[J-110-2014]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
IN RE: PETITION TO SUBMIT BALLOT : No. 126 MAP 2014
QUESTION TO CONCORD TOWNSHIP :
VOTERS : Appeal from the order of Commonwealth
: Court at No. 1426 CD 2014 dated
DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF : September 26, 2014 Affirming the order of
ELECTIONS, : the Delaware County Court of Common
Intervenor : Pleas, Civil Division, at No. 2014-06512
: dated August 14, 2014.
:
: SUBMITTED: November 21, 2014
APPEAL OF: COLETTE BROWN :
OPINION
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS DECIDED: July 20, 2015
Collette Brown,1 a Concord Township, Delaware County resident (“Appellant”),
appeals the Commonwealth Court’s order affirming the trial court’s dismissal of her
petition to place, on the November 2014 ballot, a referendum question seeking to change
the Township’s governmental status from second-class to first-class. For the following
reasons, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court and remand to the trial court
for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion.
The following issue of first impression has been presented before this Court:
Does 53 P.S. § 55207 restrict granting of a registered voter petition to
submit to voters of the subject township, a ballot question for reclassification
to First Class, to the first municipal or general election at least ninety days
1 Although the lower court opinions list Brown and Concord First, a local citizens group,
as Appellants, since Brown is a pro se litigant, she cannot represent Concord First.
after only the ascertainment of the minimum population density specified in
the statute of three hundred inhabitants per square mile, or does 53 P.S. §
55207 require submission of the ballot question to voters of the subject
township at the first municipal or general election at least ninety days after
both the ascertainment of minimum population density and after a petition
signed by five per centum of the registered voter of the township is filed with
the court?
I. Background
On July 28, 2014, pursuant to 53 P.S. § 55207, Appellant filed a petition with the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, seeking to place the referendum question
“Should Concord Township become a Township of the First Class?” on the November
2014 ballot. The petition contained 994 signatures (8.5%) out of the Township’s 11,640
registered voters and claimed that as of the 2010 census, the Township had a population
density of around 1,258 inhabitants per square mile (“IPSM”). As stated, both figures
easily exceeded the statutory thresholds of 300 IPSM and 5% registered voter
signatures, which Appellant believed operated as conjunctive preconditions.2
On August 6, 2014, seven named qualified electors (“Appellees”) filed objections
and claimed the petition was substantively and procedurally defective under the statute,
which they argued was time-limited to the first municipal or general election occurring at
least ninety days after the 2010 census. That same day, the Delaware County Bureau of
2 The statute reads, in relevant part:
At the first general or municipal election occurring, at least ninety days after
the ascertainment, by special enrollment or from the last preceding United
States census, that any township of the second class has a population of at
least three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, and after a petition
signed by at least five per centum of the registered voters of the township
has been filed in the quarter sessions court, the question of whether such
township of the second class shall become a township of the first class shall
be submitted to the voters of the township . . . .
53 P.S. § 55207.
[J-110-2014] - 2
Elections (“Intervenor”) filed a petition to intervene and a request for declaratory relief,
claiming that in addition to not satisfying the statutory requirements, the petition should be
dismissed because a home rule study referendum question was already on the ballot
(which voters later approved), and that if Appellant’s referendum question were
successful, the subsequent change in Township government could violate the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas denied the petition on August 14,
2014. The trial court read 53 P.S. § 55207 to restrict second- to first-class township
referendum questions to the first municipal or general election occurring at least ninety
days after the township’s population density has been formally ascertained at 300 or
more IPSM,3 as long as a petition has been signed by at least 5% of the township’s
registered voters. Noting that the last United States census was tallied in 2010 and
presented to the Commonwealth in 2011, and that the first municipal and general
elections occurring at least ninety days after respectively took place in 2012 and 2013,
the trial court concluded that the petition failed to meet the statutory requirements.
A Commonwealth Court panel affirmed in a unanimous published opinion on
September 26, 2014. See In re Petition to Submit Ballot Question to Concord Tp.
