This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1124
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Gentry Allan Needham,
Appellant.
Filed July 20, 2015
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-13-4686
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of aiding and abetting fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime, arguing that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion
and admitting Spreigl and character evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Gentry Needham and Todd Mielke checked into a Rochester hotel room
on the afternoon of July 17, 2013. Neither man appeared to have any luggage; the hotel
clerk thought that “[s]omething seemed off” and searched Needham’s name on Google.
The clerk discovered a couple of mug shots and a warrant, which she believed to be
active, and alerted hotel management, who contacted police. Officers Edward Fritz and
William Weiss responded to the call. Officer Fritz confirmed that Needham had an active
arrest warrant, and hotel management asked the officers to eject Needham.
The officers went to Needham’s room, along with hotel management, and knocked
on the door. An occupant asked who was knocking, and Officer Fritz said, “The police.”
The officers then heard someone lock the door with the deadbolt and scurry away from
the door, and hotel management saw the window blinds move, as if someone had looked
through them. The officers demanded that the occupants open the door, and an occupant,
later identified as Needham, complied. The officers arrested Needham, and hotel
management informed him that he was not welcome to return to his hotel room.
Through the open door to Needham’s hotel room, the officers observed
hypodermic needles on a TV stand. Hotel management requested that Officer Fritz enter
2
the room, remove the needles, and remove any other property belonging to Needham and
Mielke. Sticking out of a vent in the bathroom at eye level, Officer Fritz observed a
plastic baggie with two separate baggies inside of it, one containing marijuana and the
other containing methamphetamine. Finding no drugs on Mielke’s person or in a bag that
had been delivered to the hotel for Mielke, the officers did not arrest Mielke.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Needham with fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime (possession of methamphetamine) and possession of a small amount of
marijuana, and Needham moved to suppress all evidence against him on the basis that the
warrantless search of the hotel room was unlawful. The district court denied Needham’s
motion.
The state amended its complaint, adding a charge of aiding and abetting fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime (possession of methamphetamine). At trial, the state
introduced as Spreigl evidence Needham’s 2003 conviction of first-degree controlled-
substance crime (manufacture of methamphetamine) and impeached Needham with the
conviction, along with three unspecified felony convictions and with two false-name
convictions. The jury found Needham guilty of aiding and abetting fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime and not guilty of the remaining two charges. The court
sentenced Needham to the presumptive sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
3
DECISION
Needham’s suppression motion
The district court denied Needham’s suppression motion, concluding that
Needham had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room and alternatively
finding that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered. Needham attributes
error to both of these determinations. “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on
a motion to suppress evidence, [an appellate court] review[s] the district court’s factual
findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations
de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution guarantee
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects”
against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. These “protections are not triggered unless an individual has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded space.” State v. Perkins, 588 N.W.2d 491, 492
(Minn. 1999) (Perkins II). As a hotel guest, Needham was entitled to a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his hotel room. See State v. Perkins, 582 N.W.2d 876, 879
(Minn. 1998) (Perkins I) (“If Perkins was a guest in Room 300 he presumably was
entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .”); see also State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d
251, 255 (Minn. 1990) (stating that “defendant clearly had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the motel room, which is necessary for a protectible fourth amendment
interest”).
4
But here, the police officers were aware of an outstanding warrant for Needham’s
arrest, and the parties agree that the valid arrest warrant implicitly granted police the
limited authority to enter Needham’s hotel room when police had a reason to believe that
Needham was in the room. See State v. Williams, 409 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. App.
1987) (“A valid arrest warrant implicitly grants police the limited authority to enter a
suspect’s residence ‘when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.’” (quoting
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1388 (1980))). And the parties
agree that the arrest warrant itself did not justify a further search of Needham’s hotel
room if he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy therein. See Williams, 409
N.W.2d at 555 (“An arrest warrant does not justify the routine search of a room . . . .
These searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions (consent, emergency, or
incident to arrest), may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.”).
What the parties dispute is whether Needham, as a result of an ejection under
Minn. Stat. § 327.73, lost his reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room and his
standing to assert a violation of the constitutional protections against unreasonable
searches. In Perkins II, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that “even a reasonable
expectation of privacy [of a hotel guest] may be waived if a defendant’s conduct,
objectively viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, mandates the conclusion
that any expectation of privacy was unreasonable.” 588 N.W.2d at 493 (quotation
omitted). In that case, the supreme court concluded that the defendant “lost any
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room” by “sign[ing] a registration card that
stated that guests who caused a disturbance would be asked to leave” and then failing to
5
discontinue the excessive noise in his room despite two warnings from the hotel manager.
