Johnson v. State

131 Nev., Advance Opinion 5b
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TABUTA JOHNSON, AJK/A TABUDAH No. 63737
EUGENE HUMES,
Appellant,
vs.
FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA, JUL 3 0 2015
Respondent.

Appeal from a sentence and conviction following a jury trial of
one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, two counts of robbery, and one
count of battery with intent to commit a crime. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Kathy Hardcastle, Judge, and Carolyn Ellsworth,
Judge."
Affirmed.

Lambrose Brown and William H. Brown, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson,
District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney,
Clark County,
for Respondent.

'Johnson was tried before the Honorable District Judge Kathy
Hardcastle and sentenced by the Honorable District Judge Carolyn
Ellsworth.

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 BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and SILVER, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, TAO, J.:
Appellant Tabuta Johnson was convicted of various criminal
offenses following a trial, during which the jury was permitted to hear
testimony regarding an out-of-court "show-up" identification and the
victims identified him in court as the perpetrator of the offenses. In the
show-up, Johnson was handcuffed, placed in front of a police car, and
illuminated with a spotlight to be viewed by witnesses who then identified
him as the perpetrator of the crimes. Johnson did not object below but
now asks this court to hold that the show-up was improperly conducted in
violation of his constitutional due process rights. He also argues for the
first time on appeal that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual •

criminal.
The Nevada Supreme Court has been presented with few
opportunities to reviewS the validity of such show-up identifications; the
court last visited this area of the law in Bias v. State, 105 Nev. 869, 871,
784 P.2d 963, 964-65 (1989), in which it held that a show-up somewhat
factually similar to the one in this case was unnecessarily suggestive and
therefore improper. Under the particular facts of this case, we conclude
that the trial court did not plainly err by admitting the identification
testimony into evidence because the identification procedure used was not
unnecessarily suggestive and the identification was reliable.
We also conclude that the sentencing court did not plainly err
in adjudicating Johnson as a habitual criminal because the record does not
demonstrate that the court operated under a misconception of the law

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 regarding the discretionary nature of a habitual criminal adjudication.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of convictionS and sentence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
One evening, Christina Raebel and Albert Valdez were
walking to a bar in downtown Las Vegas when they noticed two men, later
identified as Johnson and his brother, Varian Humes, following them.
Raebel viewed the two men directly as they approached for about "a
second and a half' while Valdez saw them through his peripheral vision
for "[o]ne second." Suspicious, Raebel moved her purse from her hip to the
front of her body with both hands.
Without warning, Humes punched Valdez in the head, causing
him to fall to the ground. At the same time, Johnson grabbed Raebel from
behind, covering her mouth with one hand and gesturing with the other to
indicate he was carrying a firearm. Johnson removed Raebel's purse from
her shoulder and pushed her to the ground. Raebel screamed as she fell
and Johnson responded by punching her in the face. While both Raebel
and Valdez lay helpless on the sidewalk, Humes demanded that Valdez
"give [him] everything" and in response Valdez emptied his pockets,
throwing his wallet and cell phone on the sidewalk. Valdez's wallet was
unique and easily identifiable because it was constructed entirely out of
duct tape. Johnson and Humes then tried to escape by running
southbound. Raebel was bruised and Valdez was bleeding from a gash in
his forehead. The entire incident lasted "about thirty seconds."
Within minutes, police officers from the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) arrived at the scene. Raebel
and Valdez told the police they were attacked by two black males about six
feet tall, with one slightly taller than the other, and described their

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 clothing and the direction in which they fled. Based upon those
descriptions, the police issued a radio broadcast to search for two black
males about six feet tall wearing dark pants and hoodies who ran
southbound from the scene, with the "taller male ... wearing a black
hooded sweatshirt and the shorter of the males. . . wearing a brown
sweatshirt." The broadcast also alerted officers to look for a stolen purse,
wallet, and other property.
A few moments later, patrolling officers saw Johnson and his
brother emerge from an alley two or three blocks south of the crime scene
and jaywalk diagonally across an intersection. The other end of the alley
was a dead end blocked by a chain-link fence and shrubbery. According to
the officers, Johnson was wearing "a dark black sweatshirt with a hood on
it and dark jeans," while his brother was wearing "a black sweatshirt but
it was faded so it actually looked brown in the light and he was also
wearing jeans."2 Deciding that the duo "match[ed] the description to a tee"
and suspicious as to what the two had been doing in a dead-end alley, the
officers detained the men for questioning When they looked in the alley,
the officers saw Raebel's purse, car keys, some makeup containers, and
Valdez's unique duct-tape wallet scattered on the ground. The officers
handcuffed the two men and issued Miranda warnings to them. Officers
later found Valdez's cell phone in Humes's pocket.
Approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the crime, officers
informed Raebel and Valdez that they "found people that matched the

2At trial, Raebel testified that Johnson wore a "brownish zip up
hoodie" with "a pattern on it" and the "hood up." Valdez testified that he
recalled Johnson wearing "a grey jacket with red lining like a grid almost."

