MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jul 29 2015, 9:12 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Edward A. McGlone Caitlin M. Miller
Terre Haute, Indiana Hunt, Hassler, Lorenz & Kondras, LLP
Terre Haute, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Billy L. Haymaker, July 29, 2015
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
61A01-1411-DR-495
v. Appeal from the Parke Circuit Court
The Honorable Samuel A. Swaim,
Judge
Victoria L. Haymaker,
Trial Court Cause No. 61C01-1304-
Appellee-Petitioner. DR-152
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Respondent Billy Haymaker (“Husband”) and Appellee-Petitioner
Victoria Haymaker (“Wife”) were married in 1980 and separated in 2013 upon
Wife’s filing of a dissolution petition. Between 1997 and 2000, Wife’s mother
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had conveyed sixty-five acres of farmland to Wife and Wife’s two siblings as
joint tenants with rights of survivorship (“the Farm”). Wife had also opened a
bank account with Old National Bank (“the Account”) into which she
deposited her share of revenue from the Farm, which is operated by her brother.
[2] As part of the dissolution proceeding, the marital residence was appraised by
three persons, two of whom appraised the property at $190,000 and one at
$230,000. Wife and Husband also submitted appraisals of certain heavy
equipment of Husband’s with Wife’s appraisal of its value being significantly
higher than that of Husband’s. After a hearing, the trial court determined, inter
alia, that (1) Wife’s gift of her portion of the Farm and the Account warranted
an uneven division of the marital estate because those assets remained in her
name and were not comingled with Husband’s assets, (2) the value of the
marital residence was $230,000, and (3) the value of Husband’s heavy
equipment was the mean of all of the appraisals that were performed.
[3] Husband contends that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
that the Farm and the Account warranted a deviation from the presumptive
equal split of the marital estate, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in
valuing Wife’s interest in the Farm, (3) the trial court abused its discretion
valuing the marital residence, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in
valuing Husband’s heavy equipment. We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in, essentially, assigning the Farm to Wife but did abuse its
discretion in assigning the Account to her. We further conclude the trial court
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did not abuse its discretion in valuing the marital estate or Husband’s heavy
equipment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] Husband and Wife were married on May 17, 1980. From 1997 to 2000, Wife’s
mother executed four warrantee deeds for the “Farm,” a 325-acre property held
by Wife, Wife’s brother Joseph Fessant, and Wife’s sister Mary Beth Walls as
joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Husband was aware of the Farm but
never requested that it be retitled to add his name. At some point, Wife opened
the Account, into which she deposited her share of the Farm’s income. The
Account was used for whatever family needs arose, “[w]hether it be furniture or
something the children needed.” Tr. p. 220. The income from the Farm was
reported on the joint tax returns filed by the parties.
[5] On April 15, 2013, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to
Husband. On May 21, the trial court held a hearing on the dissolution petition.
At the hearing, the evidence included three appraisals of the marital residence
and four appraisals of certain heavy equipment of Husband’s, three performed
on his behalf and one on Wife’s. Brian Conley appraised the Farm at $325,000,
but did not take into account that it was currently a joint tenancy with rights of
survivorship. Carl Miller, III, testified that it would be difficult to market a one-
third interest in a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. Miller further
testified that the interests in the Farm would have to be separated in order to be
marketable, which could be accomplished by a partition suit. Wife and Fessant
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both testified that they wished to give their children their interest in the Farm
and intended to convert title to the Farm to a tenancy in common. As of the
date of the hearing, however, Wife and Walls had not spoken in seventeen
years.
[6] On July 3, 2014, the trial court issued its dissolution decree, which provides, in
part, as follows:
DECREE OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
This cause came on for final hearing the 21st day of May,
2014. Petitioner, Victoria L. Haymaker (hereinafter “Wife”),
appeared in person and by counsel, Teri M. Lorenz.
Respondent, Billy L. Haymaker (hereinafter “Husband”),
appeared in person and by counsel, Edward A. McGlone.
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was heard. The Court,
having taken this matter under advisement, now enters the
following Decree of Dissolution, dissolving the parties’ marriage
and dividing the assets and debts of the marriage.
1. The parties were married on May 17, 1980. The parties
separated on April 5, 2013.
….
6. Wife is an employee of the Vigo County School
Corporation and earned $30,786 in 2013. Husband is an
employee of Novelis and earned $119,046 in 2013.
Therefore, Husband’s annual income is nearly four (4)
times more than Wife’s annual income. However,
Husband is close to retirement.
….
