FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 24 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEANNA SMITH, individual and as the No. 14-15390
mother of CR, a minor,
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00332-SRB
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF ARIZONA, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
LEANNA SMITH, individual and as the No. 14-15473
mother of CR, a minor,
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00332-SRB
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KATHRYN COFFMAN, M.D., et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
And
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
STATE OF ARIZONA et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 17, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges and GLEASON,** District
Judge.
Leanna Smith appeals from the district court’s order granting Defendant-
Appellees’ motion to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds. Consolidated with that
appeal is an appeal of the district court’s order denying fees requested by
Defendant-Appellants Kathryn Coffman and St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical
Center. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
1. “This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal based on res
judicata.” W. Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.
1997) (citing UPS, Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 77 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir.
1996)). “Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars litigation in a
subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the
**
The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
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prior action. In order for res judicata to apply there must be: 1) an identity of
claims, 2) a final judgment on the merits, and 3) identity or privity between the
parties.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The district court accorded preclusive
effect to two prior actions, Smith v. Barrow Neurological Institute, No. CV 10-
01632-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 4359057 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2012) (“Smith I”) and
Smith v. Arizona, No. 2:12-cv-00905-ROS (“Smith II”), and dismissed all the
claims in this action (“Smith III”).
2. As to Smith II, most of the defendants in that action were dropped by the
amendment of the complaint, which carries no preclusive effect. Hells Canyon
Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). And
although the district court granted summary judgment on the merits to the
remaining defendants in Smith II, it subsequently issued an order dismissing the
action without prejudice, which likewise lacks res judicata effect. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(a); In re Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1989).
3. As to Smith I, a final judgment on the merits resolved that case in favor of
defendants.1 And Smith is in privity because she was the plaintiff in Smith I and is
the party against whom claim preclusion is being asserted here. See California v.
1
We affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in Smith
I in Smith v. Banner Health Systems, – F. App’x –, 2015 WL 3758031 (9th Cir.
June 17, 2015).
3
IntelliGender, LLC, 771 F.3d 1169, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2014). Therefore, res
judicata will apply to the extent there is an identity of claims between Smith I and
Smith III.
To determine whether an identity of claims exists, this court applies a four-
part test, examining
(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior
judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution
of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same
evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the
two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4)
whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts.
Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 (quoting Harris v.
Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1980)). Whether the two suits arise out of the
same transactional nucleus of facts is “the most important” criteria. Id.
Here, Smith I and Smith III arise out of the same transactional nucleus of
facts—the taking into custody of CR by the State of Arizona and the subsequent
treatment provided to CR while in state custody. And both cases involve the
alleged infringement of Smith’s parental rights. These factors weigh heavily in
favor of finding an identity of claims. The other two Costantini factors also weigh
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in favor of such a finding.2 The operative complaint in Smith I was filed on
December 23, 2010. We hold that any claim that was or could have been raised in
that complaint is barred by res judicata, and that all of the claims in this action
could have been raised in the December 2010 Smith I complaint except the claim
for malicious prosecution.
4. Smith’s malicious prosecution claim could not have been brought until
CR’s dependency proceeding was concluded in January 2012. See Giles v. Hill
Lewis Marce, 988 P.2d 143, 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (“In an action for malicious
prosecution, the plaintiff must show the defendant instituted a civil action which
was motivated by malice, begun without probable cause, terminated in favor of the
plaintiff, and damaged the plaintiff.”). However, we need not remand on that claim
because “[i]f support exists in the record, a dismissal may be affirmed on any
proper ground.” Sinibaldi v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 754 F.3d 703, 706
(9th Cir. 2014). The district court in Smith I found that “[i]n light of the reports
from CR’s doctors and established law under A.R.S. § 8-821(B), a reasonable CPS
investigator would have probable cause of believe that taking CR into temporary
protective custody was lawful at the time.” We hold that the district court’s
2
The rights or interests of the Smith I defendants could be impaired in this
action through renewed exposure to liability stemming from the same acts. And
the relevant evidence in the two actions is substantially the same.
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finding that CPS had probable cause to initiate proceedings related to CR is
properly accorded collateral estoppel effect and forecloses Smith’s malicious
prosecution claim. See B. & B. Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct.
1293, 1302–03 (2015).
5. “We review a district court’s decision to grant attorneys’ fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1988 for an abuse of discretion.” Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477
F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). We hold that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that Smith’s pursuit of this action was not
“unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious” and declining to award fees.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
AFFIRMED.
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