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 description" and asked if they wanted to identify them. After agreeing,
Raebel and Valdez were separately transported to where Johnson and his
brother were held. On the way there, the police asked Raebel and Valdez
to state if they recognized the people that would be shown to them, and
instructed that "[a] person is just as innocent as they are guilty" and that
it was "just as important to free an innocent man" as it was to identify a
guilty one. While Raebel and Valdez took turns sitting inside a police car
approximately 30 to 60 feet away, officers brought out Johnson and his
brother one at a time in handcuffs and shined spotlights on them as they
stood in front of another marked patrol car. Raebel and Valdez were
separated from each other during this process to prevent them from
influencing each other. Raebel immediately recognized both Johnson and
his brother and informed the police that she was 100 percent certain they
were the two perpetrators. Valdez felt approximately 90 percent certain
about Johnson's identity but did not recognize Johnson's brother at all.
Johnson and Humes were charged with one count of
conspiracy to commit robbery, two counts of robbery, and one count of
battery with intent to commit a crime. Humes would later enter a plea of
guilty to various charges, but Johnson chose to proceed to trial.
During the trial, the jury was apprised of the out-of-court
"show-up" identification during which Johnson was affirmatively
identified as one of the perpetrators by both Raebel and Valdez.
Additionally, both Raebel and Valdez testified at trial and identified
Johnson in court as one of the perpetrators. The jury convicted Johnson
on all counts.
Following trial, the State sought to have Johnson adjudicated
as a habitual criminal and submitted certified copies of six judgments of

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 conviction reflecting prior felonies. 3 At sentencing, the district court
voiced concern about the violence of the crime, the randomness of the
victims, and the "escalation of [Johnson's] willingness to go from non-
violent crimes to violent crimes." The court adjudicated Johnson a
habitual criminal and sentenced him to four sentences of a maximum of 25
years with minimum parole eligibility of 10 years, with two of those
sentences to run consecutively.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Johnson contends that the show-up identification
was conducted in an unnecessarily suggestive and therefore
unconstitutional manner, and the trial court should not have admitted
either testimony describing the show-up identification or the victims' in-
court identification of him during the trial. Johnson also argues that the
sentencing court plainly erred in adjudicating him as a habitual criminal.
At trial, Johnson did not object to either the show-up
identification or the trial testimony relating to it, nor did he object to his
sentence when it was rendered. Consequently, the scope of our review is
narrowly limited to determining whether plain error occurred. See NRS
178.602. In particular, we examine (1) whether there was error, (2)
whether the error was plain or clear, and (3) whether the error affected
the defendant's substantial rights. Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80
P.3d 93, 95 (2003). "An error is plain if [it] is so unmistakable that it
reveals itself by a casual inspection of the record. At a minimum, the
error must be clear under current law, and, normally, the defendant must

3 Johnson'scriminal history mainly consisted of fraud and controlled
substances violations.

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 show that an error was prejudicial in order to establish that it affected
substantial rights." Saletta v. State, 127 Nev. „ 254 P.3d 111, 114
(2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Under the particular facts of this case, we conclude that
neither the trial court nor the sentencing court committed plain error
warranting reversal.
The validity of show-up identification procedures
When a witness testifies that he knows a particular suspect
committed a crime because he personally saw the crime as it occurred and
then at a different time and place recognized the suspect to be the same
person he previously saw, he is said to have performed an "identification"
of the suspect. Witnesses can be asked to identify a suspect either outside
of the courtroom prior to the trial during the initial police investigation of
the crime, or later during the trial itself (or both). Both in-court and out-
of-court identifications can be challenged by the defendant.
Out-of-court pretrial identifications are typically conducted
through a number of common methods, including asking the witness if the
perpetrator is one of several people lined up together in the same room
(commonly called a "physical line-up"); showing the witness an array of
facial photographs and asking if the perpetrator is among them (commonly
called a "photographic line-up"); or, as in this case, by presenting a single
suspect (or a very small group of potential suspects) to the victim soon
after a crime is committed and inquiring if that person is the perpetrator
(commonly known as a one-on-one "show-up" identification, a
"confrontation," or a "field identification").

