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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-14255
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:08-cr-00110-RBD-DAB-21
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOEY ROJAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(July 29, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Joey Rojas appeals the district court’s imposition, following revocation of
his supervised release, of a 10-month sentence of imprisonment and a new 3-year
term of supervised release. He argues that his revocation sentence is unreasonable
because it resulted in an unwarranted sentencing disparity between him a similarly
situated defendant. He also insists that the district court erred by failing to reduce
the term of supervised release by the amount of time imposed in the custodial
portion of the sentence. We affirm as to the first issue but vacate as to the second.
I
We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir.
2006) (per curiam). The party challenging the sentence on appeal bears the burden
of showing that it is unreasonable. United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1269
(11th Cir. 2015).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court may revoke the term of
supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment after considering specific
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including: (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the Sentencing Guidelines and
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid
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unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants; (7) the need to provide
restitution to victims; and (8) the need to give the defendant correctional treatment.
The district court placed great weight on the need to protect the public. It
based this consideration on Rojas’s history of drug abuse. The court, therefore,
considered appropriate factors and reasonably exercised its discretion. See United
States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the weight
given to any one factor is committed to the discretion of the district court).
Rojas points to another defendant who was sentenced only to time served
upon revocation of his supervised release, and Rojas claims his own sentence is
disparate from that defendant’s. But the record contains no information about that
defendant’s criminal history, the danger he posed to society, or the reason he was
given a revocation sentence of time served. And an unwarranted sentencing
disparity can exist only if the defendant and a comparator are similarly situated.
United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014). Rojas has not met
his burden of showing that this other defendant was similarly situated, because his
unwarranted-disparity argument does not compare “apples . . . to apples.” See
United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
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II
Rojas argues that the district court erred by failing to reduce his term of
supervised release by the length of his custodial revocation sentence. He raises
this argument for the first time on appeal, so we review it only for plain error. See
United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014).1
When a court revokes supervised release and imposes a term of
imprisonment, the court may also order an additional term of supervised release
after imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). But “[t]he length of such a term of
supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by
statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less
any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised
release.” Id.
Rojas’s original conviction carried a maximum authorized term of 3 years’
supervised release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (marriage fraud is punishable by up to
5 years’ imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(4) (offenses punishable by 5 years’
imprisonment are class D felonies); id. § 3583(b)(2) (the maximum term of
1
Plain error is: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) affects substantial rights. United
States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). We may exercise our discretion to
notice a forfeited error if it (4) “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United Stated v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2013). An error
is plain when it is clear or obvious under current law. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734,
113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993). An error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable
probability that there would have been a different result if the error had not occurred. United
States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005).
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supervised release for class D felonies is 3 years). Upon revocation, after imposing
the 10-month sentence of imprisonment, the district court could impose a
maximum additional term of supervised release of only 26 months—3 years minus
the 10-month revocation sentence of imprisonment. As the government concedes,
imposition of a term of supervised release greater than that authorized by law is
plain error. And the error affected Rojas’s substantial rights because, but for the
error, his term of supervised release would have been shorter. Finally, the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings.
We vacate district court’s judgment with respect to the period of supervised
release, and remand the case with instructions that the district court resentence
Rojas to serve no more than 26 months of supervised release.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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