J.A21015/15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
PATRICK HARRISON, :
:
Appellant : No. 1533 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order May 12, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division No(s).: MC-51-CR-0036469-2013
BEFORE: ALLEN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015
Appellant, Patrick Harrison, appeals from the order denying his petition
for writ of certiorari with the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
following a judgment of sentence entered in the Philadelphia Municipal Court
after a bench trial and conviction for simple possession of a controlled
substance.1 He challenges whether the police had reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to seize him. We affirm.
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court.
See Trial Ct. Op., 11/4/14, at 1-3.2 Appellant was tried and found guilty in
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
2
We acknowledge the holding of In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013), that
after October 30, 2013, the scope of review for a suppression issue is limited
J.A21015/15
the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County, which sentenced him to twelve
months’ probation on January 23, 2014. On February 22, 2014, he filed a
petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Common Pleas, which denied
same on May 12, 2014. Appellant timely appealed on May 14, 2014, and
timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Appellant raises the following issues:
Did not the [municipal] court err when it denied
[Appellant’s] motion to suppress physical evidence where
two police officers seized him as he was walking down the
street, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
and where [Appellant’s] flight and the recovery of a jar of
PCP were the fruit of an unlawful stop?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant claims that while walking outside at 10:30 p.m., a patrol car
with two police officers pulled up to him and asked him to approach and
remove his hands from his pockets. He contends he responded by
continuing to walk, at which point one officer exited the vehicle and again
ordered him to approach and remove his hands from his pockets. Appellant
asserts he responded by removing his hands from his pockets but then
putting them back in. He argues he made no movement and the officers did
to the record available to the suppression court. Id. at 1085, 1089 (stating
holding applies to “all litigation commenced Commonwealth-wide after the
filing of this decision”). Because the instant criminal complaint was filed
prior to October 30, 2013, In re L.J. does not apply.
-2-
J.A21015/15
not discern any suspicious objects on his person that justified his seizure.
We discern no basis for relief.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a
trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct. Where the prosecution prevailed in
the suppression court, we may consider only the
Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence for
the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
In re J.E., 937 A.2d 421, 425 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). In evaluating
the legal conclusion drawn by the suppression court, this Court may also
consider uncontradicted testimony from the suppression hearing not
included in the suppression court’s findings of fact. Commonwealth v.
Mendenhall, 715 A.2d 1117, 1119 n.1 (Pa. 1998). We can also affirm on
any basis. Commonwealth v. Clouser, 998 A.2d 656, 661 n.3 (Pa. Super.
2010).
Initially we note that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
has led to the development of three categories of
interactions between citizens and the police. The first of
these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information)
which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but
carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The
second, an “investigative detention[,]” must be supported
by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop
and a period of detention, but does not involve such
coercive conditions as to constitute the functional
equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial
detention” must be supported by probable cause.
-3-
J.A21015/15
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995) (citations and
footnote omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the objective
Jones/Mendenhall3 standard “in determining whether the conduct of the
police amounts to a seizure or whether there is simply a mere encounter
between citizen and police officer.” Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d
769, 774 (Pa. 1996).
In [Commonwealth v. Hicks, 253 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1969)],
this Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), which permits a police officer to
effect a precautionary seizure where the police have a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry,
and by analogy Hicks, recognized that there are some
instances in which an individual may not be arrested, but
will still be considered to be “seized.” In Jones, this Court
adopted an objective standard for determining what
amount of force constitutes the initiation of a Terry stop:
whether a reasonable person innocent of any crime, would
have thought he was being restrained had he been in the
defendant’s shoes. This case, which preceded the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in . . . Mendenhall, . . .
was a precursor to the so-called “Mendenhall” test
posited by the United States Supreme Court: “a person
has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed he was not free to leave.”
The Jones/Mendenhall standard has since been
consistently followed in Pennsylvania in determining
whether the conduct of the police amounts to a seizure or
3
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Commonwealth v.
Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977).
-4-
J.A21015/15
whether there is simply a mere encounter between citizen
and police officer.
Id. at 773-74 (some punctuation and citations omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided further guidance in applying
this “totality of the circumstances” test:
In evaluating the circumstances, the focus is directed
toward whether, by means of physical force or show of
authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in some way
been restrained. In making this determination, courts
must apply the totality-of-the-circumstances approach,
with no single factor dictating the ultimate conclusion as to
whether a seizure has occurred.
Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 890 (Pa. 2000) (footnotes and
some citations omitted). Factors examined in this totality-of-the-
circumstances approach include “all circumstances evidencing a show of
authority or exercise of force, including the demeanor of the police officer,
the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and
the content of the interrogatories or statements.” Mendenhall, 715 A.2d at
1119. This Court also set forth a non-exclusive list of factors:
[T]he number of officers present during the interaction;
whether the officer informs the citizen they are suspected
of criminal activity; the officer’s demeanor and tone of
voice; the location and timing of the interaction; the visible
presence of weapons on the officer; and the questions
asked. Otherwise inoffensive contact between a member
of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law,
amount to a seizure of that person.
Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1047 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(en banc) (citation omitted).
-5-
J.A21015/15
A request to talk does “not need to be justified by any level of
suspicion.” In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1165 (Pa. 2001). A request is
distinguishable from a demand. Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002,
1007 n.3 (Pa. 2012). A seizure does not occur when police request
identification from an individual or ask questions of that individual. Id. at
1007 (quoting, inter alia, I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)
(“[P]olice questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment
violation.”)). Similarly, a police demand to keep one’s hands out of one’s
pockets is a “minor inconvenience” and “not a substantial impairment on [a
defendant’s] liberty of movement, particularly considering the officers[’]
legitimate concerns for their own safety.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 54
A.3d 76, 83 (Pa. Super. 2012).
In sum, the question of “whether the police needed some level of
requisite cause at the time they initially approached” the defendant is
“governed by the type of encounter that the police initiated when they
approached” the defendant. In re D.M., 781 A.2d at 1164 (emphases
added). The critical inquiry is what type of encounter the police initiated at
the time they initially approached the defendant. See id. After identifying
the type of encounter—e.g., mere encounter, investigative detention, or
custodial detention—this Court must then determine whether the police had
the requisite cause for that encounter, respectively, e.g., no suspicion
required, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, or probable
-6-
J.A21015/15
cause for an arrest. See Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1047; Jones, 378 A.2d at 839
n.4.
Instantly, Appellant’s argument did not address the flash information
relied on by the police and their belief that Appellant matched the flash.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Under the totality of the circumstances, we assume a
seizure occurred when the police, late at night and in a high crime area,
initially asked Appellant to “come here,” thus issuing an official compulsion
to stop. See Mendenhall, 715 A.2d at 1119; Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1047. The
police reinforced the directive to approach the vehicle when one of the
officers exited the vehicle and asked Appellant to remove his hands from his
pockets and “come here.” See Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1047. In other words, the
circumstances were such that a reasonable, innocent person, in Appellant’s
shoes, would have thought he was being restrained. See Matos, 672 A.2d
at 773-74.
Consequently, we ascertain whether the police had the requisite
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot after initiating the
investigative detention. See id.; Jones, 378 A.2d at 839 n.4. In
establishing whether there was reasonable suspicion, it is axiomatic that the
United States and Pennsylvania constitutions “do not proscribe all searches
and seizures . . . only ‘unreasonable’ ones.” Commonwealth v. Beaman,
880 A.2d 578, 582 (Pa. 2005) (footnote omitted).
The reasonableness of a seizure that is less intrusive than
a traditional arrest depends upon a three-pronged
-7-
J.A21015/15
balancing test derived from Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), in which the
reviewing Court weighs the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty. To be deemed
reasonable under this standard, such a seizure must
ordinarily be supported by reasonable suspicion, based
upon objective facts, that the individual is involved in
criminal activity. The existence of individual suspicion,
however, is not an “irreducible” component of
reasonableness in every circumstance.
Id. at 582 (emphasis added and citations and some punctuation omitted);
accord Commonwealth v. Mistler, 912 A.2d 1265, 1271 (Pa. 2006)
(stating that “the Fourth Amendment generally requires the presence of
individualized suspicion to justify a seizure”). “A primary concern when
balancing opposing interests is protecting the individual from arbitrary
invasions resulting from the broad discretion of the officers.” Mistler, 912
A.2d at 1271. Instantly, because of the flash and the police belief that
Appellant matched the flash,4 we hold that under the totality of
circumstances, the police reasonably believed Appellant was involved in
criminal activity. See Beaman, 880 A.2d at 582 (holding reasonable
suspicion based on objective facts). Accordingly, we discern no error by the
4
We acknowledge that the flash description was for a gunpoint robbery
committed by a black male wearing a white hoodie and a black male wearing
a blue hoodie; Appellant is a black male who was wearing a black hoodie
that appeared to be dark or blue at the time the police encountered him.
N.T., 1/23/14, at 7-8, 14-15, 24, 26.