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 Whichever method is used, the Due Process Clause of the
United States and Nevada Constitutions 4 forbids a criminal prosecution to
be based upon any witness's identification that was procured under
circumstances that were unnecessarily suggestive and likely to have
resulted in a mistake that cannot be repaired. See Gehrke v. State, 96
Nev. 581, 583-84, 613 P.2d 1028, 1029 (1980); Baker v. State, 88 Nev. 369,
372, 498 P.2d 1310, 1312 (1972). The Constitution prohibits these
suggestive and mistaken identifications whether they occurred outside of
the courtroom before trial or during a criminal trial itself when a witness
identifies the defendant from the witness stand. See Manson v.
Brat hwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104-07 (1977). Indeed, in some instances, when a
witness participated in a pretrial• identification procedure that was
extremely unreliable, courts have concluded that the witness's memory
may have been so contaminated that a later in-court identification of the
same suspect may also be precluded. See generally United States v.
Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 492 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Suggestive pretrial
identification procedures may be so impermissibly suggestive as to taint
subsequent in-court identifications and thereby deny a defendant due
process of law."). Thus, an in-court identification of the defendant during
trial can be challenged in two ways, either because the in-court

4Nevada's Due Process Clause is textually identical to the federal
clause in relevant respects, see Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8(5), and the Nevada
Supreme Court reads the state clause as coextensive with the federal
clause. See generally Wyman v. State, 125 Nev. 592, 600, 217 P.3d 572,
578 (2009). "Nevada has historically followed the United States Supreme
Court on most, if not all, of its interpretations and applications of the law
governing searches and seizures." State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. „ 312
P.3d 467, 471 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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 identification is itself improper, or because it was contaminated by an
improper out-of-court identification that occurred before trial.
In the instant case, Raebel and Valdez identified Johnson as
the perpetrator in a pretrial show-up. During the trial, Raebel and Valdez
described the pretrial show-up and also identified Johnson again in court
as the perpetrator. Johnson challenges both the in-court and out-of-court
identifications, but only contends that the in-court identification was
improper because it was tainted by the prior show-up identification.
Therefore, our focus is upon the validity of the out-of-court show-up.
Historically, "[ti he practice of showing suspects singly to
persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, [was]
widely condemned" and viewed by courts with deep suspicion. Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). The Nevada Supreme Court has held
that show-ups are "inherently suggestive because it is apparent that law
enforcement officials believe they have caught the offender." Jones v.
State, 95 Nev. 613, 617, 600 P.2d 247, 250 (1979).
Though frowned upon, such show-up identifications are
nonetheless permissible when the "totality of the circumstances"
surrounding the identification demonstrate that they are reliable. Stovall,
388 U.S. at 302 ("[A] claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct
of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances
surrounding it"); see also Jones, 95 Nev. at 617, 600 P.2d at 250; Banks v.
State, 94 Nev. 90, 94-96, 575 P.2d 592, 595-96 (1978). The question is
whether the confrontation was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification that due process was denied to the
defendant. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; Jones, 95 Nev. at 617, 600 P.2d at
250. If it was not, the witness's identification is admissible during a

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 criminal trial and the jury may examine its credibility and reliability.
Gehrke, 96 Nev. at 584, 613 P.2d at 1030.
Even though the Due Process Clause may theoretically bar an
overly suggestive identification whether it occurred before trial or during
trial, courts review, the validity of identifications under different legal
standards depending upon when and how they occurred. Because the
show-up identification of Johnson in this case occurred outside of court
and preceded the filing of any formal charges, our inquiry involves two
questions: (1) whether the show-up procedure was unnecessarily
suggestive, and (2) whether the identification was nonetheless reliable in
spite of any unnecessary suggestiveness in the identification procedure.
Banks, 94 Nev. at 94, 575 P.2d at 595 (citing Manson, 432 U.S. at 98).
We base our answer to both questions upon a review of the
totality of the circumstances. Id. Those circumstances include
examination of any countervailing policy considerations that might justify
an otherwise problematic identification, including such factors as the
presence or absence of any exigent circumstances, the need to quickly
clear any incorrectly detained suspects so that police can continue
searching for the true culprit, the freshness of the witness's recollection,
and the possibility that memories might start to fade if other procedures
were to be employed. See Bias, 105 Nev. at 872, 784 P.2d at 965 (holding
that show-up was unnecessarily suggestive when no countervailing policy
considerations or any exigency existed); Jones, 95 Nev. at 617, 600 P.2d at
250 (holding that policy considerations justified on-scene show-up when,
under the circumstances, the witness's memory was fresher immediately
after the crime and an immediate identification might have exonerated an
innocent suspect and freed authorities to continue the investigation). A

