Warden, Director of
Inmate Affairs; JEFFREY MAYO, Deputy; HILERY MAYO, Deputy,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
July 10, 2002
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
In April 1998, David Drew Clifford, a federal prisoner, filed
a § 1983 action against three federal marshals and against Saint
Tammany Parish officials alleging, among other things, that the
defendants failed to protect him from another prisoner, James
Brown, during his pre-trial confinement at Saint Tammany Parish
Jail in early 1998.1 Clifford sought declaratory relief and
compensatory and punitive damages. He alleged in his complaint
that he had not filed an administrative grievance because no relief
could be provided. The district court dismissed Clifford’s
complaint as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
On December 10, 1999, this Court granted Clifford’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, and vacated and remanded for
“further factual development” on Clifford’s failure-to-protect
claim insofar as it related to the state defendants. We affirmed
the dismissal of his other claims.
On remand, the district court appointed Clifford an attorney,
who moved to amend his complaint. The amended complaint restated
the failure-to-protect claim and added a negligence claim. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over several supervisory defendants,
that there was insufficient process and service of process, and
that Clifford had failed to exhaust administrative remedies
1
Clifford was transferred from Saint Tammany Parish Jail to
a federal prison in June 1998.
2
available to him at Saint Tammany Parish Jail.
Following oral argument, the magistrate judge concluded that
the defendants’ subject-matter jurisdiction argument was meritless,
and that their insufficiency of service of process argument was
moot. However, it recommended granting the defendants’ motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of process against all fictitious named
defendants, and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
against the other defendants. The magistrate also made several
findings and conclusions: (1) insofar as Clifford was attempting
to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the defendants, the law-
of-the-case doctrine barred the defendants’ contention that
Clifford had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; (2) Clifford acknowledged his failure to comply with 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a)’s administrative exhaustion requirement without
demonstrating that the dismissal of his claims would cause any
injustice or render judicial relief unavailable; and (3) any
“inequities” caused by dismissal, such as Clifford’s inability to
comply within applicable limitations periods, were “solely of his
own making.”
Clifford filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report.
He argued that he was no longer able to exhaust remedies at Saint
Tammany Parish Jail because he had not been confined there since
May 1998, and that exhaustion was thus futile. He also asserted
that he was not required to exhaust available administrative
3
remedies because his claim was not an action with respect to
“prison conditions,” and thus it was outside the scope of
§ 1997e(a). Finally, he contended that dismissal would be
impractical and inequitable.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and dismissed Clifford’s failure-to-protect claim
“without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”
Clifford appeals here.
II. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
Section 1997e(a), as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . . by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” Clifford had argued that § 1997e(a) did not apply to
his failure-to-protect claim because the claim did not concern
“prison conditions.” However, since Clifford brought his claim,
the Supreme Court decided Porter v. Nussle, which held that “the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about
prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong.” 122 S. Ct. 983, 992 (2002). Porter squarely
precludes Clifford’s contention that his failure-to-protect claim
4
is outside § 1997e(a)’s scope.
Clifford nonetheless argues that the district court’s
dismissal of his failure-to-protect claim was erroneous because its
action is barred by the law-of-the case doctrine. He begins by
noting that, in February 1999, the magistrate judge’s “primary”
rationale for recommending dismissal of his § 1983 complaint, which
was adopted by the district court, was that he had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. He then states that this Court
reversed the district court’s decision “without explicitly
addressing the exhaustion of administrative remedies argument.” He
contends that this Court’s remand for further factual development,
without reference to the administrative-remedies issue,
“necessarily implies” that this Court “did not intend the action to
be dismissed under [the failure-to-exhaust] rationale.”
The law-of-the-case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts
generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.” United
States v. Lawrence, 179 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 1999). “[W]hen a
court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to
govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816
(1988). However, “unlike res judicata, the law of the case
doctrine applies only to issues that were actually decided, rather
than all questions in the case that might have been decided, but
were not.” Alpha/Omega Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
5
Amer., 272 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2001).
The relevant portion of our prior opinion in this case stated:
The district court’s dismissal as frivolous of
Clifford’s failure-to-protect claim against the
state defendants, however, was premature and thus
an abuse of discretion. To establish a failure-to-
protect claim, an inmate must show that he was
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm and that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to his need for
protection.”
When the jail officials simultaneously
released Clifford and fellow inmate James Brown
from lockdown for the second time, the two inmates
had been in three fights, Brown had attacked
Clifford immediately upon their release from
lockdown the first time, and Clifford had allegedly
informed Deputy Mayo that he was afraid of more
trouble. No measures were allegedly taken to abate
the risk that Brown would again attack Clifford
upon their second simultaneous release from
lockdown. Accepting Clifford’s pleaded facts as
true, his complaint has an arguable basis in both
law and fact for both elements of an Eighth
Amendment claim.
Clifford’s motion for IFP is therefore
GRANTED. . . . The district court’s dismissal of
Clifford’s failure-to-protect claim as it relates
to the state defendants is vacated and remanded for
further factual development.
