UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4446
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHARLIE WAYNE BRYANT,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:11−cr−00072−MOC–1)
Argued: May 12, 2015 Decided: July 22, 2015
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Agee joined.
ARGUED: Cindy Helene Popkin-Bradley, CINDY H. POPKIN-BRADLEY,
ATTORNEY AT LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. William
Michael Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anne M. Tompkins, United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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WYNN, Circuit Judge:
This is the second time we are asked to review the sentence
of Defendant Charlie Wayne Bryant after he pled guilty to
assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)
and (b). The first appeal required us to evaluate the district
court’s application of United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“U.S.S.G.”) § 2A2.2 for aggravated assault. United States v.
Bryant, 540 Fed. App’x 241 (4th Cir. 2014). Although the district
court heard facts that would have supported the application of
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, the court made conflicting statements suggesting
it may have intended to instead apply U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4, the
guideline for obstructing or impeding a federal officer. We
therefore vacated the sentence and remanded so that the district
court could make necessary factual findings and clarify its intent.
On remand, the district court conducted another sentencing hearing
and once again imposed a sentence using U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2.
With this appeal, Defendant argues that the district court
improperly applied U.S.S.G § 2A2.2 and asks us to order the
district court to instead apply U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4, which would
significantly reduce his guidelines range. This we cannot do
because the district court made factual findings that are supported
by the record and justify a sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2.
Accordingly, we must affirm.
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I.
This appeal arises from an altercation between Defendant and
a security officer at the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
office in Gastonia, North Carolina. Defendant was a homeless
veteran suffering from chronic mental illness. In February 2011,
he went to the SSA office to inquire “about some checks that [his]
deceased wife tore up in 2005,” but the claims representative could
not help him. J.A. 157. Defendant then became belligerent, and
his voice got “real, real loud.” J.A. 104.
The on-duty security officer, Edward Seigle, approached
Defendant and urged him to lower his voice and stop using
profanity, but Seigle’s comments further agitated Defendant. An
altercation ensued, and although accounts vary as to how it
started, it is clear that Defendant and Seigle ended up on the
ground in the bathroom of the SSA office after Defendant “swung
at” Seigle. J.A. 86. Defendant thrashed wildly, but Seigle
eventually subdued Defendant until police arrived.
Following his arrest, Defendant was charged with, and pled
guilty to, assault on a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 111(a)(1) and (b). Defendant’s sentencing hearing focused
primarily on the mechanics of the altercation, particularly on
whether Defendant attempted to grab Seigle’s firearm. During the
hearing, the district court heard testimony from Defendant,
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Seigle, other SSA employees who witnessed the incident, and the
arresting officer.
Seigle testified that Defendant “started up at the bottom of
my holster, he got to the top of . . . my gun in my holster . . .
. [H]e was after my weapon.” J.A. 130. Defendant confirmed that
he “put [his] hand on [Siegle’s] holster.” J.A. 158. However, he
denied that he was trying to take Seigle’s firearm and instead
asserted that he touched the holster merely to “scare” Seigle so
that Seigle would “get off of me.” J.A. 158. But the two SSA
employees who witnessed the altercation confirmed Seigle’s version
of events. They testified that Defendant “grabbed on to Officer
Seigle’s holster” and was “reaching for [Seigle’s] sidearm.” J.A.
107, 118. The district court also heard from the arresting
officer, who testified that after transporting Defendant to jail
and reading him his Miranda rights, Defendant stated that he “was
trying to grab [Seigle’s] Glock,” and that his “intentions were to
kill him because he was beating me.” J.A. 147.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court
calculated Defendant’s guidelines range using the aggravated
assault guideline under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 and imposed a within-
guidelines sentence of 130 months.
Defendant appealed to this Court, challenging both the
validity of his guilty plea and the calculation of his guidelines
range. Bryant, 540 Fed. App’x at 243.
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After affirming the denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, we vacated his sentence and remanded to the
district court to clarify its factual findings and to resentence
Defendant. Id. at 251. Specifically, we asked the district court
to resolve an ambiguity it created when it made conflicting
statements during Defendant’s sentencing hearing. On the one hand,
the district court accepted “all of the findings in the Presentence
Report.” J.A. 167. This included a recommendation to apply
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, the guideline for aggravated assault, which
requires that the assault involved a dangerous weapon. On the
other hand, the district court stated that the offense took place
“with no weapon involved by the defendant.” J.A. 168. These
contradictions made the district court’s intent unclear because
“[i]f no dangerous weapon was involved, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cannot
apply.” Bryant, 540 Fed. App’x at 250.
In addition, an error in the presentence report clouded the
district court’s intent. The presentence report described the
charged offense as an assault by use of a deadly weapon when the
actual crime charged and pled to was assault inflicting bodily
injury.
We therefore vacated and remanded so the district court could
resolve these discrepancies, clarify its intent, and resentence
Defendant. Importantly, though, we did not hold that the district
court could not apply the aggravated assault guideline:
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To the contrary, the district court heard facts that
might supports its application of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 via
the Relevant Conduct Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. For
example, Seigle [and other SSA employees] all testified
that Defendant was grabbing for Seigle’s gun. Defendant
himself admitted that he was attempting to scare Seigle
by touching his holster. And [the arresting officer]
testified that Defendant told him that he was attempting
to grab Seigle’s “glock” and that if he had been
successful, he would have killed Seigle.
