UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1789
JANE WECKER HARRISON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
CTH I CAREGIVER,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRED OWENS; ANDRE BAUER; KEN ARD; EUGENE A. “Andy” LAURENT;
TANA VANDERBILT; SAM DAVIS; GLENN MCCONNELL,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Mary Geiger Lewis, District Judge.
(8:11-cv-02215-MGL)
Submitted: June 30, 2015 Decided: August 5, 2015
Before KING, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Patricia Logan Harrison, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. William H. Davidson, II, Kenneth P. Woodington,
DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; Patrick J.
Frawley, DAVIS FRAWLEY, LLC, Lexington, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Jane Wecker Harrison filed a civil complaint alleging
various state officials violated her rights under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985 (2012), and asserting state law claims of fraud
and misrepresentation, intentional interference with a contract,
wrongful discharge, common law conspiracy, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In its first
order, the district court granted the Lieutenant Governor
defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
complaint against them. In its second order, the district court
granted the remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss Harrison’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. In its
third order, the district court granted the remaining
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Harrison appeals all three orders alleging that the
district court erred in (1) finding that she did not have a
property interest in her license; (2) finding that she was not
an “employee” for purposes of establishing a constitutional
violation; (3) granting defendants qualified immunity; (4)
denying her request for injunctive relief; and (5) declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state law
claims.
We review a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Hire
Order Ltd. v. Marianos, 698 F.3d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 2012). “To
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survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
reviewed the district court’s dismissal of the Lieutenant
Governor defendants from this action and find no reversible
error.
We also review de novo an award of summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity. Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183,
188 (4th Cir. 2012); see Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d
194, 200 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that an appellate court reviews
the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo).
Summary judgment is proper only if, taking the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Durham, 690 F.3d at 188.
To be entitled to qualified immunity, a defendant must show
either (a) that his conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, or (b) that even if there was a
constitutional violation, the right in question was not clearly
established at the time that the defendant acted. Hunter v.
Town of Mocksville, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 3651646 at *1
(4th Cir. June 15, 2015); Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall
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Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof
and persuasion, with respect to a defense of qualified immunity,
rests on the official asserting that defense. Meyers v.
Baltimore Cty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013).
We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the materials
submitted on appeal, and the district court’s thorough and well-
reasoned orders, and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we
affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Harrison
v. Owens, No. 8:11–cv–02215-MGL (D.S.C. Nov. 7, 2012; Aug. 12,
2013; July 7, 2014). We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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