MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jul 30 2015, 5:28 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Walker Whatley Gregory F. Zoeller
Pendleton Correctional Facility Attorney General of Indiana
Pendleton, Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Walker Whatley, July 30, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1411-PC-781
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana,
The Honorable David Seiter, Master
Appellee-Respondent Commissioner
Case No. 49G20-0111-PC-22293
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Walker Whatley appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief
(“PCR”). He argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his petition
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because there is no record of his guilty plea hearing to show that he was advised
of certain constitutional rights and waived them. Because Whatley cannot rely
solely on the missing record to carry his burden to show that he was not advised
of his constitutional rights, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In November 2001, the State charged Whatley with class C felony possession of
cocaine and a firearm, class D felony possession of cocaine, and class A
misdemeanor possession of marijuana. In February 2002, the State and
Whatley, who was represented by counsel, entered into a plea agreement,
wherein Whatley agreed to plead guilty to class C felony possession of cocaine
and a firearm and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The plea
agreement informed Whatley that by pleading guilty he was waiving certain
rights, including the rights to a public and speedy trial by jury, to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to remain silent and not to be
compelled to testify against himself.
[3] A guilty plea hearing was held. The court reporter was later unable to locate
the audio recording of the hearing. However, the chronological case summary
(“CCS”) contains an entry for the guilty plea hearing stating that Whatley was
advised of his rights and potential penalties and the factual basis for the offense
was given and that the trial court found that Whatley understood his rights and
knowingly and voluntarily waived them. The trial court accepted the plea
agreement. The trial court later held a sentencing hearing and sentenced
Whatley in accordance with the terms of his plea agreement.
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[4] In March 2011, Whatley filed a motion for transcripts of his guilty plea and
sentencing hearings. In November 2011, the court reporter filed an affidavit
stating that she had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate the audio
recordings of those hearings but had been unable to locate them.
[5] In 2012, Whatley filed a PCR petition, alleging that the trial court violated the
Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to maintain the recording of his
guilty plea hearing, he asserted his innocence at the guilty plea hearing, his plea
was not voluntary, and he was not advised of his federal constitutional rights as
required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 1 Subsequently, he filed an
amended PCR petition, alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance
in failing to communicate with him prior to the guilty plea hearing and in
coercing him to sign the plea agreement. He also alleged that the factual basis
for the charge was not established. In 2014, Whatley filed a motion to
withdraw guilty plea, 2 which contained the same allegations that he made in his
PCR petitions.
[6] A hearing was held, at which the postconviction court admitted the court
reporter’s affidavit. Initially, Whatley testified that at his guilty plea hearing he
1
“Boykin requires that the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that
the defendant was informed of, and waived, three specific federal constitutional rights: the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers.” Hall v. State,
849 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind. 2006).
2
Our appellate courts treat such a motion as a PCR petition. State v. Oney, 993 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind. 2013).
See also Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(c) (providing that a motion to withdraw guilty plea that is filed after the
convicted person is sentenced “shall be treated by the court” as a PCR petition).
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maintained his innocence and did not admit to the factual basis underlying the
charge of class C felony possession of cocaine and a firearm. Subsequently, he
testified that, after a recess, he admitted to the factual basis for the charge but
only because his attorney coerced him to do so. No other evidence was
introduced. The postconviction court issued findings of facts and conclusions
of law denying Whatley’s petition. Specifically, the postconviction court
concluded that Whatley failed to carry his burden to show (1) that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) that the factual basis for the charge was
not established. This pro se appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[7] In a postconviction proceeding, the petitioner “bears the burden of establishing
grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ritchie v. State, 875
N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ind. 2007). “When a petitioner appeals from a negative
judgment, he or she must convince the appeals court that the evidence as a
whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by
the trial court.” Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied
(2002). Although Whatley is “proceeding pro se and lacks legal training, such
litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel and are required to
follow procedural rules.” Ross v. State, 877 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007), trans. denied (2008).
[8] The gist of Whatley’s argument appears to be that the postconviction court
erred in denying his PCR petition because the trial court failed to maintain
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audio recordings of his guilty plea as required by Indiana Criminal Rule 10, 3
and therefore there is no record to show that he was advised of his Boykin rights.
The postconviction court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law do not
contain any specific findings or conclusions relating to this contention although
Whatley did raise it in his PCR petition. In Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158
(Ind. 2001), our supreme court stated,
A court that hears a post-conviction claim must make findings of fact
and conclusions of law on all issues presented in the petition. See Ind.
Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). The findings must be supported by facts
and the conclusions must be supported by the law. See Bivins v. State,
735 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied. Our review on appeal
is limited to these findings and conclusions.
Id. at 1164. Later in the opinion, the supreme court observed that the
postconviction court failed to make a specific finding and conclusion as to one
of Allen’s claims of ineffective assistance, and therefore the court would review
that issue de novo. Id. at 1170. Accordingly, we will review the issue raised by
Whatley de novo.
[9] It is true that “[t]he failure to advise a criminal defendant of his constitutional
rights in accordance with Boykin prior to accepting a guilty plea will result in
3
Indiana Criminal Rule 10 requires that the trial court create an electronic recording of all proceedings
whenever a defendant pleads guilty to a felony or misdemeanor charge and is sentenced upon that plea. It
also requires that if a transcription of the recorded matter is not prepared, certified, and filed in the criminal
proceeding, the electronic recording must be maintained as a court record for ten years in all misdemeanors
or fifty-five years in all felony cases.
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reversal of the conviction.” Ponce v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2014).
However, our supreme court has held that
[a] petitioner cannot obtain post-conviction relief on the ground of the
lack of Boykin advisements simply by proving that the guilty plea
record is lost and cannot be reconstructed. Rather, as with any claim,
the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of
the evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief.
Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 473 (Ind. 2006). In Hall, our supreme court
concluded that Hall failed to carry his burden because at his PCR hearing, he
relied solely on the fact that there was no record of his guilty plea hearing and
did not present any evidence regarding whether he had been advised of his
Boykin rights. Id. at 472-73.
[10] Likewise, Whatley did not present any evidence at his PCR hearing regarding
whether he was advised of his Boykin rights. He cannot carry his burden by
simply relying on the fact that the record of the guilty plea hearing is missing.
The plea agreement, which Whatley signed, specifically contains an
enunciation of and waiver of rights. In addition, the CCS indicates that the trial
court advised him of his rights and that he waived them. Accordingly, we
conclude that Whatley failed to carry his burden to show that he did not receive
his Boykin advisements. 4 Therefore, we affirm the denial of his PCR petition.
4
Whatley does not challenge the postconviction court’s conclusion that he failed to carry his burden to show
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. To the extent that Whatley argues that without a record of
the guilty plea hearing, the postconviction court cannot confirm or deny whether he maintained his
innocence or whether he admitted the factual basis to support his conviction, that argument is waived for
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[11] Affirmed.
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
failure to present a cogent argument. See Whaley v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1, 18 n.15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Failure
to put forth a cogent argument acts as a waiver of the issue on appeal.”); Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)
(“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent
reasoning.”).
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