-8-
J.A21015/15
trial court and affirm, albeit on different grounds. See In re J.E., 937 A.2d
at 425; Clouser, 998 A.2d at 661 n.3.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/24/2015
-9-
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
vs. NO.: MC-51-CR-0036469-2013
PATRICK HARRISON
;,,_,·;
OPINION
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, Patrick Harrison, was charged as of the above bill and term number
with knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance and resisting arrest
following his arrest on September 18, 2013. On January 23, 2014, defendant appeared
before the Honorable Frank T. Brady of the Municipal of Philadelphia County for trial.
Prior to the commencement of trial defendant litigated a motion to suppress, which Judge
Brady denied. Defendant then proceeded to trial and at the conclusion of the trial Judge
Brady found defendant guilty of the drug offense but not guilty of the resisting arrest
charge. Judge Brady then imposed a sentence of twelve months' probation upon
defendant.
Following the imposition of sentence, defendant filed a petition for writ of
certiorari. The petition was heard by this Court and denied. Defendant thereafter filed a
notice of appeal and a requested Pa.R.A.P. l 925(b) statement.
MC·51·CR·0036469·2013 Comm. v. Harrison, Patrick M.
Opinion
III I I IIII/ II IIII I II Ill l/1
7218716041
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
FACTUAL HISTORY
On September 18, 2013, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer
Brian McCarthy and his partner, Officer Gallagher, was on routine patrol when they
received a radio call indicating that a gunpoint robbery had just occurred in the area of
4211d and Walnut Streets and that the complainant had described his assailants as two
black men garbed in blue and white hooded sweatshirts respectively, who had fled in a
westerly direction. (N. T. 6- 7, 26). 1 Approximately two minutes thereafter, the officers
observed defendant in the vicinity of 44111 and Walnut Streets walking northbound on 44th
Street. Id. Because he was wearing what the officers believed to be a blue sweatshirt and
he matched the flash information, the officers told defendant to approach them. (N.T.
7).2 Defendant looked at the officers, stuck his hands in his pocket and kept walking. Id.
As defendant was walking away, Officer McCarthy exited his vehicle, told
defendant to remove his hands from his pocket and to come to him. Id. Defendant
complied with both requests but as he approached the officers, he placed his hands back
inside his pockets. (N.T. 7). Officer McCarthy removed defendant's hands from
defendant's pockets at which time defendant fled northbound on 44th Street. (N.T. 8).
Officer McCarthy pursued him and managed to subdue defendant, who was struggling,
by getting him down onto the ground and handcuffing him with the help of other officers.
Id.
I
All references to the record refer to the testimony recorded on January 23, 2014, during the motion to
suppress and trial.
2
Officer McCarthy indicated that on closer inspection the sweatshirt was black but appeared to be blue
because it was dark. (N .T. 14).
2
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
Before he was apprehended and he as he was fleeing defendant discarded a glass
Jar from his right hand pocket. Id. Police retrieved the glass object after securing
defendant. It was found to contain more than six grams of PCP. (N .T. 48).
DISCUSSION
In his l 925(b) statement, defendant asserts that this Court erred by denying his
writ of certiorari. According to defendant the writ should have been granted because
Judge Brady erred by denying his motion to suppress because police lacked sufficient
grounds to effectuate an investigative detention of him given that he was merely walking
down the street and did not match the description of either robbery suspect. Defendant
further contends that because the police did not have grounds to stop him the PCP should
have been suppressed insofar as it was discarded as a result of illegal police conduct.
A lower court's decision on the issuance of a writ of certiorari will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. McGinley, 563 A.2d 518 (Pa.
Super. 1989). The standard of review for a challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress
is that, assuming there is support in the record, the reviewing court is bound by the facts
as found by the suppression court and may reverse the court only if the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 572 (Pa.
1997). "[The ]scope of review is limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions of
the [trial] court." In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). The
reviewing court is "limited to considering only the evidence of the prevailing party,
and so much of the evidence of the non-prevailing party as remains uncontradicted when
read in the context of the record as a whole." Id.
3
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
Our Pennsylvania courts require law enforcement officers to demonstrate
ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as those
interactions become more intrusive. The first of these is a "mere encounter," or request
for information, which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no
official compulsion to stop or to respond. Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987
(Pa. 2006). The second, an "investigative detention," must be supported by a reasonable
suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve
such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest, Id. An
officer may conduct a brief investigative stop of an individual where the totality of the
circumstances leads the officer to possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot. Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226, 228 (Pa. 1996).
Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.