Id. at 250–51. Nevertheless, we chose not to speculate as to what
the district court might have intended.
On remand, the district court conducted another sentencing
hearing. During the hearing, the district court acknowledged that
“[t]he record may not be as clear as it should have been,” but
that it would “correct[] the record today.” J.A. 235. To that
end, the district court noted that it “was not saying there was no
gun involved in the case at the time.” J.A. 235. Rather, the
district court meant that “[t]he defendant didn’t bring the deadly
weapon there.” J.A. 230. The district court went on to state the
guideline it was applying and why it was applying it:
[A]ggravated assault . . . is defined . . . as a
felonious assault that involved a dangerous weapon with
the intent to cause bodily injury . . . .
The Court finds that the threatened use of it, that is,
in the middle of a fight reaching for the officer’s
firearm, as all of the witnesses, including defendant,
said the defendant did. The defendant has changed his
story, but the Court is discounting that and finds from
the preponderance of the evidence that he was going for
the gun. That because of that this becomes an aggravated
assault and, therefore, that’s why I’m finding 2A2.2 is
correct.
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J.A. 237–38. The district court then calculated the guidelines
range and imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 115 months. This
appeal followed.
II.
Defendant maintains on this second appeal that the district
court again erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 instead of U.S.S.G.
§ 2A2.4. Defendant argues that U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cannot apply
because there is no factual basis to support a finding that the
assault “involved” a dangerous weapon. We disagree.
When reviewing a district court’s sentencing determination,
we must “ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range . . . .” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We assess the district court’s guidelines
calculation by reviewing its legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Lawing, 703
F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir. 2012). Clear error occurs only when we
are left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 337 (4th
Cir. 2008).
Here, Defendant pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)
and (b), a statute making it a crime to assault, resist, or impede
a government officer or employee. The sentencing guidelines direct
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that a defendant’s sentence for violating Section 111 must be
calculated either under the guideline for “Obstructing or Impeding
Officers,” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4, or under the guideline for
“Aggravated Assault,” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. See U.S.S.G. App. A. The
district court here chose the guideline for “Aggravated Assault,”
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2.
The central question before us is whether Defendant’s offense
“involved” a firearm. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. “Aggravated assault” is
defined, in relevant part, as “a felonious assault that involved
. . . a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e.,
not merely to frighten) with that weapon.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 app.
n.1 (emphasis added). Thus, “involve” is the operative threshold
needed to trigger Section 2A2.2 here.
The term “involve” is, on its face, broad and not limited to,
for example, “use,” “possess,” or “control.” See United States v.
Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 278–81 (3d Cir. 2010) (interpreting the
phrase “involved in” as used in a firearm statute and concluding
“involve” is a “broad term”). While not defined in the guidelines,
the dictionary defines “involve” as “[t]o have as a necessary
feature or consequence; entail . . . [t]o relate to or affect.”
American Heritage Dictionary 923 (5th ed. 2011). See also, e.g.,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1191 (2002) (defining
“involve” as “engage,” “entail,” “imply,” and “implicate”). And
“[t]his [C]ourt has long consulted dictionaries of common usage in
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order to establish the plain meaning of disputed statutory
language.” United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir.
2012).
We do not purport to establish some grand test for when an
assault “involves” a firearm. But when we turn to the facts of
this case, it is clear that Defendant’s conduct, as found by the
district court, satisfies the involve threshold.
During the resentencing hearing, the district court explained
that when it stated during the first sentencing hearing that the
offense took place “with no weapon involved by the defendant,”
J.A. 168, it was merely commenting that Defendant did not bring
the weapon to the SSA office himself.
Moreover, the district court relied upon the very facts that
we stated could support application of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. See
Bryant, 540 Fed. App’x at 250–51. Namely, Seigle and two other
SSA employees testified that Defendant “reach[ed] for the
officer’s firearm” and was “going for the gun.” J.A. 237.
Defendant also admitted that he touched Seigle’s holster. And the
arresting officer testified that Defendant stated he was
attempting to grab Seigle’s “glock” and intended to use it to kill
Seigle.
The district court then discredited Defendant’s version of
the events in which he claimed, among other things, that he was
not the aggressor and did not touch or intend to take Seigle’s
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gun. These findings together led to the conclusion that Defendant
“threatened [the] use” of Seigle’s firearm and that the assault
involved a dangerous weapon. J.A. 237. Accordingly, the district
court found “from the preponderance of the evidence that . . .
this becomes an aggravated assault and, therefore, that’s why . .
. 2A2.2 is correct.” J.A. 237–38.
Given the conflicting testimony, the district court was
entitled to discredit Defendant’s version of the incident and find
that he was attempting to grab Seigle’s firearm. And absent clear
error, which is not present here, we are not at liberty to disturb
such supported factual findings. Harvey, 532 F.3d at 337 (“We .
. . review the factual findings of the district court . . . for
clear error.” (citation omitted)). Instead, we must uphold the
district court’s determination. See United States v. Chandia, 675
F.3d 329, 337 (4th Cir. 2012).
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district
court properly applied the aggravated assault guideline. We
therefore
AFFIRM.
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