131 Nev., Advance Opinion IS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC., No. 61059
Appellant,
vs.
FILED
BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES, INC., MAR 2 6 2015
Respondent. 1E K. L)NDEMAN
RT
BY
CHIEF DE CLERK
Certified questions under NRAP 5 concerning whethei - the
rule against perpetuities applies to an area-of-interest provision in a
commercial mining agreement for the payment of royalties and, if so,
whether reformation of the agreement is available under NRS 111.1039.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Sidney R. Thomas,
Chief Circuit Judge, M. Margaret McKeown and William A. Fletcher,
Circuit Judges.
Question answered.
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg and Joel D.
Henriod, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Parsons, Behle & Latimer and Michael R. Kealy, Reno; Parsons, Behle &
Latimer and Francis M. Wikstrom, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Respondent.
Baker & Hostetler LLP and Mary P. Birk, Denver, Colorado,
for Amicus Curiae Mary Ann Schmidt.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
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OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, J.:
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions to
this court concerning Nevada's rule against perpetuities. The first
question asks whether Nevada's "Rule Against Perpetuities appl[ies] to an
area-of-interest provision in a commercial mining agreement." The second
asks whether, if the rule applies, courts may reform such agreements
under NRS 111.1039(2). We accepted the certified questions and directed
briefing.
We conclude that Nevada's common-law rule against
perpetuities does not extend to area-of-interest royalties created by
commercial mining agreements. Courts developed the rule to promote
public policy by ensuring that property remained alienable. Applying the
rule to area-of-interest royalty agreements does not further public policy.
Our Legislature has said as much by exempting commercial, nondonative
transfers from the statutory rule against perpetuities. Even though the
statutory rule was not in effect when this agreement was made, we see no
reason to disagree with the Legislature in our own policy analysis.
Because we answer the first question negatively, we do not need to
consider the second.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
"This court's review is limited to the facts provided by the
certification order. . . ." In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, 128 Nev.
„ 289 P.3d 1199, 1207 (2012). Those facts are as follows.
Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. (Bullion), alleges that Barrick
Goldstrike Mines, Inc. (Barrick), owes royalty payments to Bullion under
an area-of-interest provision in a 1979 agreement. According to Bullion,
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its predecessor-in-interest entered into the agreement with a mine
operator, Barrick's predecessor-in-interest, to develop Bullion's
predecessor's mining claims in the Carlin Trend.
The area-of-interest provision requires the mine operator to
pay Bullion a royalty on production resulting from the operator's mining
claims that the operator might subsequently acquire within the area of
interest. Under the agreement, Bullion is to receive royalty payments on
production from after-acquired claims in the area of interest for 99 years.
Bullion filed suit in Nevada federal district court seeking
royalty payments on production from after-acquired claims in the area of
interest. Barrick argued that it did not owe royalties because the area-of-
interest provision is void under the rule against perpetuities. Bullion
responded that the rule does not apply to area-of-interest royalty
agreements. In the alternative, Bullion sought reformation of the
agreement under NRS 111.1039(2).
The federal district court granted summary judgment to
Barrick based on the rule against perpetuities. Bullion appealed. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then certified these questions to this court.
DISCUSSION
"The common-law rule [against perpetuities] is usually stated
thus: No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."
Sarrazin v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 60 Nev. 414, 418, 111 P.2d 49, 51
(1941) (internal quotation omitted). In Nevada, the rule is codified in our
Constitution: "No perpetuities shall be allowed except for eleemosynary
purposes." Nev. Const. art. 15, § 4. But in 1987, Nevada adopted a
statutory rule against perpetuities. See NRS 111.1031; 1987 Nev. Stat.,
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ch. 25, §§ 2-8, at 62-65. The new statutes added a wait-and-see provision,
which, as amended, gives contingent property interests 365 years to vest
before they are invalidated. See NRS 111.1031(1)(b). The statutory
scheme exempts nondonative transfers from the rule against perpetuities.
NRS 111.1037(1). It also lets courts reform agreements made before its
enactment to bring them into conformity with the rule. NRS 111.1035.
Nevada's statute was not in effect at the time of the agreement at issue in
this case.
We are thus confronted with the question of whether Nevada's
common-law rule against perpetuities, as codified by the Nevada
Constitution, applies to commercial mining agreements for the payment of
area-of-interest royalties. We hold that it does not.
Barrick argues that the perpetuities provision in the Nevada
Constitution confines our analysis of the rule. It argues that we ought to
apply the rule as it existed when the Constitution was adopted. It then
asserts that, because commercial agreements may have been subject to the
rule in 1864, all commercial agreements are still subject to the common-
law rule. We disagree.
As a creature of the common law, the rule against perpetuities
is not static. Our Constitution may have adopted the common-law rule,
but it did not freeze the rule's application. See Jack M. Balkin, Original
Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const. Comment. 427, 433
(2007). The meanings of the Constitution's words remain constant, but
their application may vary with the circumstances of time and place. See
generally. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation Construction Distinction,
-
27 Const. Comment. 95-118 (2010) (distinguishing between discovery of
textual meaning and application of text to case at bar). For example,
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when interpreting the Second Amendment, the United States Supreme
Court reasoned that "arms" was not limited to weapons in existence at our
nation's founding:
Some have made the argument, bordering
on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence
in the 18th century are protected by the Second
Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional
rights that way. Just as the First Amendment
protects modern forms of communications, e. g.,
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S.