11. During the marriage, Wife received a gift of a 1/3 interest
in 65 acres of farm real estate, in Vigo County, IN, from
her mother, following the death of her father in a farm
accident. The co-owners of said farm are Wife’s brother
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and sister. The real estate is titled to these three (3)
siblings as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Wife is
3 years older than her brother, Joseph Fessant, and 15
years older than her sister, Mary Beth Walls. Mortality
tables indicate Wife may survive her brother because
females live longer than males, however, such tables
would also indicate that Mary Beth Walls will survive both
her siblings and as the youngest surviving joint tenant with
right of survivorship, would end up owning the fees simple
in the 65 acres. The alternative to the last surviving sibling
owning the fee simple in the real estate would be for the
three (3) owners to agree to divide the real estate, in kind;
to agree to sell the real estate and divide the proceeds
among them; or one or more of the siblings filing a lawsuit
to partition the real estate.
12. The fact that Wife and her younger sister have not spoken
to each other for years indicates that co-operation to divide
or sell the real estate will be unlikely and having to file a
partition action will be likely.
13. The fee simple interest in the 65 acre farm was appraised
by Brian Conley during the pendency of this matter for
$325,000.
14. The costs to Wife of partitioning her interest in the 65 acre
farm, according to Carl N. (“Chip”) Miller, III, are:
a. Litigation costs including attorney fees: $20,000
b. Real estate appraisal fee: $2,000
c. Realtor’s commission at 6% $6,500
Total: $28,500
These expenses would, therefore, reduce the value of
Wife’s fractional 1/3 interest in the real estate from
$108,333 to $79,833. In any event, the value of this asset
is somewhat irrelevant. Regardless of the value, it is
Wife’s asset alone. She inherited it and Husband has
contributed nothing toward this asset. The Court would
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deviate from the 50/50 presumption in favor of the Wife
by any amount placed as the value of this asset.
However, its value and income do somewhat
counterbalance Husband’s superior income earning
ability.
15. During the marriage Wife maintained Old National Bank
Account #0302, into which she deposited her net farm
income after payment of farm expenses such as Indiana
real property taxes.
….
19. The parties built the home at 10660 S. Rukes Road and
invested approximately $350,000 in its construction.
20. There were four (4) appraisals on the marital residence.
Wife had the real estate appraised by Johnny Swalls
($190,000) and by Chip Miller ($230,000). Both of these
appraisals were market-analysis appraisals. Wife also had
a market assessment performed by Becki Busiere of Remax
Real Estate who inspected the real estate, inside and out,
and determined the fair market value of the real estate to
be $230,000 to $235,000. Husband had the real estate
appraised by Cindy Steiner at $190,000; however, Ms.
Steiner looked at the home from the road, only, and did
not view the interior of the home. Ms. Steiner’s appraisal
was a “lender’s appraisal”.
21. Ms. Steiner did not inspect the interior of the residence
until after preparation of her appraisal report and
understated the square footage of the real estate by 258
square feet and determined a value per square foot of the
real estate at $114.46. Chip Miller opined, that had
Steiner used the correct square footage, her value of the
real estate would have increased by $29,530, bringing her
value to $219,530. Ms. Steiner acknowledged at the final
hearing that she had underestimated the square footage of
the residence but testified that her correction of that error
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would not increase her opinion of the value of the real
estate.
22. Appraiser, Johnny Swalls adjusted his Comparable #1 as
if it had a larger basement than the parties= [sic] basement,
when, in fact, it had no basement. Correcting this error
increased the value of Comparable #1 by $25,460. Swalls
corrected this error in his appraisal after it was brought to
his attention by Chip Miller; however he did not increase
the value of the real estate as a result of this correction.
23. Neither Steiner nor Swalls seemed to make any adjustment
on their comparables for the fact that the basement in the
parties’ home is fully finished and includes two (2)
bedrooms and a full bath. Chip Miller believed that the
value of this improvement, as compared to an unfinished
basement, was $29,000. Had Swalls or Steiner adjusted
their values, accordingly, for the fully finished basement at
the marital residence, which provides substantial
additional living space, their values of the real estate
would have exceeded the value of the real estate
determined by Chip Miller.
24. Chip Miller testified that shortly before the parties’ final
hearing, a home comparable to and in close proximity to
the parties’ Parke County real estate had sold for $250,000.
He testified that had this comparable been available at the
time of his appraisal, he would have relied heavily on it.
He testified that this recent comparable confirmed his
value of the parties’ real estate at $230,000.
25. The Court determines that the value of the residence, at
separation, was $230,000. This is a beautiful home for
which the parties should be proud. It would appear to the
Court that $230,000 is actually a very reasonable price for
such a home.
26. The date of separation balance of the Wells Fargo
mortgage against the real estate was $127,806, leaving
equity in the real estate of $82,194.