Voters, 100 A.3d 765 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2014) (hereinafter “In re Petition”). Contrary to
Appellant’s argument that the “first . . . election occurring at least ninety days after”
language applies to both the population density and petition signature filing requirements
as simultaneous prerequisites, the Commonwealth Court found that:
3 The population density requirement may be verified from the United States census or
by “special enrollment.” 53 P.S. § 55207. Special enrollment may be performed, no
later than one year before the upcoming United States census, upon petition by the
owners of 25% of a second-class township’s assessed real estate. 53 P.S. § 55205. A
specially appointed commissioner then determines if the township’s population density
meets the statutory threshold. Id.
[J-110-2014] - 3
“[F]irst election” relates only to the phrase with which it is immediately
juxtaposed, “ascertainment [of population] . . . from the last preceding
United States census.” The phrase “first election 90 days after
[ascertainment of population]” operates as a clear time limitation which
serves the necessary purpose of ensuring that the population density upon
which the ballot question is based remains accurate when the matter is put
to the voters. The time limitation would be entirely eviscerated if the
[appellants] could extend it by waiting several years to file their petition with
the court.
In re Petition, 100 A.3d at 767.
The Commonwealth Court also noted that the original statute, enacted in 1931, did
not require (or even allow for) petition signatures. Instead, the referendum question was
automatically added to the next ballot occurring at least ninety days after the formal
ascertainment of a second-class township’s population density at 300 or more IPSM.4
The Commonwealth Court accordingly found that the petition signature filing requirement,
added to the statute in 1941, was not intended to change the ninety-day time limitation,
which would otherwise frustrate its purpose.5
4 See Act of Jun. 24, 1931, P.L. 1206, § 207 (original statute).
At the first general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after
ascertainment, by special enrollment or from the United States census,
including the United States census of [1930] and each subsequent census,
that any township of the second class has a population of at least three
hundred inhabitants to the square mile, the question whether such township
of the second class shall become a township of the first class shall be
submitted to the voters of the township . . . .
Id.
5 See Act of Jul. 24, 1941, P.L. 502, §1 (first amended statute).
At the first general or municipal election occurring, or at a special election
held, at least ninety days after the ascertainment, by special enrollment or
from the last preceding United States census, that any township of the
second class has a population of at least three hundred inhabitants to the
square mile, and after the filing of a petition signed by at least five per
centum of the registered voters of the township has been filed in the quarter
sessions court, the question whether such township of the second class
(continuedJ)
[J-110-2014] - 4
Appellant filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal, and on October 17, 2014,
we granted allocatur to address the issue as stated supra. On November 17, 2014, the
Concord Township Government Study Commission (“Commission”), composed of seven
named commissioners-elect (“Commissioners-Elect”) who, pursuant to the Home Rule
Charter and Optional Plans Law, 53 P.S. § 2911 et seq., were elected in November 2014
to form the Commission (together “Amici”), filed an amicus brief, sought intervenor status,
and requested an enlargement in the briefing schedule. We denied Amici’s application
to intervene and for enlargement of briefing schedule on December 31, 2014.
II. Discussion
A. Arguments of the Parties
1. Appellant
Redacting the words she believes are not in substantive dispute, Appellant
presents the text of 53 P.S. § 55207 as follows:
At the first . . . election occurring, at least ninety days after the
ascertainment [that the township has the minimum population density], and
after a petition [meeting its requirements] has been filled with the . . . court,
the question . . . shall be submitted to the voters of the township . . . .
Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant maintains that the grammatical structure of “. . . at least
ninety days after the ascertainment . . . , and after the petition . . . has been filed” indicates
both requirements must be met before determining the timing of “the first general or
(Jcontinued)
shall become a township of the first class shall be submitted to the voters of
the township . . . . A special election for such purpose shall be held . . .
upon petition signed by at least five per centum of the registered voters of
the township. . . . .
Id. (emphasis in published statute to denote changes from original).
[J-110-2014] - 5
municipal election occurring at least ninety days after.” Id (emphasis in original).
Appellant adds that Appellees’ interpretation “fundamentally alters the statute’s language,
adding a restrictive ‘only’ and changing the ‘and after’ phrasing for the petition
prerequisite to ‘and if.’” Id. at 15.
