Case: 14-14379 Date Filed: 07/28/2015 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-14379
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:94-cr-00169-KMM-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MARK LODIGENSKY,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 28, 2015)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-14379 Date Filed: 07/28/2015 Page: 2 of 6
Mark Lodigensky appeals the sentence a district court imposed when he
violated the conditions of his supervised release. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm.
Mr. Lodigensky completed a term of incarceration in February 2012 and
began a three year term of supervised release. As relevant here, under the terms of
his supervised release Mr. Lodigensky was prohibited from committing any
federal, state, or local crime. In June 2013, the probation office petitioned the
district court for revocation of Mr. Lodigensky’s supervised release, alleging that
he had committed a string of burglaries beginning in late 2012. The district court
conducted an evidentiary hearing and adjudged Mr. Lodigensky guilty of all
alleged violations, a determination he does not challenge here.
The parole office’s probation revocation report noted that the nine violations
yielded an advisory guideline range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment, but that the
nature of the convictions for which he originally served time dictated that the
maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon revocation of
supervised release was two years. The district court accordingly sentenced Mr.
Lodigensky to a two year term of imprisonment, which he does not challenge, to
be followed by a one-year term of supervised release, which he now challenges on
appeal.
2
Case: 14-14379 Date Filed: 07/28/2015 Page: 3 of 6
We review the reasonableness of a sentence, including one imposed upon
the revocation of supervised release, for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v.
Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006). We “must first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error,” including by “failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines
as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines
range.”1 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Mr. Lodigensky contends that his one year term of supervised release is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court provided no explanation
regarding why further supervised release was necessary. 2 We disagree. The
1
The factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) include the nature and circumstances of
the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes by the
defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training; and the
kinds of sentences available and established sentencing ranges. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(5).
2
Mr. Lodigensky also devotes considerable space in his brief to a discussion of why the
district court is not permitted to impose any additional term of imprisonment should he violate
his new one year term of supervised release. But he concedes that the district court had authority
to impose the term of supervised release. Instead, he seems to suggest that, because the district
court cannot impose further incarceration should he violate the terms of his supervised release
yet again, the court was unreasonable to impose a term of supervised release at all. However,
nothing would prevent the district court from imposing additional terms of supervised release if
Mr. Lodigensky violates the current terms the court has delineated. Thus, the supervised release
term is not without purpose and, as explained above, was based on the district court’s reasoned
judgment.
3
Case: 14-14379 Date Filed: 07/28/2015 Page: 4 of 6
district court spoke extensively with Mr. Lodigensky and counsel for the
government about Mr. Lodigensky’s offense history and characteristics and the
need to deter future criminal activity, as well as about the court’s previous attempts
to provide rehabilitation opportunities for Mr. Lodigensky, before stating that it
had “considered the statements of all parties and the information in the [parole]
violation report.” Doc. 229 at 15; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). The court then
“determined that a sentence within the guideline range is appropriate.” Id. at 15-
16. Because the record reflects that the district court considered the arguments on
both sides and exercised reasoned judgment in arriving at an appropriate sentence,
we cannot say the court abused its discretion. See United States v. Livesay, 525
F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting the district court must “set forth enough
to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has
a reasoned basis for exercising [its] legal decisionmaking authority” but “is not
required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the
§ 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors”).
We next consider the substantive reasonableness of Mr. Lodigensky’s
sentence, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. The weight to be accorded any given sentencing factor generally is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Dougherty,
754 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion in
4
Case: 14-14379 Date Filed: 07/28/2015 Page: 5 of 6
sentencing a defendant by failing to afford consideration to relevant sentencing
factors that were due significant weight, giving significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor, or by committing a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
Mr. Lodigensky argues that all that is necessary to make it less likely that he
will recidivate is the two year term of imprisonment the district court imposed, so
the additional term of supervised release necessarily is “greater than necessary” to
achieve the deterrence the court seeks. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (proving that a
sentence should be no greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing,
including deterrence of future criminal conduct). We disagree. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that “forbidding the reimposition of supervised release after
revocation and imprisonment would be fundamentally contrary to” Congress’s
intent to give district courts broad discretion to allocate supervision “to those
releasees who needed it most.” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709
(2000). This is because “if any prisoner might profit from the decompression stage
of supervised release, no prisoner needs it more than one who has already tried
liberty and failed.” Id. The district court considered Mr. Lodigensky to be one of
those prisoners who needed a decompression most considering that he previously
committed nine violations of his term of supervised release. We see no abuse of
discretion in imposing an additional one year term.
5
Case: 14-14379 Date Filed: 07/28/2015 Page: 6 of 6
AFFIRMED.
6