Id. at 492–93. In addressing Perkins’s expectation of privacy, the supreme court noted
that the district court had looked to a federal case, United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289
(8th Cir. 1986), “which, under similar circumstances, examined the effect of Minnesota’s
‘undesirable guest statute,’ Minn. Stat. § 327.73, subd. 1(2), on the privacy interests of
evicted hotel guests.” Id. at 492.
In Rambo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated, “When
the rental period expires and control reverts to the hotel management, a hotel employee
may consent to a room search by police.” 789 F.2d at 1295−96 & n.7. Similarly, in
United States v. Molsbarger, 551 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2009), the Eighth Circuit noted
that “[j]ustifiable eviction terminates a hotel occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy
in the room.” “Disruptive, unauthorized conduct in a hotel room invites intervention from
management and termination of the rental agreement. Thus, an individual ‘cannot assert
an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place
from which he has been justifiably expelled.”’ Id. (quoting Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296).
Needham argues that the hotel ejected him because of the arrest warrant and that
Minnesota Statutes section 327.73 does not list the existence of an arrest warrant as a
ground for ejection. Section 327.73 provides that:
An innkeeper may remove or cause to be removed
from a hotel a guest or other person who:
....
(3) the innkeeper reasonably believes is using the
premises for the unlawful possession or use of controlled
substances by the person in violation of chapter 152 . . . ; [or]
....
6
(5) violates any federal, state, or local laws,
ordinances, or rules relating to the hotel . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 327.73, subd. 1(a) (2012). Here, although hotel management requested that
the police officers eject Needham because of the existence of the arrest warrant, hotel
management actually did not eject Needham until after Officer Fritz informed
management about the hypodermic needles in Needham’s hotel room. Officer Fritz
testified that his search of the hotel room commenced after he informed management of
the hypodermic needles and was instructed to retrieve them. We therefore conclude that,
irrespective of the arrest warrant, the hotel justifiably ejected Needham from the hotel
room, along with Mielke, an unregistered guest, following Needham’s arrest and before
the police officers entered the hotel room and conducted a search.
Needham also argues that because the hotel did not refund his payment, the
ejection was not lawful. But Needham offers no authority for the proposition that ejection
can only occur if a prepayment is refunded, and we have found no such authority. We
conclude that, as a result of his justifiable ejection under Minn. Stat. § 327.73, Needham
lost his reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room and his standing to assert a
violation of the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches. The district
court therefore did not err by denying Needham’s motion to suppress the drugs on the
ground that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Because we affirm the district court’s denial of Needham’s suppression motion on
the ground that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy, we do not reach the court’s
alternative, inevitable-discovery ground for denying the motion.
7
Spreigl evidence
The district court admitted Needham’s 2003 controlled-substance conviction as
Spreigl evidence over Needham’s objection. Needham argues that the court thereby
committed reversible error. “To prevail on [a] Spreigl argument, [a defendant] must show
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence and that the erroneous
admission was prejudicial.” See State v. Campbell, 861 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Minn. 2015).
Evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts “is inadmissible to prove a
defendant’s character, but may be admitted to show motive, intent, absence of mistake,
identity, or plan.” Id.; see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). For such evidence to be admitted:
(1) notice [must be] given that the state intends to use the
evidence; (2) the state [must] clearly indicate[] what the
evidence is being offered to prove; (3) the evidence [must be]
clear and convincing that the defendant participated in the
other [act]; (4) the . . . evidence [must be] relevant and
material to the state’s case; and (5) the probative value of the
. . . evidence [must] not [be] outweighed by its potential for
unfair prejudice.
State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998).
Needham first argues that the district court erred by failing to identify the precise
fact to which the Spreigl evidence was relevant. “In assessing the probative value and
need for the evidence, the district court must identify the precise disputed fact to which
the Spreigl evidence would be relevant.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn.
2006) (quotation omitted). “This entails isolating the consequential fact for which the
evidence is offered, and then determining the relationship of the offered evidence to that
fact and the relationship of the consequential fact to the disputed issues in the case.” Id.
8
Here, the state argued that the Spreigl evidence would be used to prove
Needham’s culpable knowledge and intent with regard to the methamphetamine, and the
court stated that the Spreigl evidence “certainly shows lack of mistake, knowledge and
common plan or scheme.” Needham’s knowledge about the presence of drugs and the
purpose for renting the hotel room were at issue. Although the court did not pinpoint the
disputed fact to which the Spreigl evidence would be relevant, we conclude that the court
adequately identified permissible purposes for the admission of Spreigl evidence that was
relevant to disputed issues. See Campbell, 861 N.W.2d at 102 (stating that Spreigl
evidence “may be admitted to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or
plan”).