In addition to its plain text, Appellant avers the statutory history of 53 P.S. § 55207
and related statutes are favorable to her position. Appellant argues that although the
original statute called for the automatic addition of the referendum question to the next
eligible ballot, its 1941 revision, which added the petition signature filing requirement,
“unambiguously tied both prerequisites to the determination of timing for which election
the question would be submitted to voters.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant adds that
the new option of a special election, placed as a clause between the generally scheduled
elections and “at least ninety days after” clauses, indicates the legislature’s intent that the
petition signatures be filed at least ninety days before either type of election.6 Appellant
also believes that the ninety-day period was necessary for the county board of elections
to adequately prepare the ballots and ballot instructions, especially in 1941.
Appellant additionally cites 53 P.S. § 55208, which controls where a second- to
first-class township referendum question fails to obtain a majority vote.7 Appellant first
6 Appellant notes that although the legislature removed the special election provision
when it amended the statute for the last time in 1949, it left the petition signature filing
requirement in conjunction with the “after . . . and after” grammatical structure.
Appellant’s Brief at 18.
7 See 53 P.S. § 55208 (returns of election and effect thereof).
. . . . If a majority of the votes cast at any such election shall be in favor of
remaining a township of the second class, no further proceedings shall be
had for a period of two years, after which period the supervisors, by
unanimous action, may, or, upon petition of ten per centum of the registered
voters of the township, shall, through the County Board of Elections,
(continuedJ)
[J-110-2014] - 6
notes that the statute mandates a two-year wait before the question may be resubmitted
“in the manner hereinbefore provided,” meaning that second- to first-class referendum
questions were never meant to be tethered to the first election immediately following the
census. Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant also claims that prior to this case, many
former second-class townships; including Pocono, Monroe County (2013), 8 Lower
Macungie, Lehigh County (2007), and Whitemarsh, Montgomery County (1956);
approved and passed first-class referendums well beyond the first ballot available
ninety-plus days after the most recent census.
Appellant further claims the lower courts’ holding that a strict time limitation
ensures the township’s population density remains above the statutory threshold is faulty
policy reasoning. Appellant argues that while “it is possible that a township with [a]
population density just above the minimum might later fall below it, . . . given the
unrelenting historic trend toward growing population, it is impossible . . . to justify an
argument that the legislature had that overriding concern.” Appellant’s Brief at 22.9
(Jcontinued)
resubmit the question to the electors of the township in the manner
hereinbefore provided.
Id.
8 The Pocono Township referendum was actually timely under the opposing parties’
reading of the statute, since the full results of the 2010 census were not accepted by the
Commonwealth until August 17, 2011. See Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment
Comm’n, 614 Pa. 364, 378, 38 A.3d 711, 719 (2012) (noting that the Legislative Data
Processing Center’s acceptance of the complete 2010 census data package as “usable”
triggered, in that case, “the ninety-day period for filing a preliminary redistricting plan”).
9 Appellant’s sole citation in support of this claim is the general (though easily verifiable)
statement that “Pennsylvania’s population has continued to grow with every census since
this statute was passed, up to and including the census of 2010.” Appellant’s Brief at
22-23 n.6. See Census of Population and Housing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html.
[J-110-2014] - 7
Appellant also remarks that 53 P.S. §§ 55209-55209(a) already address the scenario
where a first-class township’s population density falls below 300 IPSM.10 In that case,
voters may (but are not required to) revert to second-class status via a referendum
question that is automatically placed on the next ballot. 53 P.S. § 55209(a).