Clifford v. Gibbs, No. 99-30302, slip op. at 2-3 (5th Cir. Dec. 10,
1999) (citations omitted). Clearly, despite Clifford’s argument,
our prior opinion did not consider, either explicitly or
implicitly, whether he had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Rather, we only considered the District Court’s previous
conclusion that Clifford’s claim was frivolous. Accordingly, the
6
District Court’s conclusion here that Clifford failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies is not barred by the law-of-the-case
doctrine.2
Because Clifford’s claim is within the scope of § 1997e(a),
see Porter, 122 S. Ct. at 992, and because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the district
court’s dismissal of Clifford’s claim here was proper unless
Clifford establishes some other valid basis for failing to comply
with § 1997e(a). Citing McCarthy v. Madigan, Clifford asserts that
exhaustion is not required when it would cause “undue prejudice to
subsequent assertion of a court action.” 503 U.S. 140, 146-47
(1992).
In McCarthy, the Supreme Court discussed a prior version of §
1997e, which it characterized as a statute “impos[ing] a limited
exhaustion requirement for [§ 1983] claim[s] brought by a state
prisoner . . . provided that the underlying state prison
administrative remedy meets specified standards.” 503 U.S. at 150.
Because the plaintiff in McCarthy was a federal, rather than state,
prisoner, the Court recognized that § 1997e did not apply. Thus,
2
Further, even if we had previously decided that Clifford’s
claim fell outside the scope of § 1997e(a)’s administrative remedy
exhaustion requirement, the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in
Porter v. Nussle would justify a different holding here. See
Goodwin v. Johnson, 224 F.3d 450, 457-58 (5th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that we will depart from the law-of-the-case doctrine
when “controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of
the law applicable to such issues”).
7
to determine whether the plaintiff prisoner could proceed with his
suit, the Court looked to the general administrative exhaustion
requirement and explained three “broad exceptions” to its
application: (1) when requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies “may occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of
a court action;” (2) when the administrative remedy may be
inadequate “because of some doubt as to whether the agency was
empowered to grant effective relief;” and (3) when the
administrative body is shown to be biased. 530 U.S. at 146-48.
Clifford urges us to apply McCarthy’s “undue prejudice”
exception to relieve him of his duty to exhaust administrative
remedies. However, the amendments to § 1997e(a) since McCarthy was
decided cast doubt on the continued validity of any of these
exceptions in cases covered by § 1997e(a). In McCarthy, the Court
recognized that the prior version of § 1997e contained a “limited”
exhaustion requirement that courts had “ample discretion” to
forgo.3 McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 149-50. In contrast, the current
version at issue here provides no such discretion—exhaustion is
mandatory. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought
. . . until such administrative remedies as are available are
3
This prior version provided that, “if the court believes
that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests
of justice, [the court may] continue such case for a period of not
to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of such plain,
speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (amended by PLRA of 1995).
8
exhausted.”).
Moreover, to the extent that the McCarthy exceptions had any
application in § 1997e cases prior to its 1995 amendment, the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1997e’s new language in Booth
v. Churner and Porter v. Nessle unambiguously forecloses
application of such exceptions under the current statutory scheme.
See Booth, 121 S.Ct. at 741 n.6 (admonishing that, under the
amended version of § 1997e, an inmate must exhaust administrative
remedies “regardless of the relief offered through administrative
procedures”); Porter, 122 S.Ct. at 988 (“Once within the discretion
of the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is
now mandatory.”) Accordingly, we decline to apply McCarthy’s
“undue prejudice” exception.
III. EQUITABLE TOLLING
The applicable limitations period for claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by state law. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S.
235, 249-50 (1989). Accordingly, Louisiana’s one-year statute of
limitations period for personal-injury actions applies to
Clifford’s claim. See Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th
Cir. 1998). Because the assault at issue here occurred in early
April of 1998, the district court’s dismissal of Clifford’s claims
without prejudice actually operates as a dismissal with prejudice
because Clifford is barred from returning to federal court after
9
exhausting his remedies because limitations has already run. See
Hatchet v. Nettles, 201 F.3d 651, 652-53 (5th Cir. 2000).
Recognizing this, Clifford urges us to apply equitable tolling to
prevent his claim from becoming forever precluded. See Underwood
v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that
§ 1997e’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and may be
subject to certain defenses such as waiver, estoppel or equitable
tolling).
In a factually similar case, we previously granted the
equitable relief Clifford requests here. In Wright v.
Hollingworth, a prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
nurse alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 260
F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). Relying on Booth, we held that
dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies was proper. Id. However, because limitations had already
run on the defendant’s claim, he urged us to equitably toll
limitations during the pendency of his federal § 1983 action and
any additional state administrative proceedings. Id. at 359. We
held this remedy to be appropriate. Id.
We conclude equitable tolling in this case is likewise
appropriate. Accordingly, we grant Collin’s request to equitably
toll limitations on his § 1983 action during the pendency of this
action and during any additional state administrative proceedings.
10
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that Clifford’s suit is an action “brought
with respect to prison conditions.” Thus, it is subject to
§ 1997e(a)’s administrative exhaustion requirements, and,
therefore, the district court’s dismissal of his suit without
prejudice was proper. We also hold that limitations on his
action should be equitably tolled during the pendency of this
suit and any state administrative proceeding.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED.
11