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 show-up is more likely to be deemed unnecessarily suggestive, and
therefore invalid, when countervailing policy considerations are absent.
Jones, 95 Nev. at 617, 600 P.2d at 250.
The show-up in this case was not unnecessarily suggestive
Johnson alleges that the show-up procedures utilized in this
case were unnecessarily suggestive, and that no countervailing policy
considerations exist to justify the procedures the police chose to employ.
Specifically, Johnson contends that because he was wearing handcuffs and
spotlighted in front of a marked police car during the show-up, the
circumstances strongly implied to Raebel and Valdez that the police had
already arrested the perpetrators of the crime based on other evidence,
and Raebel and Valdez were therefore implicitly pressured to corroborate
the police work already done. Johnson did not object below and raises
these arguments for the first time on appeal.
In seeking reversal of his conviction, Johnson relies principally
upon Bias, 105 Nev. at 871-72, 784 P.2d at 964-65, in which the Nevada
Supreme Court held that a show-up was unnecessarily suggestive where
the defendant was handcuffed, placed in front of a police car, and
illuminated with a spotlight to be viewed by witnesses who then identified
him as the perpetrator of the crimes. The show-up was conducted four
hours after the crime, under conditions in which no exigency existed. Id.
at 872, 784 P.2d at 965. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded "that this
show-up procedure was unnecessarily suggestive because there were no
countervailing policy considerations to justify it." Id. The court
nonetheless affirmed the conviction because the identification was deemed
"sufficiently reliable." Id.

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 In Gehrke, approximately 45 minutes after the incident,
eyewitnesses were escorted by an officer to the defendant's home where
they were told the police had a suspect in mind. 96 Nev. at 584, 613 P.2d
at 1030. The police placed the defendant in front of the headlights of a
police car. Id. The two eyewitnesses "were seated together in the back
seat of the police car, where their initial reaction, whether correct or not,
could be reinforced." Id. at 586, 613 P.2d at 1031 (Mowbray, C.J.,
concurring) The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that due to the lack of
exigent circumstances, the identification procedure was unnecessary. Id.
at 584, 613 P.2d at 1030.
Determining whether a particular show-up was unnecessarily
suggestive turns not on general principles, but rather upon the particular
circumstances surrounding the identification. In this case, even though
Johnson was handcuffed and spotlighted, several other circumstances
demonstrate that the show-up was not unduly suggestive when considered
as a whole, and therefore the show-up in this case was unlike those in
Bias and Gehrke. In this case, Raebel and Valdez were specifically
cautioned that it was just as important for the show-up to exonerate
innocent people as it was to implicate guilty ones. Additionally, during
the show-up, Raebel and Valdez were separated and not allowed to talk to
each other while they each independently viewed Johnson and his brother.
Neither of these circumstances occurred in Bias or Gehrke. In Gehrke, the
two eyewitnesses were seated together in thefl back seat of the car, "where
their initial reaction, whether correct or not, could be reinforced." 96 Nev.
at 586, 613 P.2d at 1031 (Mowbray, C.J., concurring). Moreover, the
witnesses in Bias and Gehrke were never directed that an important
purpose of the show-up was to free the innocent and not merely to blindly

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 confirm the suspicions of the police whether true or not. Quite to the
contrary, in Gehrke, the witness was merely told that the police "had a
suspect in mind," and no other instructions were given. 96 Nev. at 584,
613 P.2d at 1030. In Bias, the witness was simply asked "if the black guy
was the one." 105 Nev. at 870, 784 P.2d at 964. In contrast, the
circumstances of the instant case reflect that the police took substantial
steps to ensure that Raebel and Valdez were not unduly pressured into a
false or mistaken identification. 5
Even if the show-up contained elements of suggestiveness,
strong countervailing policy considerations existed in this case that
justified the officers' decision to attempt a show-up rather than another
form of identification. The show-up was conducted within half an hour of
the crime, while the victims' memories were still fresh. The crime was
violent and occurred in the open on the streets of Las Vegas; had the police
mistakenly detained the wrong people and employed a more time-
consuming method of identification before clearing the suspects and
resuming their search, the true criminals could have committed additional

5Various federal cases have held that show-up identification
procedures similar to the one employed in this case were not improper.
See United States v. Drake, 543 F.3d 1080, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that show-up was not unnecessarily suggestive, although the
robbery occurred in less than one minute, the police officers informed the
victim "that they had captured the suspect," and the defendant was
handcuffed and surrounded by officers); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d
482, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that show-up was not unnecessarily
suggestive, although the witness viewed the defendant seated in a police
car, handcuffed, and surrounded by officers); United States v. Kessler, 692
F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining that "Mlle use of handcuffs or
other indicia of custody" does not automatically invalidate a show-up).