2. Appellees
Appellees respond that outside of special enrollment (which is not at issue here),
53 P.S. § 55207 requires timely utilization of the United States census. Appellees assert
that limiting second- to first-class township referendum questions to the first election
following formal population density ascertainment is the only way to “allow the electorate,
elected officials, potential candidates, and the County Board of Elections a rational and
10 53 P.S. §§ 55209-55209(a) state that:
At any time, not less than one year before the time fixed for taking a
decennial census of the United States, whenever the owners of twenty-five
per centum of the assessed valuation of the real estate of any township of
the first class shall present their petition to the court of quarter sessions
averring that the township no longer has a population of three hundred
inhabitants to the square mile, and shall give such security as the court may
prescribe for the payment of all costs and expenses which may be incurred
in any procedure had upon said petition, the court shall appoint a
commissioner to perform the duties hereafter prescribed. . . . .
53 P.S. § 55209 (ascertainment of population).
At the first general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after
the ascertainment by special enrollment or from the last preceding United
States census, that any township of the first class no longer has a
population of at least three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, the
question whether such township of the first class shall be reestablished as a
township of the second class shall be submitted to the voters of the
township . . . .
53 P.S. § 55209(a) (submission of question to voters; returns of election, and effect
thereof).
[J-110-2014] - 8
reasonable basis to consider submission of [the] question to voters until the results of the
next census are ascertained.” Appellees’ Brief at 4.
Appellees otherwise maintain that Appellant’s “distorted logic” would allow, with
respect to the 2010 census, for the consideration of second- to first-class township
referendum questions any time between 2012 and 2020. Id. Appellees claim that
within this timeframe, “[p]ossibly 3 to 4 municipal election cycles could have taken place in
which the majority of voters elected supervisors only to have this mandate potentially
overturned,” and that “a candidate could run for supervisor in a municipal election held 90
days after ascertainment, lose the election, then . . . circulate a petition for First Class the
following year for the sole purpose of unseating the duly elected supervisor.” Id.
3. Intervenor
Intervenor largely echoes Appellees’ arguments, emphasizing that the plain text,
statutory history, and sound public policy support the lower courts’ reasoning.
Intervenor also implies that Appellant’s petition lacks sufficient signatures, noting that the
trial court expressed concern without directly addressing the issue.
4. Amici
Amici note that Concord Township voters approved a referendum pursuant to the
Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, 53 P.S. § 2911 et seq., whereby
Commissioners-Elect were chosen to study the possibility of home rule government and
recommend accordingly.11 Amici argue that by establishing the Commission, Township
voters have exercised their right to adopt their own form of local government. Amici
11 If the majority of commission members were to recommend a home rule charter or
optional plan, a referendum would be placed on the ballot, giving Township voters the
final decision. Otherwise, the group would be discharged and no change would take
place.
[J-110-2014] - 9
claim that if Appellant’s referendum question were added to the ballot, which would
purportedly be before the Commission even began its study, the reason for and purpose
of that study would be rendered moot. Amici otherwise incorporate Appellees’ and
Intervenor’s allegations that Appellant failed to comply with the statutory requirements.
Appellant counters that at the time Amici filed their brief, the results of the
November election had not yet been certified, meaning the Commission had not validly
formed and the Commissioners-Elect could not take legal action in its name. 53 P.S. §
2915(a). Appellant adds that even if the Commission were validly formed, it cannot seek
relief because its purpose is limited to examining the possibility of home rule government.
53 P.S. § 2918. Appellant further alleges that the ballot question authorizing the
Commission itself may have been unlawful, since “[a]n ordinance may not be passed . . .
for the election of a government study commission . . . while proceedings are pending
under any other petition . . . .” 53 P.S. § 2927(a).
B. Standard of Review and Relevant Law
Issues of statutory interpretation are pure questions of law. Accordingly, this
Court’s standard of review is de novo and our scope is plenary. Focht v. Focht, 613 Pa.
48, 52, 32 A.3d 668, 670 (2011). This Commonwealth’s statutes shall be interpreted
under the rules set forth in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901 et seq., unless their application would result
in a construction that contravenes the intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901.
The General Assembly is presumed to not intend a result that is absurd, unreasonable, or
impossible to execute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
The meaning of words and phrases shall be discerned through the rules of
grammar and in accordance with their common and approved usage. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903.
While a statute’s plain language is generally the best indicator of its legislative intent,
where there are issues of ambiguity, additional factors may be considered, including the
[J-110-2014] - 10
occasion and necessity for the statute, the circumstances under which the statute was
enacted, the object to be attained, and the consequences of a particular interpretation. 1
Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); Malt Beverages Distribs. Ass’n v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd.,
601 Pa. 449, 974 A.2d 1144, 1149 (2009). While a statute’s grammar and punctuation
shall not control or affect its legislative intent, “[w]ords and phrases which may be
necessary to the proper interpretation of a statute and which do not conflict with its
obvious purpose and intent, nor in any way affect its scope and operation, may be added
in the construction thereof.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1923(b)-(c).
An amended statute shall be viewed as merging into, and becoming one with, the
original statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1953. In addition, the amendment shall be construed as if
it had been part of the original statute. American Brake Shoe Co. v. Dist. Lodge 9 of Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists, 373 Pa. 164, 173, 94 A.2d 884, 887 (1953). However, where a
statute has been amended multiple times, the most recent amendment shall be read into
the statute as previously amended and not into the statute as originally enacted. 1
Pa.C.S. § 1954. Statutes in pari materia (related to the same persons, things, or classes
of things) shall be viewed together as one statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932.
C. Analysis
Appellant argues that based on the text alone, the population density and petition
signature filing requirements must both be fulfilled before the ninety-day time limitation
triggers with respect to the first upcoming election. The opposing parties maintain that
the population density requirement alone starts the “at least ninety days after” clock, with
the petition signature filing requirement serving as an additional prerequisite. Both sides
cite the statutory history of 53 P.S. § 55207 and related statutes, and the public policy
reasoning behind those statutes, in support of their positions.
[J-110-2014] - 11
1. Statutory Interpretation
Since 53 P.S. § 55207 has been amended three times, its plain text cannot be
examined in isolation. Rather, it must be viewed sequentially, in light of its past
iterations. This entails a two-step process in the case at bar. Without losing sight of the
statute as a whole, the first amendment to the statute “shall be construed as merging into
the original statute . . . and viewed [together] as one statute passed at one time.” 1
Pa.C.S. § 1953. The second amendment, by extension, “shall be read into the original
statute as previously amended and not . . . as originally enacted.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1954.
Abridged to its relevant portions, the original statute reads:
At the first . . . election occurring at least ninety days after ascertainment,
. . . that any township of the second class has a population of at least three
hundred inhabitants to the square mile, the question whether such township
of the second class shall become a township of the first class shall be
submitted to the voters of the township . . . .
Act of Jun. 24, 1931, P.L. 1206, § 207. Its first amendment states:
At the first general or municipal election occurring, or at a special election
held, at least ninety days after the ascertainment . . . that any township of
the second class has a population of at least three hundred inhabitants to
the square mile, and after the filing of a petition signed by at least five per
centum of the registered voters of the township has been filed in the quarter
sessions court, the question whether such township of the second class
shall become a township of the first class shall be submitted to the voters of
the township . . . .
Act of Jul. 24, 1941, P.L. 502, §1 (emphasis in published statute to denote changes from
original).
The original statute called for automatically adding the referendum question to the
first ballot occurring no fewer than ninety days after formal ascertainment of the requisite
population density. The first amendment made two notable additions: the petition
signature filing requirement, which carried over to the present statute, and a special
election option, which did not. Regardless, reading the original act and its first
[J-110-2014] - 12
amendment as one cohesive statute, the plain language supports Appellant’s belief that
the population density and petition signature filing requirements must both be fulfilled in
order to activate the ninety-day time limitation. Removal of the special election option
does not change this conclusion. The present statute reads:
At the first . . . election occurring, at least ninety days after the
ascertainment, . . . that any township of the second class has a population
of at least three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, and after a petition
signed by at least five per centum of the registered voters of the township
has been filed . . . , the question of whether such township of the second
class shall become a township of the first class shall be submitted to the
voters of the township . . . .
