UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4802
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAL PULLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
Judge. (8:01-cr-00439-DKC-1)
Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 31, 2015
Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan Skelton, Appellate
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Thomas P. Windom, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamal Pulley was sentenced to 54 months’ imprisonment, to
be followed by a 3-year term of supervised release, after he
pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Upon release from
imprisonment, Pulley violated his terms of supervision and the
district court revoked his supervised release, sentenced him to
time served, and reimposed two years of supervised release.
During this second period of supervision, the district court
found that Pulley again violated his terms of supervision by
(1) failing to report to the probation office within 72 hours of
his release from custody, (2) leaving the district without
permission, and (3) committing new offenses. The district court
sentenced Pulley to 17 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 18
months’ supervised release. On appeal, Pulley argues that the
district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) and his
rights to due process and confrontation by admitting hearsay
evidence to prove that he committed new offenses and failed to
self-surrender on outstanding charges. We affirm.
We review a district court’s ruling to admit hearsay
evidence during a supervised release hearing for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Ferguson, 752 F.3d 613, 616 (4th
Cir. 2014). “Supervised release revocation hearings are
informal proceedings in which the rules of evidence, including
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those pertaining to hearsay, need not be strictly applied.”
United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2012).
However, due process affords a releasee a limited right “to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses” at a revocation
hearing “unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972). Prior to admitting hearsay evidence in a
revocation hearing, “the district court must balance the
releasee’s interest in confronting an adverse witness against
any proffered good cause for denying such confrontation.”
Doswell, 670 F.3d at 530. Further, the due process guarantee is
embodied in the procedural rule that a releasee is “entitled to
. . . question any adverse witness unless the court determines
that the interest of justice does not require the witness to
appear.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C). However, evidentiary
rulings are subject to harmless error review, such that any
error is harmless if we conclude “that the error had no
substantial and injurious effect or influence on the outcome
. . . .” Ferguson, 752 F.3d at 618 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Regardless of whether the hearsay evidence was properly
admitted, we hold that any alleged error was harmless. Pulley
does not contend that the district court lacked sufficient
grounds to revoke his supervised release, or that he should not
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have served a term of imprisonment, or even that his sentence
was plainly unreasonable. Rather, Pulley argues that the
district court improperly assessed a Grade B violation instead
of a Grade C violation against him because it relied on hearsay
evidence to show that Pulley committed new offenses while on
supervision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 7B1.1(a)
(2013). The district court, however, explicitly stated that it
would impose the same sentence against Pulley even if it did not
think he had committed the new offenses, based on Pulley’s
admitted failure to report to the probation office after his
first revocation hearing. We accordingly conclude that any
evidentiary error was harmless.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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