Opinion issued July 23, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-15-00606-CR
———————————
EX PARTE ALFONSO SANTANA VILLA, Appellant
On Appeal from the 174th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 752734-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Alfonso Santana Villa, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
application for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Background
Villa pleaded guilty on August 8, 1997, to the felony offense of aggravated
assault. Pursuant to Villa’s plea bargain agreement with the State, the trial court
deferred making any finding on Villa’s guilt, placed him on community
supervision for five years, and assessed a $500 fine. Villa’s sworn plea paperwork
states: “I fully understand the consequences of my plea herein, and after having
fully consulted with my attorney, request that the trial court accept said plea.” The
paperwork further states that Villa’s “plea [was] freely and voluntarily made,” that
he understood the court’s admonishments and was “aware of the consequences of
[his] plea,” and that he was “satisfied with the representation provided by [his]
counsel and [he] received effective and competent representation.” Villa did not
appeal from the trial court’s August 8, 1997 judgment.
Villa filed an application for writ of habeas corpus on August 27, 2014,
challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea based on allegedly ineffective
assistance of counsel and requesting that the trial court vacate its judgment placing
him on community supervision. The trial court denied his application on June 8,
2015. Villa timely filed a notice of appeal on June 26, 2015.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on an application for writ of habeas corpus
for an abuse of discretion. See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006); Ex parte Zantos-Cuebas, 429 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). However, we review de novo a trial court’s
determination that is based solely on an application of legal standards or that
2
involves mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend upon credibility and
demeanor. See Ex parte Zantos-Cuebas, 429 S.W.3d at 87; State v. Collazo, 264
S.W.3d 121, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). In conducting
this review, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.
See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664; Ex parte Zantos-Cuebas, 429 S.W.3d at 87.
A habeas applicant bears the burden of establishing that the facts entitle the
applicant to relief. See Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997); Ex parte Murillo, 389 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, no pet.).
Applicable Law
For a guilty plea to be consistent with due process, it must be entered
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664; Ex parte
Olvera, No. 05-11-01349-CR, 2013 WL 4052467, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug.
21, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). A guilty plea may
not be induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises. See Kniatt,
206 S.W.3d at 664, Morrow, 952 S.W.2d at 534. “Generally, a guilty plea is
considered voluntary if the defendant was made fully aware of the direct
consequences [of the plea].” State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999); accord Olvera, 2013 WL 4052467, at *2; see also Ex parte
Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“[W]e continue to
3
recognize the distinction between direct and collateral consequences . . . .”). “A
defendant’s sworn representation that his guilty plea is voluntary ‘constitutes a
formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.’” Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d
at 664 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629
(1977)).
“A guilty plea is not knowing or voluntary if made as a result of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d at 689. When a habeas
applicant challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we
apply the two-pronged Strickland test. See Murillo, 389 S.W.3d at 926 (citing Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985)). To be entitled to relief,
an applicant challenging his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance must
establish that: (1) trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s
ineffectiveness, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See
Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d at 691; Ex parte Carpio-Cruz, No. 08-10-00240-CR,
2014 WL 5316988, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 17, 2014, no pet.) (not
designated for publication); Ex parte Roldan, 418 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
4
Analysis
In his application for writ of habeas corpus, Villa argues that his guilty plea
was involuntary because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Villa
contends that he would not have pleaded guilty if counsel had fully informed him
of the consequences of the plea.
Under Padilla v. Kentucky, trial counsel representing a criminal defendant
“must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” 559 U.S.
356, 374, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). Counsel’s performance is deficient if
counsel fails to advise a noncitizen client about deportation consequences that are
“truly clear.” Id. at 369, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. Padilla, however, does not apply
retroactively, and therefore “defendants whose convictions became final prior to
Padilla . . . cannot benefit from its holding.” Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1103, 1113 (2013); see Ex parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013).
Here, Villa pleaded guilty on August 8, 1997, before Padilla was decided on
March 31, 2010, and he did not take any further action regarding the trial court’s
order of deferred adjudication. His conviction therefore became final for purposes
of Padilla and federal immigration law on August 8, 1997, and he may not benefit
5
from Padilla’s holding. See State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 588 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013); Carpio-Cruz, 2014 WL 5316988, at *3.
Under pre-Padilla law, immigration consequences were collateral
consequences of a guilty plea, and “the constitutional guarantee to effective
assistance of counsel does not extend to ‘collateral’ aspects of the prosecution;
thus, a pre-Padilla plea is not involuntary even if counsel [was] deficient in
advising his client regarding the immigration consequences.” Roldan, 418 S.W.3d
at 147; see Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d at 888–89; Morrow, 952 S.W.2d at 536; Carpio-
Cruz, 2014 WL 5316988, at *2–3; Olvera, 2013 WL 4052467, at *7. Accordingly,
even if Villa’s trial counsel did not advise him of the possible immigration
consequences of his plea, Villa cannot satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test
because he cannot show that his plea was involuntary based on any alleged failure
of counsel to fully advise him regarding the immigration consequences of his plea.
See Morrow, 952 S.W.2d at 536–37; Carpio-Cruz, 2014 WL 5316988, at *3;
Olvera, 2013 WL 4052467, at *7; Roldan, 418 S.W.3d at 148.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it found that Villa “fails to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for trial counsel’s alleged
deficient conduct, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
would have been different,” that Villa “fails to show that his initial guilty plea was
6
unlawfully induced, made involuntarily, or made without an understanding of the
nature of the charge against him and the consequences of his plea,” that Villa “fails
to overcome the presumption that his initial guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily made,” and that Villa’s “plea was voluntary.”
Alternatively, we may uphold the trial court’s ruling because it found that
counsel “conducted a thorough investigation” and “was aware that the applicant
was not a citizen of the United States of America,” that Villa “was informed of the
potential immigration consequences of his plea,” and that Villa’s “assertion that he
was never told about the consequences of his plea is not credible,” and those
findings are supported by the evidence, namely, trial counsel’s affidavit stating that
counsel “reviewed the State’s file,” that counsel “plainly told Mr. Villa[ ]in his
native language of Spanish that since he was not a citizen of the United States of
America, a plea of guilty for the offense charged may result in deportation,
exclusion from admission to the county [sic], or the denial of naturalization under
federal law,” that “Villa understood the consequences of his plea,” and that
“Villa’s plea was both voluntary and intelligently made.” Because the trial court’s
findings turn on an evaluation of credibility and are supported by counsel’s
affidavit, we defer to those findings. See Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452,
457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Manzi v. State, 88 S.W.3d 240, 242–44 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002); Roldan, 418 S.W.3d at 145, 148.
7
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Villa’s application for
writ of habeas corpus because Villa failed to carry his burden of proving his
entitlement to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We
dismiss any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Massengale.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
8