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 violent offenses against other unsuspecting victims in the meantime or
escaped apprehension entirely. Furthermore, Johnson suggested he had a
firearm during the robbery. While no firearm was ultimately recovered,
his claim to have had one on him underscored the need to find him quickly
before he could endanger other victims. Thus, the decision to employ a
show-up rather than another more onerous method of identification was
warranted under the exigencies that existed in this case.
Therefore, we conclude that the confrontation in this case was
not unnecessarily suggestive, and any suggestiveness that might have
existed was counterbalanced by important policy considerations justifying
the show-up.
The identification was reliable
Even if the procedures employed here could be said to have
been suggestive, suggestiveness by itself does not necessarily preclude the
use of identification testimony at trial if the identification was otherwise
reliable. Bias, 105 Nev. at 872, 784 P.2d at 965. In fact, when assessing
admissibility, reliability rather than suggestiveness is the main concern.
Jones, 95 Nev. at 617, 600 P.2d at 250. Reliability is measured by: (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the crime,
(2) the degree of attention paid by the witness, (3) the accuracy of the
witness's prior description, (4) the level of the witness's certainty
demonstrated at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the
crime and confrontation. Canada v. State, 104 Nev. 288, 294, 756 P.2d
552, 555 (1988) (quoting Manson, 432 U.S. at 114).
Here, Raebel testified that she had a clear opportunity to view
the two suspects for about a second-and-a-half as they approached her
prior to the crime, and paid special attention because she sensed danger.

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 She then remained in close physical proximity to her assailants for
another 30 seconds as the assault took place. Valdez testified that, prior
to the crime, he only viewed the suspects for a second through his
peripheral vision, but had more opportunity to see them as they assaulted
him over the next 30 seconds. Raebel and Valdez were in close proximity
to their attackers and were asked to conduct the show-up within about 30
minutes after the crime while the incident was still fresh in their minds.
At the show-up, Raebel immediately recognized both suspects with 100
percent certainty. Valdez immediately recognized Johnson with 90
percent certainty.
Moreover, prior to the show-up, Raebel and Valdez accurately
described the race, gender, and height of the suspects they later positively
identified, and provided descriptions of the color of their clothing accurate
enough that, within minutes, the police found suspects who fit the
description "to a tee." 6 Raebel and Valdez informed officers that the two

GJohnson notes that the victims' clothing descriptions appeared to
change and became more detailed only after they participated in the show-
up. At the scene, the victims told police that the perpetrators wore dark
pants and hoodies, one black and the other brown. At trial, Raebel
recalled that Johnson wore a "brownish zip up hoodie" with "a pattern on
it" and the "hood up." Valdez testified that he recalled Johnson wearing "a
grey jacket with red lining like a grid almost." While it is certainly true
that notable discrepancies existed, on balance these discrepancies are
insufficient to render the identification unreliable when weighed against
all of the other facts present in this case. See Kessler, 692 F.2d at 586
(explaining that subsequent descriptions that became more "detailed and
accurate cannot be used to show impermissible suggestiveness" because
"one of the central and legitimate purposes of a show-up is to sharpen the
recollections of eyewitnesses and to enable them to focus attention on
details they may have otherwise overlooked"). See also United States v.
Brown, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1127 (D. Nev. 2009) (holding that
continued on next page...
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 perpetrators fled south on foot, and police found Johnson and Humes
minutes later on foot two or three blocks immediately south of the crime
scene disposing of the victims' property. Additionally, Valdez's cell phone
was discovered in Humes's pocket.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
identification of Johnson, both in court and during the pretrial show-up,
was reliable and not mistaken. See Bias, 105 Nev. at 872, 784 P.2d at 965
(holding that show-up not inadmissible when the victim was certain that
the defendant was the assailant and recognized the defendant's features
and clothing, as well as the weapon found at the scene of the show-up); see
also United States v. Gregory, 891 F.2d 732, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that identification was reliable when the witnesses viewed the
robber for approximately 30 seconds and described the assailant to police
officers soon after the robbery); United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076,
1085 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the witness's "degree of attention
was undoubtedly high" because she was the victim of the robbery).
Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not commit plain
error when it permitted the jury to hear testimony regarding the victims'
identification of Johnson both before and during trial.

