UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
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No. 01-30587
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JOHN POULLARD,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
VERSUS
JOSEPH M. TURNER; ET AL,
Defendants-Counter Claimants,
JOSEPH M. TURNER, Captain; LONNIE EDMONDS, Lieutenant; MICHAEL
LEVATINO, Lieutenant; DON THAMES, Sergeant,
Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
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July 16, 2002
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
John Poullard, a pro se Louisiana prisoner incarcerated in
Angola, sued prison guards Joseph Turner, Lonnie Edmonds, Michael
Levatino, and Don Thames for violations of his civil and Eighth
Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court entered judgment
on a jury verdict in favor of Poullard for $750,000 in compensatory
damages and $750,000 in punitive damages. We remand for new trial
on damages.
I.
Poullard was beaten in his cell by Turner, Edmonds, and
Levatino, allegedly with billy clubs and allegedly because he had
refused to drop a lawsuit against Edmonds and an administrative
complaint against Levatino. Poullard also claimed that, later that
day, Edmonds beat him with his fist while Poullard was in the back
seat of a patrol vehicle on his way to the hospital.
Poullard’s treating physician testified that he suffered
fractures to both ankles, one of which required surgery, and an
assortment of lesser injuries to other parts of the body. He was
confined to a wheelchair for two and one-half months.
The jury awarded $750,000 compensatory and $750,000 punitive
damages. The court rejected the defendants’ motions for new trial
on liability and damages.
The defendants argue that the district court erred in denying
their motion for new trial on both liability and damages. For
reasons that will become obvious, we consider first their arguments
that the district court’s jury instruction on damages were
erroneous, requiring a new trial on compensatory damages.
II.
At trial, Poullard explicitly disclaimed any intention to seek
damages for mental anguish or emotional distress.1 Nevertheless,
the court charged the jury that
You may award damages for bodily injury that the
plaintiff sustained and any pain and suffering and/or
mental anguish that the plaintiff experienced in the past
or will experience in the future as a result of the
injury. No evidence of the value of intangible things,
such as mental or physical pain has been or need be
introduced.
(Emphasis added.)
Before the jury began deliberations, defendants’ counsel
specifically objected to this language, correctly pointing out that
“Mr. Poullard stated, quite affirmatively, ... that he had no claims
for mental pain and suffering and mental anguish.” This satisfies
the requirement that a “party must object to a jury charge before
the jury begins its deliberations in order to preserve its right to
appeal that jury charge, unless the error is so fundamental as to
be a miscarriage of justice.”2
“We must vacate an award [of damages] if the jury charge as a
whole leaves substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has
been properly guided in its deliberations.”3 The jury could not
have been properly guided in its deliberations if the court
1
In response to questioning by the court, Poullard said he
“do[esn’t] claim no emotional distress or nothing. My lawsuit is
for a physical beating. There is no complaint in the lawsuit that
I filed on mental anguish or emotional distress.”
2
Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 662 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 925 (2000).
3
Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, 188 F.3d 606, 614
(5th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
instructed it to consider possible damages for mental anguish
despite the plaintiff’s own denial that he was seeking any such
damages. Moreover, the likelihood that the jury was improperly
influenced by the instructions is exacerbated by the court’s
statements that the jury could consider future as well as past and
present anguish and by the instruction that the plaintiff was not
required to give any estimate of the value of intangible items,
including mental distress. Damages were not itemized, so it is
impossible to determine what sum, if any, the jury awarded for
mental anguish to permit us to reduce the total award by that
amount. This error requires us to grant a new trial on compensatory
damages.
III.
It is a well-established principle that punitive damages must
bear a “reasonable relationship” to compensatory damages.4 Although
punitive damages are not measured by the extent of injury to a
plaintiff, actual damages are a proper factor for consideration by
the finder of fact in determining the amount of punitive damages.
The D.C. Circuit in Hutchinson v. Stuckey5 concluded that the same
jury charged with determining what, if any, award should be made for
compensatory damages should be the same jury that awards punitive
damages. That Court stated: “We believe a jury should be permitted
4
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1601
(1996).
5
952 F.2d 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
to consider the amount of actual damages in calculating a punitive
damage award. Thus, when a new trial is ordered on actual damages,
the question of punitive damages should also be retried.”6 Thus,
we follow the general rule that when a new trial is granted on
compensatory damages, “it must at the same time be granted on the
issue of punitive damages.”7 We therefore grant a new trial on
punitive damages as well as compensatory damages.
IV.
We have considered appellant’s remaining arguments and conclude
that they are without merit. For reasons stated above, we vacate
the judgment below and remand for a new trial on damages only.
Judge Garza would affirm the judgment of the district court and
dissents without opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED FOR NEW DAMAGES TRIAL.
6
Id. at 1423, citing Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
111 S.Ct. 1032, 1045 (1991)(upholding constitutionality of punitive
damage award in part because "post-verdict review ensures that
punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the offense and have some understandable relationship
to compensatory damages") (emphasis added); and Jordan v. Medley,
711 F.2d 211, 216 (D.C.Cir.1983) (punitive damage award must be set
aside and the issue retried when a new trial is ordered on
liability and actual damages).
7
L. SCHLUETER AND K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 6.3(B)(4th 2000).