844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment
applies to modern forms of search, e. g., Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U. S. 27, 35-36 (2001), the
Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even
those that were not in existence at the time of the
founding.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008).
We confronted a similar issue in Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev.
397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974). There, this court considered NRS 1.030, which
states that "[t]he common law of England, so far as it is not. . . in conflict
with [Nevada or federal law] shall be the rule of decision in all courts of
this State." Id. at 399, 528 P.2d at 1014 (quoting NRS 1.030). In spite of
this statute, this court refused to apply the old common-law rule of
interspousal immunity. Id. at 404, 528 P.2d at 1017. This court noted
that "[h]aving been created and preserved by the courts, the doctrine is
subject to amendment, modification and abrogation by the courts if
current conditions so dictate." Id. at 399, 528 P.2d at 1014. The court
concluded that "we believe that the time has arrived to abrogate the
doctrine [of interspousal immunity]." Id. at 403, 528 P.2d at 1017. The
common law, though adopted in broad form by statute, continued to evolve
as new circumstances required new application.
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Likewise, in our case, the word "perpetuities" in the Nevada
Constitution applies to precisely that: perpetuities. But we must for the
first time decide whether an area-of-interest royalty is indeed an
unenforceable perpetuity under the common law of Nevada. This inquiry
into the common law is informed by both precedent and policy.
Nineteenth century legal dictionaries define perpetuities in
reference to donative transfers, not commercial ones. An 1888 legal
dictionary provides an example of a trust income that, upon the death of
the beneficiary, is conferred upon his son, and after the son's death to his
son, and so on:
Perpetuity properly signifies a disposition of
property by which its absolute vesting is
postponed forever; as, for instance, if property
were conveyed to trustees upon trust to pay the
income of A. for life, and after his death to his
eldest son for life, and after his death to his eldest
son, and so on. Such dispositions are contrary to
the policy of the law, because they "tie up"
property and prevent its free alienation.
2 Stewart Rapalje and Robert L. Lawrence, A Dictionary of American and
English Law 953 (Jersey City, N.J., Frederick D. Linn & Co., 1888),
available at http://goo.gl/yiEmzA . An 1850 legal dictionary defines
perpetuity as "[t]he condition of an estate being rendered
perpetually. . . unalienable by the act of the proprietors." Henry James
Holthouse, A New Law Dictionary 302 (Boston, Charles C. Little and
James Brown, 2d ed. 1850), available at http://goo.gl/ABNUp5 . These
definitions do not appear to contemplate a business agreement that might
outlive the real persons executing it, but won't outlive the business
entities that own the interest. And because royalty interests can be
exchanged, bought, or sold, there is no obvious restraint on alienation.
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Indeed, Barrick and Bullion were not the original parties to the
agreement; they acquired those interests. This shows that alienation is
not restricted in the traditional sense, where property is tied up with
descendants through the dead-hand power of century-ago settlors. So it is
not obvious from the definition of "perpetuity" that it encompasses
commercial mining interests.
While the traditional articulation of the rule against
perpetuities does not distinguish between commercial and donative
transfers, see Sarrazin, 60 Nev. at 418, 111 P.2d at 51 (stating common-
law rule without distinguishing between commercial and donative
transfers), the modern trend is to not apply the rule rigidly or
mechanistically. 70 C.J.S. Perpetuities § 10 (2014). Many courts refuse to
apply the rule where its purposes will not be served. Id. The rule
developed "to curb excessive dead-hand control of property retained in
families through intergenerational transfers." Restatement (Third) of
Prop.: Servitudes § 3.3 cmt. b (2000). Thus, courts have held that certain
commercial agreements are not subject to the common-law rule against
perpetuities because to hold otherwise would contravene public policy. See
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil & Gas Corp., 320 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Colo.
2014) ("[W] e have avoided applying the rule against perpetuities to certain
types of interests in commercial settings where we have concluded that
the purposes of the common law rule would not be advanced."). 1
1-See also Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1936) ("The
[oil lease] option under consideration is within neither the purpose of nor
the reason for the rule. . . . [The option] does not restrain free alienation
by the lessor. He may sell at any time. . . . The option is therefore not
objectionable as a perpetuity."); Bauermeister v. Waste Mgmt. Co. of Neb.,
continued on next page . . .
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For example, in Juliano & Sons Enterprises, Inc. v. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 593 A.2d 814, 818-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), a New
Jersey appellate court decided that the rule against perpetuities does not
apply to commercial transactions. Juliano is similar to this case because
the transaction at issue took place before the enactment of New Jersey's
statutory rule. Id. at 815, 817. Even though the statutory rule was not in
effect at the time of the transaction, the court applied it anyway in order
"to effectuate the current policy declared by the legislative body." See id.
at 819. The court noted that "Mlle fact that nondonative commercial
transactions are excluded from the Act is not dispositive" of the issue. Id.