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27. Each party shall be confirmed in the continued ownership
of all household goods, furnishings, personal effects, tools
and heavy equipment in his/her possession, same having
been allocated between the parties during the pendency of
this matter.
28. There were also four (4) appraisals of some part or all of
the parties’ personal property.
a. Wife commissioned the appraisal by Johnny Swalls
of all household goods and furnishings, tools,
equipment and heavy machinery. The value of such
property as determined by Swalls was $48,331.50.
Swalls appraised the heavy equipment at $30,100.
b. Husband commissioned three other appraisals of
some part or all of his heavy equipment, only. The
value of some part or all of the heavy equipment
determined by Husband’s appraisers were:
David Hayes: $11,825
Jim Maier (“Diamond”) $13,800
Wright Implement $11,659
29. The Court finds Wife’s approach in averaging the 2 to 4
appraised values of each piece of heavy equipment to
determine its mean value to be reasonable. Therefore, the
adjusted value of the parties’ personal property is $35,899,
of which Wife received property valued at $5,835 and
Husband received property valued at $30,004.
30. The Court accepts Husband’s argument that the 50/50
presumption should be rebutted because only 33/35ths of
his Novelis Pension Plan was accrued during the marriage.
The Court will award Husband with 53% of this Plan.
31. The Court finds that the assets which comprise the marital
estate and the value thereof, at separation, are as follows:
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Marital
Asset Titling FMV Debt Pot
Value
Parties’ Pre-Marital
Gifted Assets
….
Wife’s gifted 1/3
interest as joint tenants
with right of
survivorship with W’s
siblings in 65 acres of
farmland in Sanford
(Vigo County),
w 79,833 79,833
Indiana. Appraised by
Brian Connelly for
$325,000 reduced by
costs of partition
action. $325,000 ÷ 3 =
$108,333 - $28,500 =
$79,833
ONB Savings (Farm
w 3,540 3,540
Account) #0302
….
Additional Assets
Acquired by Joint
Effort of Parties
Real Estate
Marital residence as
10660 S. Rukes Road,
Rosedale (Parke
County), Indiana,
including 6 acres;
subject to Wells Fargo jt 230,000 127,806 102,194
mortgage #0359
($127,806). Value per
market analysis
appraisal of Carl N.
Miller, III.
Personal Property
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Household goods and
furnishings; value per
appraisal by Johnny
Swalls with heavy
equipment valued at jt 35,899 35,899
mean value
determined by Swalls
and 3 other appraisers
of such equipment.
….
Total Estate 2,138,827 127,806 2,011,021
32. The presumption of an equal division of assets between the
parties under I.C. 31-15-7-5 is rebutted and the Court
determines that Wife is entitled to more than fifty percent
(50%) of the marital estate because of the value of her
gifted assets which remained in Wife’s name, alone,
during the marriage and which were not commingled with
Husband. Wife also argues the court should rebut the
presumption because of Wife’s inferior earning ability and
her inferior economic circumstances with respect to Social
Security retirement benefits and the increased cost of her
medical insurance. These are valid concerns, but Husband
is close to retirement and Wife has been keeping her own
income out of marriage for a significant amount of time.
While this may not rise to “dissipation” it is an economic
circumstance the Court has considered. In addition, Wife
will end up with her acreage in Vigo County. The Court
finds that each of the parties contributed an equal amount
of money to the completion of the home Husband was
building at the time of the marriage and therefore brought
an equal value of assets into the marriage, and that neither
party dissipated assets during the marriage. While each
party alleged that the other party had dissipated assets, the
parties would not have accumulated the marital estate that
existed at separation if there had been any significant
dissipation of assets. The Court intends to equally divide
the estate, except the premarital assets and gifts. The
additional amount awarded to Wife ($45,215.38) roughly
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represents the additional amounts Wife has as a gift or
premarital item.
….
36. Husband shall refinance the Wells Fargo mortgage secured
by a lien against the marital residence and pay Wife her
$51,097 equity in the real estate within 60 days of this
Order. Wife shall quit claim to Husband her interest in the
real estate in the context of his refinancing, under a Quit
Claim Deed prepared by Husband’s attorney. Husband
shall continue to pay and hold Wife harmless against all
expenses associated with the former marital residence,
pending his refinancing.
Appellant’s App. pp. 18-23, 25, 28.
[7] On August 1, Husband filed a motion to correct error. On October 22, 2014,
the trial court issued its order to correct error, revaluing some assets that are not
at issue in this appeal and redividing the marital estate accordingly.