See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 614 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Pa. 1992). The key difference
between an investigative detention and a custodial one is that the latter involves such
coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest, Pakacki, 901
A.2d at 987. In determining whether an encounter with the police is custodial, the
standard is an objective one, and must be determined with reference to the totality of the
circumstances. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1085-86 (Pa. 1993).
Whenever a police officer stops a person and restricts his or her freedom to leave,
the officer has "seized" the individual and the protections of the Fourth Amendment
apply. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). "[A]n encounter becomes a seizure if the
officer engages in conduct which a reasonable man would view as threatening or
offensive even if performed by another private citizen. This would include such tactics
4
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
such as ... blocking the path of the suspect, and encircling the suspect by many officers ..
. . " Bennett, 604 A.2d at 283. To determine whether an interaction rose to the level of a
seizure, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v.
Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 890 (Pa. 2000) (quoting 3 WAYNE LEFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE§ 9.2(H) (20 ED. 1987).
Instantly, the suppression court found that the interaction originated as a mere
encounter and only later rose to the level of an investigative detention after defendant put
his hands back inside his pockets after being told to remove them from his pockets and he
fled after Officer McCarthy removed defendant's hands from them. (N.T. 39). This
Court found nothing amiss with this conclusion because the officers did nothing
suggesting that defendant could not continue on his way during their initial interaction
with defendant. The police did not grab defendant, brandish weapons, block his way, or
use language a reasonable person would have concluded could not be ignored.
Police officers are "entitled to approach ordinary citizens on the street and ask a
few questions." Commonwealth v. Guzman, 44 A.3d 688, 694 (Pa. Super. 2012). It was
only after defendant refused to remove his hands from his pockets did the encounter rise
to the level of an investigatory stop.3 In Commonwealth v. Matiin, 705 A.2d 887 (Pa.
Super. 1997), police received an anonymous tip at 3:30 p.m. that Martin was selling
narcotics at the Capital Cafe. Martin, 705 A.2d at 890. The tip was relayed to Detective
3
It is noted that simply asking someone to remove his hands from his pocket does not escalate a mere
encounter into an investigative detention. See Commonwealth v. Lyles, 54 A.3d 76 (Pa. Super. 2012),
affirmed, 97 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2014) (noting that the minor act of asking someone to remove his hands from
his pocket is "not a substantial impairment on ... liberty of movement, particularly considering the officers
legitimate concerns for their own safety.").
5
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
Raymond Greene who knew Martin. Id. Detective Greene proceeded to the Cafe where
he approached Martin, asked him if he could speak with him, and then asked him "to step
outside." Id. Martin responded, "Okay," and exited the Cafe. Id.
On appeal, the Superior Court held that in asking Martin to talk and step outside
did not initiate an investigative detention because Detective Greene did not approach
Martin in a threatening manner, did not coerce or intimidate him, and never told Martin
that he was required to leave the Cafe. Id.
Similarly, In the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 2001), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that no seizure had occurred in a case in which an officer received a
call that a man was seen with a gun at a certain intersection in Philadelphia. Id., 781 A.2d
at 1162. Police responded immediately and saw D.M., who matched the description of
the armed man provided by the caller. Id. The officer "exited his vehicle and told [D.M.]
to come over." Id. The Supreme Court found that the officer acted legally his iteratction
with "did not need to be justified by any level of suspicion" because, "at the time the
police initially approached D.M. it was unclear whether the police intended to do
anything other than talk to him." Id.
Instantly, as in the foregoing cases, police did nothing more than manifest an
intention to speak to defendant. As noted above, there is no evidence that the police
acted in a threatening, coercive, or intimidating manner, or that when they first
encountered defendant they told him that he was required to stop. Instead, the record
shows that defendant voluntarily stopped and began speaking with the police. It was only
after defendant placed his hands inside his pocket that the incident escalated into an
6
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
investigative detention. Thus, the lower court did not en by finding that defendant's
rights were not violated when police initially interacted with defendant.
Next, the fact that the police ordered defendant to take his hands out of his
pockets did not convert the encounter into a seizure. The Superior Cami has ruled that
"if during a mere encounter, an individual on his own accord, puts his hands in his
pocket, thereby creating a potential danger to the safety of a police officer, the officer
may justifiably reach for his side arm and order the individual to stop and take his hand
out of his pocket. Such reaction by a police officer does not elevate the mere encounter
into an investigative detention because the officer's reaction was necessitated by the
individual's conduct." Commonwealth v. Caiier, 779 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. 2001);
see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 713 A.2d 650, 653 (Pa. Super. 1988) (the defendant was
not seized when an officer asked him rev'd on other grounds, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001).