53 P.S. § 55207.
The Commonwealth Court’s finding that “‘first election’ relates only to the phrase
with which it is immediately juxtaposed” belies the statute’s plain language. In re
Petition, 100 A.3d at 767. Rather, the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation transforms
“after . . . and after” into “after . . . and provided.” Even assuming arguendo that the
statute is ambiguous and warrants the consideration of other relevant factors, there are
no additional related statutes or salient public policy concerns that undercut Appellant’s
argument. 53 P.S. § 55208 proves instructive. As noted by Appellant, second- to
first-class township referendum questions that fail to pass by a majority vote may be
resubmitted two years later “in the manner hereinbefore provided” in 53 P.S. § 55207.
53 P.S. § 55208. This contradicts the opposing parties’ claim that such questions may
only be submitted immediately after the census or special enrollment.
Appellant’s citation to 53 P.S. §§ 55209-55209(a), which govern where a first-class
township’s population density later falls below 300 IPSM, is less on-point. Those
statutes state that township voters may choose, via referendum, to revert to second-class
status either upon petition between censuses or automatically after the next census.
[J-110-2014] - 13
There is nothing mutually exclusive about the language of those statutes and Appellees’
reading of 53 P.S. § 55207. See Cozzone ex rel. Cozzone v. W.C.A.B., 621 Pa. 23, 39,
73 A.3d 526, 536 (2003) (unless otherwise indicated, statutes in pari materia shall not be
read “as if one part operates to nullify, exclude or cancel the other”).
Finally, at least two former second-class townships; namely Lower Macungie,
Lehigh County and Whitemarsh, Montgomery County; submitted via voter petition, and
approved via referendum, a change to first-class status well beyond the time limit as
construed by the opposing parties. 12 Furthermore, when Whitemarsh Township’s
referendum petition was unsuccessfully challenged as lacking in affidavits, the
Montgomery County Court of Quarter Sessions never considered the timeliness of its
submission, which would be late according to the opposing parties. See Whitemarsh Tp.
Referendum, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 271, 274-75 (Pa.Quar.Sess. 1955) (reciting the statutory
text without addressing the “at least ninety days after” language).13
2. Public Policy
The opposing parties’ public policy arguments are similarly unavailing. While the
Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that a strict time limitation is necessary to ensure the
“[ascertainment of population] . . . upon which the ballot question is based remains
12 Once again, the Pocono Township referendum was timely under the lower courts’ and
opposing parties’ reading of the statute. See supra n.9. For details regarding the
Pocono and Lower Macungie referendums, see David Pierce, Drive in Pocono Township
for First Class Status Gains Momentum, POCONO RECORD, Jul. 28, 2013, 12:01 AM,
http://www.poconorecord.com/article/20130728/News/307280341.
13 The plaintiff in Whitemarsh did not raise the issue of timeliness, and it is never the
responsibility of the court to develop claims on behalf of a party. See Zeigler v. Church of
the Brethren Gen. Bd., 570 Pa. 2, 3, 807 A.2d 872, 872 (2002) (noting it is “improper for
court to act as advocate and sua sponte raise defense on behalf of party”). Nonetheless,
the quarter sessions court would have presumably remarked on the absence of a claim
that would otherwise prove fatal to the defendant’s petition.
[J-110-2014] - 14
accurate when the matter is put to the voters” appears sensible in the abstract, actual
census data safely dispels this concern. In re Petition, 100 A.3d at 767. In addition to
Concord Township, whose population has experienced large, consistent gains since
reaching 335.2 IPSM in 1970, seven other Delaware County townships (and former
townships) have surpassed 300 IPSM in more recent years.14 The populations of Bethel
and Thornbury, which respectively exceeded 300 IPSM in 1960 and 1970, have since
grown by over 10% each census period. While Marple and Newtown’s populations have
wavered since first reaching 300 IPSM in 1950, at their current population densities of
2,326.1 and 1,221.6 IPSM, these mature bedroom communities are safely past the point
of reverting to their former agrarian states. Even relatively rural Chadds Ford and
Edgmont, which have population densities of 418.4 and 406.8 IPSM, would have to lose
over 25% of their current populations (over 1,000 people) before returning to 300 IPSM.