Discussion and Decision
[8] When we review a case in which the trial court has made
requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set
aside the court’s judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. Rose
Acre Farms, Inc. v. Greemann Real Estate (1987), Ind. App., 516
N.E.2d 1095, 1097, trans. denied. A judgment is clearly erroneous
when unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions
thereon. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record
lacks any facts or reasonable inferences to support them.
Donavan v. Ivy Knoll Apartments Partnership (1989), Ind. App., 537
N.E.2d 47, 50. In determining whether the findings and
judgment are clearly erroneous, we will neither reweigh the
evidence nor judge witness credibility, but we will consider only
the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support
the judgment. Agrarian Grain Co. v. Meeker (1988), Ind. App., 526
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N.E.2d 1189, 1191. A judgment is contrary to law if it is
contrary to the trial court’s special findings. Id.
DeHaan v. DeHaan, 572 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied.
I. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in
Dividing the Marital Estate Unequally
[9] Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 provides as follows:
The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital
property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this
presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant
evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that
an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
spouse:
(A) before the marriage; or
(B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
disposition of the property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to
dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court
considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
(A) a final division of property; and
(B) a final determination of the property rights of the
parties.
[10] “Subject to the statutory presumption that an equal distribution of marital
property is just and reasonable, the disposition of marital assets is committed to
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the sound discretion of the trial court.” Augspurger v. Hudson, 802 N.E.2d 503,
512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom. An abuse of discretion also occurs when the trial
court misinterprets the law or disregards evidence of factors listed
in the controlling statute. The presumption that a dissolution
court correctly followed the law and made all the proper
considerations in crafting its property distribution is one of the
strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on
appeal. Thus, we will reverse a property distribution only if there
is no rational basis for the award and, although the circumstances
may have justified a different property distribution, we may not
substitute our judgment for that of the dissolution court.
Id. (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
[11] Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in departing from the
statutory presumption of an equal division of marital assets. Specifically,
Husband contends that Wife failed to establish that her interest in the Farm and
the Account were sufficient to rebut the presumption of an equal split.
[12] We reject Husband’s argument so far as the Farm is concerned. As previously
mentioned, the presumption of equal division may be rebutted by evidence
regarding the extent to which property was acquired through inheritance or gift.
See Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5(2)(B). Here, Wife presented evidence that her interest
in the Farm was deeded to her and her alone and no attempt was ever made to
retitle Wife’s interest to add Husband, despite his full knowledge of the Farm.
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Fessant testified that he, Wife, and Walls’s great-grandfather owned the Farm
originally and that Fessant’s goal was to have his grandchildren have an interest
in the Farm. Wife testified that she wanted the Farm “for all [her] kids” and
that her parents’ main objective for the Farm was that it stay in the family. Tr.
p. 159. In light of the evidence that no attempt was made to incorporate the
Farm into the marital estate and that Wife and Wife’s family intended it to
remain the “family farm,” we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in departing from the presumption of an equal division of the marital
estate.1
[13] As for the Account, we reach a different conclusion. 31-15-7-5(4) provides that,
in deciding whether to depart from the presumption of equal division of the
marital estate, the trial court may consider “[t]he conduct of the parties during
the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.” Wife
testified that Farm income was reported on the parties’ joint tax return each
year and that the income was used “not just for [her], for whatever was
necessary[,]” including “furniture or something the children needed.” Tr. p.
220. Wife also testified that Husband had access to the Account. By Wife’s
admission, the funds in the Account were commingled with the marital estate
and used for marital expenses. So, while the trial court did not abuse its
1
Husband also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the value of Wife’s share in the Farm
was to be reduced by the cost of a partition suit when it was unclear that such a suit would be necessary.
Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning the interest in the Farm
entirely to Wife, however, we not address arguments concerning its specific value.
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discretion in concluding that Wife’s receipt of the Farm itself justified an
unequal division of the marital estate, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion by essentially taking the Account out of the marital estate.
II. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in
Assigning Value to Certain Marital Assets
A. The Marital Residence
[14] Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning a value
of $230,000 to the marital residence. Wife had two appraisals performed on the
residence, by Swalls and Miller, who valued it at $190,000 and $230,000,
respectively. Husband had Cindy Steiner appraise the property and she valued
it at $190,000. In addition, Wife put into evidence an opinion from Becky
Busiere that the residence was worth from $220,000-$235,000, although Busiere
specifically indicated that her opinion letter was “not an appraisal and is not
intended for that use.” Ex. 7. Only Miller and Steiner testified at the final
dissolution hearing.
