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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-14836
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:14-cr-00157-SDM-TBM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONALD DEANDREA SOLOMON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(July 28, 2015)
Before HULL, WILLIAM PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Ronald Deandra Solomon appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). Solomon challenges the
sufficiency of his indictment and the denial of his motion for a judgment of
acquittal. We affirm.
Solomon’s challenges to the sufficiency of his indictment fail. Solomon
argues that his indictment is factually insufficient, but he waived that challenge to
his indictment by failing to “raise [it] before trial,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). See
United States v. Pacchioli, 718 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013). Solomon also
argues that his indictment is deficient because it charged him in the conjunctive
with “possess[ing] in and affecting” instead of in the disjunctive as provided in
section 922(g), but an indictment does not have to recite verbatim the language of
the statute, United States v. Fern, 155 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
Solomon’s indictment stated that his conduct violated “Section 922(g)(1),” which
was sufficient to inform him of the charge against him. And the indictment
described the firearm that Solomon possessed, “a Glock, Model 19, 9 millimeter
pistol,” and the date and place where he committed the offense, which enabled him
to prepare and present a defense and to avoid a second prosecution for the same
offense. See United States v. Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1046 (11th Cir. 2002).
Solomon argues that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal, but his
arguments are foreclosed by our precedents. Solomon argues that section 922(g) is
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an unconstitutional exercise by Congress of its power under the Commerce Clause
to purely intrastate conduct, under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995), but unlike the statute in Lopez, section 922(g) “contains an express
jurisdictional requirement,” United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th
Cir. 2011). Solomon also argues that his firearm did not “substantially affect”
interstate commerce because he possessed it briefly in a residential parking lot, but
a convicted felon violates section 922(g)(1) if the firearm that he possesses
traveled previously in interstate commerce, see United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d
708, 715–16 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273–74
(11th Cir. 2001); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996).
The district court did not err by convicting Solomon when he stipulated that his
firearm “was manufactured in Austria and . . . traveled in and affected interstate
and foreign commerce prior to” reaching him in Florida.
We AFFIRM Solomon’s conviction.
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