MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jul 24 2015, 10:55 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Gregory F. Zoeller
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Kelly A. Miklos
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Manuel Guzman, July 24, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1409-CR-667
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas H. Busch,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Cause No. 79D02-1305-FA-6
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] After the trial court accepted a plea agreement, Manuel Guzman (“Guzman”)
was convicted of a single count of Dealing in Methamphetamine, as a Class A
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felony,1 and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, with four years to be
served in Community Corrections and five years suspended to probation.
Guzman now appeals, challenging as inappropriate the trial court’s sentencing
order with respect to the duration of the executed portion of his sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] We take our facts from the single charge to which Guzman entered a guilty
plea.
[4] On May 3, 2013, Guzman knowingly manufactured methamphetamine while
in, on, or within one thousand feet of two family housing complexes or an
elementary school. (App’x at 36.)
[5] On May 8, 2013, Guzman was charged with Conspiracy to Manufacture
Methamphetamine, as a Class A felony;2 Dealing in Methamphetamine, as a
Class A felony; Possession of Methamphetamine, as a Class B felony;3
Possession of Chemical Agents or Precursors with Intent to Manufacture, as a
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1. Our General Assembly enacted wide-reaching revisions of Indiana’s criminal
statutes, which took effect after the date of Guzman’s offense. We refer to those statutory provisions in effect
at the time of Guzman’s proceedings before the trial court.
2
I.C. §§ 35-41-5-2 & 35-48-4.1-1.
3
I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1.
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Class C felony;4 two counts of Possession of a Schedule IV Controlled
Substance, as Class C felonies;5 Possession of Paraphernalia, as a Class A
misdemeanor;6 and Operating a Vehicle while Suspended, as a Class A
misdemeanor.7 Guzman was also alleged to be a Habitual Substance Offender. 8
[6] On January 16, 2014, the State moved to amend the charging information as to
the counts for Conspiracy to Manufacture Methamphetamine, Dealing in
Methamphetamine, and Possession of Chemical Agents or Precursors with
Intent to Manufacture. The trial court granted the motion.
[7] On March 21, 2014, Guzman and the State entered into a plea agreement,
whereby Guzman agreed to enter a plea of guilty as to Dealing in
Methamphetamine, as a Class A felony, as charged. In exchange for the guilty
plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Sentencing was left to
the trial court’s discretion. The trial court accepted the agreement.
[8] During the course of the proceedings, one of Guzman’s court-appointed
attorneys was forced to withdraw from the representation due to a conflict of
interest in the case. Guzman raised concerns with the performance of his
4
I.C. § 35-48-4-14.5.
5
I.C. § 35-48-4-7.
6
I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3.
7
I.C. § 9-24-19-2.
8
I.C. § 35-50-2-10.
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subsequent appointed counsel. These factors resulted in a delay of Guzman’s
sentencing hearing until August 20, 2014.
[9] During the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied a motion from Guzman’s
second court-appointed counsel to withdraw from the representation. After
reviewing the presentencing report and hearing argument from the parties, the
trial court sentenced Guzman to twenty years imprisonment, with eleven years
to be executed in the Indiana Department of Correction, four years to be served
with the Tippecanoe County Community Corrections, and five years suspended
to probation.
[10] This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[11] In this appeal, Guzman argues that his sentence is inappropriate. The authority
granted to this Court by Article 7, § 6 of the Indiana Constitution permitting
appellate review and revision of criminal sentences is implemented through
Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides: “The Court may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” Under this rule, and as interpreted by case
law, appellate courts may revise sentences after due consideration of the trial
court’s decision, if the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Cardwell v. State, 895
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N.E.2d 1219, 1222-25 (Ind. 2008); Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 856-57 (Ind.
2003). The principal role of such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers.
Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225.
[12] Here, Guzman was convicted of Dealing in Methamphetamine, as a Class A
felony. Accordingly, Guzman faced a sentencing range running from twenty to
fifty years of imprisonment, with an advisory term of thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-
2-4. Guzman received the minimum term of twenty years; with five years of
the sentence suspended to probation, eleven years of the sentence were to be
served in the Indiana Department of Correction, and four years were to be
served with Tippecanoe County Community Corrections.
[13] Turning first to Guzman’s argument concerning the nature of his offense, we
have little evidence other than the facts as alleged in the charging information
and factual statements drawn from the affidavit of probable cause.
Nevertheless, we observe that the gravamen of Guzman’s argument as to this
factor in Appellate Rule 7(B) is that Guzman received a more severe term of
executed time than his co-defendant, who was convicted of Class C and D
felonies and who allegedly taught Guzman how to make methamphetamine.
Guzman is correct that sentencing of a co-defendant may be considered in
reviewing the inappropriateness vel non of a defendant’s sentence. However,
based upon the category of offense to which Guzman pled guilty, Guzman
received the lowest possible difference between the length of his sentence and
that of his co-defendant. We think, then, that the nature of Guzman’s offense
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and his comparative culpability do not support a conclusion that his sentence
was inappropriate.
[14] We now turn to Guzman’s character. As he notes, Guzman has led a very
difficult life, with a very abusive childhood environment, few educational
opportunities, ongoing medical issues, childhood exposure to substance abuse,
and even compelled substance abuse while he was a child. Guzman also has a
history of mental health diagnoses that may have been incorrect, and has taken
steps to address his educational situation by obtaining a GED as an adult. The
trial court took all of this into account in sentencing Guzman to a minimum
sentence, and granted him probation and community corrections placement for
nearly half of that.
[15] Yet Guzman also has a long history of criminal convictions resulting from a
history of substance abuse, and has not taken advantage of numerous
opportunities for rehabilitation. Guzman also has a prior conviction for
Domestic Battery, and was facing criminal charges in two other cases at the
time of his guilty plea hearing. While Guzman entered a guilty plea in this
case, we observe that he derived substantial benefit in doing so, by avoiding the
possibility of conviction and sentencing for numerous additional charges.
[16] In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that a minimum sentence, with
substantial portions of that sentence ordered to be spent in a community
corrections program or suspended to probation—the award of which leniency is
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a matter of grace on the part of the trial court, Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549
(Ind. 1999)—was inappropriate.
[17] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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