Appellees’ public policy arguments range from spare conclusory statements to
extreme hypothetical scenarios. Common sense refutes Appellees’ notion that voters
cannot consider second- to first-class referendum questions on “a rational and
reasonable basis” unless they are rushed onto the ballot. Appellees’ Brief at 4.
Appellees’ claim that “[p]ossibly 3 to 4 municipal election cycles could have taken place in
which the majority of voters elected supervisors only to have this mandate potentially
overturned,” implies that after an unspecified probationary period, elected officials gain an
inalienable right to serve their local governments, irrespective of whether voters later
decide that their officials, governmental organization, or both, require changing. Id.15
14 Census of Population and Housing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html.
15 See 53 P.S. § 55208 (returns of election and effect thereof):
(continuedJ)
[J-110-2014] - 15
Moreover, there is nothing barring second class township officials from re-running if and
when their governments reorganize. 16 Finally, while a spurned candidate could
theoretically circulate a first-class township petition “for the sole purpose of unseating the
duly elected supervisor,” Appellees’ assumption that such an act would win over voters
who did not elect that candidate in the first place is dubious at best. Appellees’ Brief at 4.
(Jcontinued)
. . . . If a majority of the votes cast at any such election shall be in favor of
becoming a township of the first class, the government of the township of
the first class shall be organized and become operative on the first Monday
of January next succeeding such election, at which time the terms of the
officers of the township of the second class shall cease and terminate.
Id.
16See 53 P.S. §§ 55225, 55226 (officers for new townships; election of commissioners in
new townships):
Whenever a new township of the first class shall be created . . . , the court of
quarter sessions shall appoint five commissioners, and the other elective
officers to which the township is entitled . . . . The officers so appointed shall
hold their offices from the first Monday of January following the election
creating such township until the first Monday of January following the
municipal election at which officers of the township are elected as
hereinafter provided.
53 P.S. § 55225.
At the first municipal election following the creation of a township as
hereinbefore provided, if such township has not been divided into wards,
there shall be elected five township commissioners at large. Three of such
commissioners shall be elected for terms of four years each, and tow [sic]
for terms of two years each, from the first Monday of January next following
such election. . . . .
53 P.S. § 55226.
[J-110-2014] - 16
3. Additional Arguments
Appellant’s desired referendum question and Amici’s stated interests are
tenuously connected. Beyond what appear to be statements of educated conjecture,
Amici fail to explain how inclusion of the referendum question would necessarily thwart
the interests of voters or supersede the purpose of the Commission. Amici’s general
citation to the series of statutes that permits voter-approved home rule charter
government study commissions is unavailing, as is the case law in support of their vague
assertion that finding in favor of Appellant would “contravene[] the long standing policy of
the Courts to protect the rights of voters whenever possible as well as their right to select
their local form of government.” Amici’s Brief at 5.
The issue squarely before this Court is one of statutory interpretation. It is not, as
Amici would like to believe, the public policy implications of allowing an allegedly
competing referendum question on a future ballot that would, in all likelihood, have
appeared on the November 2014 ballot but for these proceedings. For the same
reasons this Court denied Amici’s petition to intervene, Amici’s claims require no further
review. See Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620 Pa. 373, 396, 67
A.3d 1211, 1224-25 (2013) (amicus briefs raising issues not implicated by the parties
warrant no consideration).
Intervenor’s claim that Appellant’s petition lacks sufficient signatures is also
tangential to the issue before this Court, and therefore requires no further review. See
Appeal of Municipality of Penn Hills, 591 Pa. 164, 169, 546 A.2d 50, 52 (1988) (stating
that “the intervenor takes the litigation as he finds it . . . and . . . must raise claims in
subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the original action . . . .”).
[J-110-2014] - 17
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that pursuant to 53 P.S. § 55207, second-
to first-class township referendum questions shall be submitted to voters at the first
general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after fulfilling both the
population density ascertainment and petition signature filing requirements as set forth in
the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court and remand
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Messrs. Justice Eakin and Baer join the opinion.
Mr. Chief Justice Saylor files a dissenting opinion in which Madame Justice Todd
joined.
[J-110-2014] - 18