UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4651
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JESSE JAMES BALDWIN, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00318-TDS-2)
Submitted: June 30, 2015 Decided: July 30, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY & JOHNSON, LLP, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Joanna G. McFadden, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jesse James Baldwin, Jr., pled guilty to conspiracy to pass
counterfeit obligations and passing counterfeit obligations, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 472 (2012). Baldwin was
sentenced to 28 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $48,800
in restitution. On appeal, Baldwin argues that his sentence was
unreasonable and that the court’s restitution order was not
adequately supported by evidence. Our review reveals no
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); United States v. Rivera–Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 100
(4th Cir. 2012). First, we ensure “that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the [Sentencing]
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552
U.S. at 51. We review a preserved claim of sentencing error for
abuse of discretion and, if error is found, will reverse unless
we conclude that the error was harmless. United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010).
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If the sentence is free of “significant procedural error,”
we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume on appeal that any sentence
within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is
reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). “A defendant can
only rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2014)
(alteration omitted).
Baldwin argues that the district court procedurally erred
by accepting the presentence report’s calculation of his
criminal history points, which assessed Baldwin seven criminal
history points for offenses he committed at age 16. We reject
Baldwin’s argument, as the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) (2013) contemplates that juvenile offenses may,
in certain circumstances, be taken into account when calculating
criminal history points. Baldwin’s convictions meet these
circumstances, and thus were appropriately assessed criminal
history points. Id.
Baldwin also argues that his within-Guidelines sentence was
substantively unreasonable because his sentence was longer than
those of his codefendants. We have reviewed the record and
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conclude that, though Baldwin’s sentence was longer than the
sentences imposed on his codefendants, Baldwin’s sentence was
reasonable. He had a higher offense level than one codefendant
and a greater criminal history category than the others. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Additionally, during sentencing, the
court’s reasoning and reliance on factors found in § 3553(a) was
thorough and Baldwin has not presented–nor does the record
provide–any basis for finding that his within-Guidelines
sentence was substantively unreasonable when compared with the
§ 3553(a) factors.
II.
Baldwin next argues that his restitution order was not
adequately supported by the evidence. We “review the district
court’s restitution award for an abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Catone, 769 F.3d 866, 875 (4th Cir. 2014); see also
United States v. Grant, 715 F.3d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A
district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or
irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors
constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous
factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.”). The
district court issued Baldwin’s restitution order pursuant to
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3663A-3664 (2012). The MVRA requires that a sentencing court
order the defendant to make full restitution to victims of an
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offense against property. § 3663A(a), (c)(1)(A)(ii); see also
United States v. Roper, 462 F.3d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 2006). When
the underlying offense is a criminal scheme or conspiracy,
restitution must be paid to “any person directly harmed by the
defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme,
conspiracy, or pattern,” § 3663A(a)(2); see United States v.
Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 341 (4th Cir. 2003).
Baldwin argues that his restitution order of $48,800 was
not adequately supported by the evidence. We disagree. The
presentence report, which was adopted by the district court,
served as the basis for the $48,800 figure. Although Baldwin
may have desired a more thorough explanation, the court’s
decision was based on the adopted factual findings, in
accordance with the MVRA, and not irrational or erroneous.
Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing restitution. Further, as to Baldwin’s
arguments regarding the amount of his restitution order compared
with his codefendants’, we lack the discretion to reduce
Baldwin’s restitution order, as the MVRA dictates that the
victims must receive full restitution.
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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