Thus, by having his hands in his pocket and then placing them back inside them
after being directed to remove them, defendant gave police grounds to stop and
investigate him. In Hall, supra, the facts were as follows:
Two Reading police officers, patrolling in their cruiser, saw
defendant and a companion conversing in an alley near a
cafe. The police parked their vehicle, the conversants broke
up, and appellant approached the police car while getting
his I.D. out of his wallet and asked "Is everything all right,
officer?" After a brief exchange, the officer removed from
his vehicle and noticed Hall had his hands in his pocket. He
asked if he was armed and Hall said he was not. Hall was
asked to take his hands out of his pocket, but only removed
his left hand. As the officer came to him, Hall pivoted with
his hand in his pocket. After being asked again to remove
his hand, he did, but became confrontational and stated that
he would not be searched. The officer replied that he would
not search him, but only pat him down for weapons.
Hall, 713 A.2d at 652-653.
7
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
The Hall Court ruled that "when Hall approached with his hand thrust in his
pocket and refused to remove it, the encounter escalated into a situation where the totality
of circumstances involved a reasonable suspicion and justified a detention to stop and
frisk." Hall, 713 at 653. Thus, the Hall's decision to keep his hand in his pocket after
being asked to remove it escalated the encounter into one of reasonable suspicion.
Here, as in Hall, defendant's decision to again place his hands raised the matter
from a mere encounter to an investigative detention. The finding by the lower court that
this was so was not erroneous.
In addition, even if the initial interaction between the police and defendant herein
did rise to the level of an investigative detention, a reversal is not required because police
had the right to stop defendant based on the totality of circumstances existing at the time.
While on routine patrol, the officers herein received a flash report of a gunpoint robbery.
The flash report provided a physical and clothing description of the assailants as well as
the direction in which they fled. Not more than two minutes later, two block west of the
scene of the robbery, the police observed defendant, who matched the physical
description of one of the assailants, was dressed in garb closely matching the description
of the clothes worn by one of the suspects and had his hands in his pockets.
Case law is clear that facts such as the instant ones justified the stop. As a general
matter, police are permitted to conduct an investigatory stop "when relying on
information transmitted by a valid police bulletin." In re D.M., 727 A.2d 556, 558(Pa.
1999) ( citations omitted); See also Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357 (Pa. Super.
2009) (police had reasonable suspicion to conduct investigatory detention upon arriving
at location, a high crime area, within 90 seconds of the radio call and found the defendant
8
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
matching the description of the radio call, and the defendant walked away from the
approaching police cruiser and grabbed at his waist band); Commonwealth v. Jackson,
519 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa. Super. 1986) (police officer may rely on police radio flash
information to justify investigatory stop).
That same factor present here as well as others, all of which justified the stop of
defendant, including the recent radio call, the fact that the robbery was committed by
gunpoint, and defendant's similarity to the description broadcast over police radio.
Defendant asserts that the stop was illegal because he did not match the flash
description because his sweat shirt was black in color and not blue. This small
discrepancy was explained by the officer. Moreover, the law is clear that minor
differences in clothing do not render a stop illegal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vinson,
522 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. Super. 1987) (stop proper although the appellant and his
companion were shorter than the victim's description, and their jackets were different);
Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 437 A.2d 44 (Pa. Super. 1981) (stop was proper even though
the defendant wore a different color and type of coat from the description, and he lacked
the described hat).
It is important to note that a reviewing court "cannot evaluate the totality of the
circumstances through the grudging eyes of hindsight nor in terms of library analysis, but
as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 907 A.2d 540, 543 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703
A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1997)).
9
Circulated 07/08/2015 12:39 PM
Finally, regarding defendant's claim that the illegal actions of the police forced
him to abandon the PCP, and therefore the lower court erred by denying his suppression
motion, it is noted that
[T]he principle of "forced abandonment" is not recognized
under the Fourth Amendment, California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690, (1991),
although it is under Article 1, Section 8. Conunonwealth v.
Matos, 43 Pa. 449, 672 A.2d 769 (1996). While
Pennsylvania recognizes the principle of forced
abandonment, that legal theory requires that the
abandonment of contraband or evidence be precipitated by
illegal police conduct. In the Interest of Evans, 717 A.2d
542 (Pa.Super. 1998).
Commonwealth v. Jones, 978 A.2d 1000, 1005 n. 6. (Pa. Super. 2009).
Because the police acted legally in all respects in their interaction with defendant,
there was no forced abandonment and the lower court did not en by denying defendant's
motion to suppress on that ground.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, it is suggested that the ruling made
by this Court denying defendant's petition for writ of certiorari be sustained.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.
DATE 1#/N
10