UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6203
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN DEONTA STROM, a/k/a Jae Dee, a/k/a Jae, a/k/a J-Dirt,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00159-JCC-1)
Submitted: June 19, 2015 Decided: August 4, 2015
Before WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Justin Deonta Strom, Appellant Pro Se. Marc Birnbaum, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Inayat Delawala, Assistant
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Justin Deonta Strom appeals the district court’s order
denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment and his Fed.
R. Crim. P. 33 motion for new trial. Strom filed both motions
while his direct criminal appeal was pending in this court. The
district court held that the pendency of Strom’s appeal divested
it of jurisdiction over both of Strom’s motions. We have
reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusion that
it lacks jurisdiction over a matter. Ameur v. Gates, 759 F.3d
317, 322 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015).
Generally, “an appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of
appeals and divests the district court of its control over those
aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” United States v.
Modanlo, 762 F.3d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This general rule is subject to limited
exceptions, permitting the district court “to take subsequent
action on matters that are collateral to the appeal, or to take
action that aids the appellate process.” Doe v. Public Citzen,
749 F.3d 246, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Strom’s motion to alter or amend the judgment asked the
district court to reduce Strom’s sentence; thus, the motion fell
within the general rule depriving a district court of
jurisdiction over a motion involving aspects of a case presented
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in the appeal. See United States v. Turchen, 187 F.3d 735, 743
(7th Cir. 1999).
A pending appeal, however, does not divest a district court
of jurisdiction to entertain a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
667 n.42 (1984). Instead, the district court should “either
deny the motion on its merits, or certify its intention to grant
the motion to the Court of Appeals, which could then entertain a
motion to remand the case.” Id. Here, however, Strom did not
go to trial, but entered a guilty plea. “By its express terms,
Rule 33 is confined to those situations in which a trial has
been had.” United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 78 (1st Cir.
1995). Thus, relief is unavailable to Strom under Rule 33. See
United States v. Collins, 898 F.2d 103, 104 (9th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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