...continued
identification was reliable, although the witness held a mistaken belief
about the color of the assailant's sweatshirt and jeans); Drake, 543 F.3d at
1088-89 (holding that identification was reliable, although the victim
"significantly underestimated" the defendant's height and the robbery
occurred in less than a minute).

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 The district court did not plainly err in adjudicating Johnson a habitual
criminal
Johnson argues that the sentencing court improperly
adjudicated him as a habitual criminal based only on his perceived
escalating violence. Although Johnson did not object when the sentence
was rendered, he contends this constituted plain error because the
sentencing court impermissibly based its sentence upon only a single
consideration rather than the multiplicity of factors on which a proper
sentence should be based. Thus, Johnson avers that the district court
believed that it was required to apply the habitual sentencing statutes.
Under NRS 207.010, a defendant who has been convicted of at
least three felonies qualifies as a habitual criminal. The Nevada Supreme
Court has held that a district court has the discretion to sentence a
defendant as a habitual offender merely because the defendant was
convicted of at least three separate prior felonies. LaChance v. State, 130
Nev. „ 321 P.3d 919, 930 (2014). Nevertheless, a district court may
exercise discretion to "dismiss a count under NRS 207.010 when the prior
offenses are stale or trivial, or in other circumstances where an
adjudication of habitual criminality would not serve the purposes of the
statute or the interests of justice." French v. State, 98 Nev. 235, 237, 645
P.2d 440, 441 (1982); see Clark v. State, 109 Nev. 426, 428, 851 P.2d 426,
427 (1993) (explaining that "Wile decision to adjudicate a person as a
habitual criminal is not an automatic one"). The purpose of the habitual
criminality statute is to allow the criminal justice system to deal
determinedly with career criminals who seriously threaten public safety.
Sessions v. State, 106 Nev. 186, 191, 789 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1990).
Adjudication under the habitual criminal statutes entails "the
broadest kind of judicial discretion," Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1004,
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 946 P.2d 148, 152 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), and the
statutes do not include any express limitations on the judge's discretion.
French, 98 Nev. at 237, 645 P.2d at 441. In reviewing a district court's
decision to sentence a defendant under these statutes, we consider the
record as a whole and evaluate whether the sentencing court, in fact,
exercised its discretion. O'Neill v. State, 123 Nev. 9, 16, 153 P.3d 38, 43
(2007). In doing so, no requirement exists that "the sentencing court must
utter specific phrases or make particularized findings that it is just and
proper to adjudicate a defendant as a habitual criminal." Hughes v. State,
116 Nev. 327, 333, 966 P.2d 890, 893 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, the habitual criminal statute "makes no special
allowance for non-violent crimes or for the remoteness of convictions" but
rather regards these as "considerations within the discretion of the district
court." Arajakis v. State, 108 Nev. 976, 983, 843 P.2d 800, 805 (1992).
The sentencing court acts properly as long as it does not operate "under a
misconception of the law regarding the discretionary nature of a habitual
criminal adjudication." Hughes, 116 Nev. at 333, 996 P.2d at 893-94.
Here, we conclude that the district court properly exercised its
discretion to sentence Johnson as a habitual criminal. The record does not
demonstrate that the district court was unaware of the discretion
statutorily entrusted to it. While the sentencing court expressed concern
over the "escalation of [Johnson's] willingness to go from non-violent
crimes to violent crimes," the court never characterized this as the sole
basis for adjudicating Johnson as a habitual criminal, nor did the court
indicate any belief that habitual criminal adjudication was mandatory or

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 automatic. The court was not required to utter specific phrases or findings
to justify its decision. Taken as a whole, the record does not demonstrate
that the district court operated under a misconception of the law regarding
the discretionary nature of a habitual criminal adjudication. Thus, the
sentencing court did not plainly err in adjudicating Johnson as a habitual
criminal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial
court did not plainly err in admitting testimony relating to the show-up
identification, nor did the sentencing court plainly err in adjudicating
Johnson as a habitual criminal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
conviction and sentence.

Tao
. 7 Akre- , J.

We concur:

CA.

1/4-1-Zeica) J.
Silver

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