And even if the district court erred by admitting the Spreigl evidence, we will
affirm unless Needham “can establish that he was prejudiced by the erroneous admission
of the evidence.” See State v. Welle, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2015 WL 3875372, at *6
(Minn. June 24, 2015). “[An appellate court’s] role is to examine the entire trial record
and determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). Based on our reading
of the record, which we have summarized here, we are satisfied that no reasonable
possibility exists that any error by the district court in admitting the 2003 controlled-
substance conviction significantly affected the verdict, and that any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In reaching this conclusion, we are influenced by a number of factors. Needham
had a weak defense. The state presented overwhelming evidence of Needham’s
9
knowledge of and involvement in the possession of methamphetamine in the hotel room
on July 17, 2013. Mielke testified that Needham not only knew about the drugs but also
“participate[d] in shooting up meth with [him].” Needham argues that the prosecutor
dwelled on the Spreigl evidence in closing argument, but he points only to a single
statement—“we know that the defendant has used methamphetamine.” This statement
makes no reference to Needham’s 2003 controlled-substance conviction, which involved
manufacturing of methamphetamine. The record reflects that the prosecutor did not dwell
on the Spreigl evidence. Moreover, the district court cautioned the jury to limit the use of
the Spreigl evidence and not to convict based on any prior conviction. We determine that
the court’s instructions mitigated the harm from any erroneous admission of Spreigl
evidence. See Campbell, 861 N.W.2d at 103 (“[Appellate courts] presume that the jury
followed the[ district court’s limiting] instructions.”).
Character evidence
The prosecutor questioned Needham without objection about his history of drug
use. Needham argues that the district court plainly erred by allowing the state to elicit
evidence regarding his history of drug use. When no objection is made to the admission
of testimony, “[an appellate court’s] review is under the plain error standard.” See State v.
Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002). Under that test, there must be “(1) error;
(2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” State v. Griller, 583
N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). “If the[] three prongs are met, the appellate court then
assesses whether it should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the
judicial proceedings.” Id.
10
Needham argues that he did not place his character at issue and that the admission
of evidence regarding his history of drug use was plain error in violation of Minn. R.
Evid. 404(a). “In a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor may not attack the character of a
defendant until the defendant puts his or her character in issue.” Strommen, 648 N.W.2d
at 687; see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(a). And “[the supreme court] ha[s] said emphatically
that the fact that the accused takes the stand to testify does not put in issue his or her
general character or propensities; that it opens up only the issue of credibility.” State v.
Gress, 250 Minn. 337, 344, 84 N.W.2d 616, 622 (1957).
The state argues that Needham opened the door to the issue of his history of drug
use, claiming that the prosecutor’s questions were in response to Needham’s testimony
that “[he had] never used drugs with [Mielke] ever.” “‘Opening the door’ occurs when
one party by introducing certain material creates in the opponent a right to respond with
material that would otherwise have been inadmissible.” State v. Wenthe, ___ N.W.2d
___, ___, 2015 WL 3875366, at *11 (Minn. June 24, 2015) (quotation omitted). Indeed,
evidence of Needham’s history of drug use, in conjunction with Mielke’s testimony
regarding his history of drug use and his and Needham’s long relationship, all served to
rebut a relevant fact that Needham himself placed at issue: whether he had ever,
including in the hotel room on July 17, 2013, used methamphetamine with Mielke. Given
the facts of this case, we cannot say that Needham did not open the door to the
prosecutor’s elicitation of testimony about his history of drug use. We therefore are
unpersuaded that the district court plainly erred by allowing the prosecutor to question
Needham about his history of drug use.
11
Even if the district court plainly erred by allowing evidence of Needham’s history
of drug use, the error “did not affect [his] substantial rights.” See State v. Matthews, 779
N.W.2d 543, 551 (Minn. 2010). The testimony in question represents but a small piece of
the state’s strong case against Needham. The state introduced substantial evidence of
Needham’s culpable conduct, including his initial interaction with hotel staff, his and
Mielke’s dilatory and seemingly evasive conduct when the officers arrived, and the
visible presence of hypodermic needles in the hotel room. The state also introduced
Mielke’s testimony that Needham “participate[d] in shooting up meth with [him].”
Furthermore, the jury acquitted Needham of both principal-liability possession charges,
strongly suggesting that the jury did not rely on Needham’s history of drug use as
evidence that he “act[ed] in conformity” with that history. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(a).
In sum, because the district court committed no reversible error by denying
Needham’s suppression motion or admitting Spreigl and character evidence, we affirm.
Affirmed.
12