MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jul 21 2015, 12:59 pm
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Suzy St. John Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Meridian Horton, July 21, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1411-CR-806
v. Appeal from the Marion County
Superior Court Criminal Division 8
State of Indiana, Cause No. 49F08-1405-CM-23045
Appellee-Plaintiff
The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge
Friedlander, Judge.
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[1] Meridian Horton was convicted of Criminal Trespass, a class A misdemeanor.1
Horton appeals her conviction and presents the following restated issue for our
review: Did the State present sufficient evidence to support a conviction for
criminal trespass?
[2] We affirm.
[3] The facts most favorable to the conviction are as follows. Horton was homeless
at the beginning of May 2014 and was staying in a women’s shelter. All women
wishing to stay overnight at the shelter are required to check-in before 4:00 p.m.
Horton left the shelter to go to the food stamp office and pick up her
medication. Horton missed her check-in time at the shelter because her trip
lasted longer than she anticipated. Without a place to spend the night, Horton
went to a nearby motel, King’s Inn.
[4] King’s Inn’s overnight rate is forty dollars a night plus an additional ten-dollar
security deposit. Horton had only fifty dollars to her name, which she gave to
the King’s Inn employee upon check-in. Once assigned a room, Horton placed
her belongings on the ground and got into bed.
[5] The next morning, Horton went to check out of the motel room at 11:00 a.m.
and to retrieve her security deposit. Maintenance noted that Horton had
broken a lamp and flooded the floor in her assigned room. The motel employee
1
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2) (West, Westlaw current with all 2015 First Regular Session of the 119th
General Assembly legislation effective through June 28, 2015).
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told Horton she had “destroyed the room” and she could not have her security
deposit back. Transcript at 16. Horton then requested to speak to the manager
but was told the manager had yet to arrive. Horton called the police and waited
for them to arrive.
[6] The manager of the motel arrived before law enforcement and tried to resolve
the dispute with Horton but was unsuccessful. The manager asked Horton to
leave the premises but she refused to leave until her deposit was returned.
When the police officer arrived, Horton told the officer that she would not leave
without her deposit. Horton was arrested for criminal trespass. On September
30, 2014, the trial court found Horton guilty of criminal trespass. The trial
court explained that Horton’s contractual interest in the room expired upon
check-out.
[7] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal
conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Henley v.
State, 881 N.E.2d 639 (Ind. 2008). “We consider only the evidence supporting
the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
evidence.” Id. at 651. “[This court] will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder
could have found the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Dumes v.
State, 23 N.E.3d 798, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[8] To convict Horton of criminal trespass the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Horton (1) did not have a contractual interest in the
property, and (2) knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the real property of
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another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that
person’s agent. See I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2).
[9] Pertaining to the first element, Horton contends the State did not prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that she lacked a contractual interest in the property.
‘“Contractual interest’, as that phrase is used in the criminal trespass statute,
refers to the right to be present on another’s property, arising out of an
agreement between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to
do a particular thing.” Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
In Woods v. State, the court held, “[A] person with a contractual interest cannot
become a trespasser by virtue of being asked to leave the premises.” 703
N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
[10] Horton argues she had a contractual interest as a guest of the motel and
entertained a good faith belief that she had an implied right to remain on the
property to settle the dispute over her security deposit. Horton acknowledges
that her right to be in the motel room terminated upon checkout; however, she
claims that her right to be on the motel’s premises did not expire until the
checkout process was complete by the return of her security deposit.
[11] “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests
that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which
the trespass is alleged to have occurred.” Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d at 10. In
Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012), the Court held that the State met
its burden of proof by presenting evidence showing the defendant was “irate
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and disrespectful.” “The defendant was neither an owner nor an employee of
the bank, [and] the bank manager had authority to ask customers to leave the
bank premises.” Id.
Here, Horton “made quite the scene” when she tried to get around the front
desk to confront the motel employee. Transcript at 5. The manager of the motel
asked Horton to leave “several times” before she evicted Horton from the
King’s Inn. Id. at 7.
[12] As for the intent element, Horton contends that she did not have the requisite
mens rea to be convicted of criminal trespass. Under I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2), to
satisfy the mens rea element the State must prove Horton knowingly or
intentionally refused to leave the real property of another person after having
been asked to leave by the other person or that person’s agent.
[13] Horton argues that she believed she had a right to remain on the property until
her security deposit dispute was resolved. “The belief that one has a right to be
on the property of another will defeat the mens rea requirement of the criminal
trespass statute if it has a fair and reasonable foundation.” Taylor v. State, 836
N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Assuming Horton believed that she
had a right to remain on the property, such was unreasonable because she was
asked to leave several times before law enforcement arrived. “When the
evidence shows an invitee of a business has no contractual right to be on the
business’s premises and remains there after being asked to leave, the State has
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met its burden to prove intent.” Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996).
[14] Horton checked out of her motel room, set her belongings outside of the
building, and returned to ask for her security deposit. Horton was informed
that due to the room damage, the motel would not return her security deposit
and she was asked to leave the property. Horton refused and told the property
manager that she “would have to call the police” because she “wasn’t going
anywhere.” Transcript at 8. When the police officer arrived, Horton stated,
“You’re going to have to cuff me because I’m not leaving.” Id. The evidence
was sufficient to prove that Horton committed criminal trespass.
[15] Judgment affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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