. . . continued
783 N.W.2d 594, 600 (Neb. 2010) ("There are sound public policy reasons
which support the conclusion that contractual options to repurchase, such
as the one at issue in this case, are not subject to the rule against
perpetuities."); Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d
379, 385 (N.Y. 1986) ("[W]e hold that the rule against remote vesting does
not apply to preemptive rights in commercial and governmental
01- transactions. . . ."); Rich, Rich & Nance v. Carolina Cons! Corp., 558
S.E.2d 77, 80 (N.C. 2002) ("[Olur common law rule against perpetuities
does not exclude commercial interests from its application. . . . [However,
ci ommercial transactions that do not violate the underlying policies
behind the rule against perpetuities. . . do not fit under the umbrella of
the common law rule."); Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 P.2d 772, 774
(Okla. 1980) (agreeing with federal district court that the rule against
perpetuities "should not apply and no worthwhile social or economic
purpose is served by applying it to this common, frequent and useful type
of oil and gas transaction. The provision in question does not clog
alienation." (citation omitted)); Robroy Land Co., Inc. v. Prather, 622 P.2d
367, 371-72 (Wash. 1980) ("By so holding, we believe we more nearly meet
the needs of a commercial society than by strictly enforcing the rule
against perpetuities as it has come to us from the common law.").
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at 818. The court acknowledged that the "Legislature, as the
authoritative source of public policy, has now decided the types of
transactions which should be subject to the rule against perpetuities and
which should not." Id. at 819. The court reasoned that "[n]either the
Legislature nor this court can perceive any danger to titles or alienability
of real properties requiring continued application of the rule to
nondonative commercial transactions even where they occurred prior to
the effective date of the Act." Id. The court concluded that "the
nondonative commercial transaction. . . is no longer subject to the
common-law rule against perpetuities." Id. at 815.
The Colorado Supreme Court very recently refused to apply
the rule against perpetuities to a 25-year option to repurchase a shale oil
property. Atl. Richfield Co., 320 P.3d at 1181. The court said that "we
will apply the rule against perpetuities only where the purposes of the rule
are served." Id. at 1187 (quotation omitted). "Looking to whether the
purposes of the common law rule are served," the court reasoned "that
the. . . option did not discourage valuable improvements to the land"
because each party possessed sufficient incentives to improve or invest in
the land. Id. at 1190. Accordingly, the court held that the common-law
rule against perpetuities did not apply. See id. at 1181.
An area-of-interest royalty agreement is an agreement
whereby one party agrees to pay a portion of not-yet-acquired mineral
interest's output to the other party because that mineral interest lies
within an area of interest. The provision may exist, for example, in an
agreement for the sale of a mineral interest. The mineral interest's
current owner is often "of the opinion that it is as a result of his efforts
that the [interest buyer] is in the 'area' and that he should participate in
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any proceeds derived from that locale." Larry D. Clark, Area of Interest
Provisions, 12C Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 6, 6-1 (1981). It is often unclear
how far a mineral vein will run. The owner of the interest wishes to
receive, in a sense, a finder's fee in the form of a royalty, in case the mine
operator discovers that the vein runs farther than the location of the
conveyed mineral interest. See Mark T. Nesbitt, Area of Interest
Provisions—Two-Edged Swords, 35 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 21, § 21.02
(1989).
We are persuaded that public policy weighs against applying
the rule against perpetuities to area-of-interest royalty agreements.
Because such provisions compensate explorers, applying the rule this way
appears efficient. And because the agreement is a commercial one, there
is no human decedent exercising dead-hand control over still-living
descendants. CI Atl. Richfield, 320 P.3d at 1184 ("[Tlhe vesting period of
the common law rule, based on lives in being plus twenty-one years,
makes little sense in the world of commercial transactions."). Further, as
noted above, even if the interest remains on the land, nothing appears to
prohibit alienation of the interest. Bullion and Barrick are both
successors in interest, not by birth, but by commercial exchange. This is
not the kind of "entailed estate[ 1" that the rule against perpetuities was
intended to prevent. Debates & Proceedings of the Nevada State
Constitutional Convention of 1864, at 741 (Andrew J. Marsh off. rep.
1866); see Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.3 cmt. b (2000).
Our Legislature has determined that, as a matter of policy, nondonative
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transfers should not be subject to the rule against perpetuities. See NRS
111.1037. We see no reason to disagree with this policy in our application
of the rule. Cf. Juliano, 593 A.2d at 819 ("Neither the Legislature nor this
court can perceive any danger . . . requiring continued application of the
rule to nondonative commercial transactions even where they occurred
prior to the effective date of the Act.").
Therefore, in response to the first certified question, we
answer that the rule of perpetuities does not apply to area-of-interest
royalty provisions in commercial mining contracts. Because the rule does
not apply, there is no need to address the second certified question.
CCherry
We concur:
, C.J.
Hardesty
Saitta
Gibbons
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