NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUL 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
DWAYNE SWEARINGTON, No. 14-16172
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00958-MJS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Michael J. Seng, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted July 21, 2015***
Before: CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Dwayne Swearington appeals pro se from the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
Swearington consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging numerous
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)
(order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We may affirm on any
ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534
F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Swearington’s claims against the
California Department of Corrections because those claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 100 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its
agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment.”).
Dismissal of Swearington’s supervisory liability claims against defendants
Wisneski, McDaniel, and Grooves was proper because Swearington failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that those defendants were personally involved in any
constitutional violation, or that there was a causal connection between their
conduct and any such violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.
2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability).
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The district court properly dismissed Swearington’s claims alleging denial of
access to the courts and interference with mail because Swearington failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that defendants caused any violation of his rights. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (a plaintiff must allege facts that
“allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (requirements
of an access-to-courts claim); Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam) (describing prisoners’ First Amendment right to send and receive
mail).
The district court properly dismissed Swearington’s retaliation claims
because Swearington failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants’
actions did not advance a legitimate correctional purpose. See Rhodes v. Robinson,
408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (requirements of a retaliation claim in the
prison context).
The district court properly dismissed Swearington’s medical deliberate
indifference claim because Swearington failed to allege facts sufficient to show
that defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Swearington’s health.
See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (requirements of a
medical deliberate indifference claim).
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The district court properly dismissed Swearington’s claim alleging an
unauthorized deprivation of property because Swearington had an adequate
post-deprivation remedy under California law. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d
813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (negligent or intentional unauthorized
deprivation of a prisoner’s property fails to state a claim if the state has an
adequate post-deprivation remedy, which California provides).
The district court properly dismissed Swearington’s claim alleging that
defendant Flores violated his medical privacy because Swearington failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that Flores improperly disclosed any private information.
See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir.
1998) (discussing the constitutionally protected privacy interest).
The district court properly dismissed Swearington’s conspiracy claims
because Swearington failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants
agreed to violate his constitutional rights. See Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608
F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010) (requirements of a conspiracy claim).
To the extent that Swearington’s claims are based on defendants’ alleged
failure to follow prison policy, the district court properly dismissed them because
any such failure would not constitute a violation of a federal right. See Cousins v.
Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (alleged failure to follow prison
4 14-16172
policy does not establish federal constitutional violation).
The district court properly denied Swearington’s request for injunctive relief
because Swearington failed to allege facts sufficient to show the violation of any
federal right or the threat of irreparable harm. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d
1118, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2001) (requirements for injunctive relief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to
amend because Swearington did not cure the complaint’s deficiencies despite the
district court’s specific instructions about how to do so. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that leave to amend should be given unless the deficiencies in the
complaint cannot be cured by amendment); see also Fid. Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district
court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the court has
already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.”).
AFFIRMED.
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