[15] Husband argues that Miller’s upward adjustment for the residence’s finished
basement, $48,000 as opposed to Swalls’s $19,000 adjustment and Steiner’s
$20,000 adjustment, was excessive. Miller justified his adjustment by noting
that approximately 1400 square feet of the residence’s basement was finished
“just like living area” with “two bedrooms, a family room, a bathroom, [and] it
walks out to the back.” Tr. p. 30. Miller, while stopping short of saying that
Swalls failed to take into account the fact that the basement was finished,
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testified that Swalls’s adjustment for the basement reflected that “his
interpretation of the contributory value of a finished basement is not the same
as mine.” Tr. p. 35. As for Steiner, she testified that she did an exterior-only
inspection of the residence, and while she looked into some of the windows, she
was unable to look into the basement. In the end, Miller testified that, in
addition to his in-person inspection of the residence, he consulted “public
records and MLS data, talked to market participants. The normal scope of
work that you would do in any appraisal.” Tr. p. 24. Husbands points to many
other reasons why we should reject Swalls’s appraisal in favor of one of the
lower ones. The trial court, however, was in the best position to evaluate the
expertise and credibility of the witnesses and evaluate their documentary
submissions, and the trial court chose to accept Miller’s assessment. Husband’s
argument in this regard is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the
evidence, which we will not do. See DeHaan, 572 N.E.2d 1315, 1320.
B. Husband’s Heavy Equipment
[16] Husband also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing
several items of heavy equipment that were ultimately assigned to him. Wife
commissioned an appraisal by Swalls of all of the parties’ personal property,
while Husband had certain pieces of heavy equipment appraised by David
Hayes of Hayes Auctioneering, Wright Implement, and Jim Maier of Diamond
Equipment. The various appraisals of the items at issue are summarized below:
Item Swalls Hayes Wright Maier
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John Deere $9500 $4900 $5259 $5500
tractor
King Kutter $900 $450 $500 $500
finish mower
Eighteen-foot $1200 $800 $800
trailer
Homemade $125 $25
Ford bed
trailer
Case backhoe $8500 $2500 $2500 $3500
Cub Cadet $750 $225 $150 $500
mower
Gehl skid $8000 $2500 $2500 $2500
steer loader
Ford tractor $1000 $300 $500 $500
John Deere $125 $125 $250
five-foot
blade
[17] As laid out previously, the trial court summarized the results of the various
appraisals of Husband’s heavy equipment as follows:
a. Wife commissioned the appraisal by Johnny Swalls
of all household goods and furnishings, tools,
equipment and heavy machinery. The value of such
property as determined by Swalls was $48,331.50.
Swalls appraised the heavy equipment at $30,100.
b. Husband commissioned three other appraisals of
some part or all of his heavy equipment, only. The
value of some part or all of the heavy equipment
determined by Husband’s appraisers were:
David Hayes: $11,825
Jim Maier (“Diamond”) $13,800
Wright Implement $11,659
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Appellant’s App. pp. 21-22. The trial court determined the final value for each
piece of heavy equipment by accepting the average values of the two to four
appraisals that were made for each item at issue, as submitted by Wife:
Item Average
appraised
value
John Deere $67532
tractor
King Kutter $6333
finish mower
Eighteen-foot $800
trailer
Homemade $75
Ford bed
trailer
Case backhoe $4250
Cub Cadet $406
mower
Gehl skid $3875
steer loader
Ford tractor $575
John Deere $167
five-foot
blade
[18] Husband’s argument is essentially that Swalls’s appraisal of his heavy
equipment in particular—and all of the parties’ personal property in general—
should be discounted entirely because Swalls’s appraisals of his heavy
equipment were substantially higher than those of Hayes, Maier, and Wright
Implement. Husband, however, points to no flaws in Swalls’s methodology, no
2
The average of the four appraisals for the John Deere tractor is actually $6289.75.
3
The average of the four appraisals for the King Kutter finish mower is actually $587.50.
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reason to question his qualifications or objectivity, or any other reason to reject
his appraisal, for that matter. As with Husband’s previous argument, this
argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we
will not do. See DeHaan, 572 N.E.2d 1315, 1320. Husband has failed to
establish that the trial court’s valuation of his heavy equipment constitutes an
abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
[19] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deviating from
the presumption of an equal division of the marital estate and, in effect,
excluding Wife’s interest in the Farm from the marital estate. We conclude,
however, that the trial court abused its discretion in effectively excluding the
Account from the marital estate. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in valuing the marital residence or Husband’s heavy
equipment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for recalculation of
the final distribution of the marital estate, including the Account, which was
valued at $3540 at the time of separation.
[20] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and we
remand with instructions.
Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 61A01-1411-DR-495 | July 29, 2015 Page 19 of 19
Billy L. Haymaker v. Victoria L. Haymaker (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion