131 Nev., Advance Opinion 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
DAVID ABARRA, No. 62107
Appellant,
vs. F'
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.
Appeal from a district court order granting a motion to
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. First Judicial District
Court, Carson City; James Todd Russell, Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low and Therese M. Shanks and Kent R.
Robison, Reno,
for Appellant.
Az:Voni -Y-4f -
; ; I Attorney General, and Clark G. Leslie, Senior
Deputy Attorney General, Carson City,
for Respondent.
BEFORE PARRAGUIRRE, SAITTA and PICKERING, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the district
court erred in dismissing appellant's complaint against various state
entities and prison officials for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Additionally, we are asked to determine whether appellant stated a due
process claim in his complaint. We hold that the district court erred in
concluding that appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies;
.511 45! erivOititm eorree.--W pee . ti+&,'1i V47Iihec . cr 15 - 03214.1)
however, the district court correctly determined that appellant failed to
state a due process claim. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.
FACTS
In February 2011, a correctional officer at Northern Nevada
Correctional Center (NNCC) found appellant David Abarra, an NNCC
inmate, carrying 21 pills, a contraband pornographic magazine that
included a note stating that an unspecified item or service would be "the
usual price," and another inmate's completed W-2 form. NNCC charged
Abarra with, among other things, unauthorized trading or bartering and
providing legal services for a fee. Abarra pleaded guilty to bartering but
pleaded not guilty to providing legal services for a fee (an "MJ29"
violation).
At a disciplinary hearing, Abarra stated that although he was
guilty of passing contraband, the "usual price" note was in reference to the
magazine itself and that he was returning the W-2 to another prisoner as
part of his work as a prison law clerk. The NNCC convicted Abarra of the
MJ29 violation and, as punishment, removed him from his position as a
law clerk.
Abarra challenged the MJ29 discipline through an informal
grievance, followed by a first-level formal grievance.' According to the
first-level grievance, Abarra disagreed "with the finding of guilt on the
MJ29. There is no showing of any legal work being done or any proof of
"The prison's grievance process requires an inmate to first file an
informal grievance, followed by first- and second-level formal grievances.
See generally NDOC AR 740.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
fees being charged." He also disagreed with the severity of his
punishment. In response, Abarra received a letter from NNCC's associate
warden stating that Abarra "exhausted the grievance process on this
issue, therefore [his grievance] is moot and no further response is forth
coming [sic]."
Thereafter, Abarra filed a complaint in district court asserting
five claims: (1) improperly filing the MJ29 disciplinary charge, (2) refusing
to correct the improper MJ29 charge at the disciplinary hearing, (3)
improperly convicting him of violating MJ29, (4) violating his due process
rights by refusing to hear his grievance appeals, and (5) retaliation for
exercising his First Amendment rights. The State filed a motion to
dismiss, and the district court concluded that dismissal was proper
because Abarra failed to exhaust the grievance process. According to the
district court, Abarra did not exhaust claims one (improper filing), two
(failure to correct), four (due process), and five (first amendment) because
his grievance only addressed claim three (the actual finding of guilt).
Further, Abarra did not exhaust claim three (improper finding of guilt)
because he never filed a second-level grievance. The district court also
dismissed Abarra's fourth claim (due process) because he had no liberty
interest in a disciplinary appeals process. Abarra now appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Abarra argues that (1) he exhausted the
administrative remedies for claim three because the associate warden's
letter rendered pursuit of further remedies futile; (2) he exhausted the
administrative remedies for claims one, two, four, and five because they
were included in his grievances; and (3) he adequately pleaded a due
process claim.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
This court reviews de novo an order granting dismissal under
NRCP 12(b)(5). Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224,
227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008).
Abarra exhausted the administrative remedies for claim three
In order to initiate an action for damages against the
Department of Corrections, a prisoner must first exhaust his or her
administrative remedies. NRS 41.0322(1). However, the exhaustion
doctrine only applies to available administrative remedies. State, Dep't of
Taxation v. Masco Builder Cabinet Grp., 129 Nev. „ 312 P.3d 475,
478 (2013). To that end, this court has declined to require exhaustion
"when a resort to administrative remedies would be futile." Malecon
Tobacco, LLC v. State, Dep't of Taxation, 118 Nev. 837, 839, 59 P.3d 474,
476 (2002).
NNCC's associate warden responded to Abarra's first-level
grievance with a letter stating that Abarra "exhausted the grievance
process" and that "no further response is forth coming [sic]." This letter
forestalls, in no uncertain terms, any further efforts by Abarra to pursue
his grievance. Further efforts by Abarra would have been futile, meaning
he fulfilled the exhaustion requirement set out in NRS 41.0322(1) for
claim three and any other claims asserted through his first-level
grievance. See id.
Abarra exhausted the administrative remedies for claims one, two, four,
and five
Like NRS 41.0322(1), the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). Under the PLRA, a prison's
grievance process defines "Itlhe level of detail necessary in a grievance to
comply with the grievance procedures." Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202,
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) 1947A
1211 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)). If
the grievance procedures do not "instruct prisoners on what precise facts
must be alleged in a grievance, 'a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison
to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought." Id. (quoting
Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009)). Thus, "[a]
grievance need not include legal terminology or legal theories," nor does it
need to "contain every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual
legal claim." Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. This is in accord with Nevada's
own jurisprudence, where "[a] plaintiff who fails to use the precise legalese
in describing his grievance but who sets forth the facts which support his
complaint thus satisfies the requisites of notice pleading." Liston v.
LVMPD,111 Nev. 1575, 1578, 908 P.2d 720, 723 (1995).
The pertinent prison regulations require a first-level grievance
to consist of "a signed, sworn declaration of facts that form the basis for a
claim." NDOC AR 740.06 § 2. The grievance procedures do not require
more than the underlying facts, and they do not require a separate
grievance for each legal theory. Here, Abarra's grievance provides the
"facts that form the basis for a claim." Id. All of Abarra's claims revolve
around his contentions that he was improperly found guilty of and
punished for the MJ29 violation. His grievance sets forth those facts.
Therefore, the prison had sufficient notice of claims one, two, four, and
five. 2 Accordingly, Abarra fulfilled the exhaustion requirement for claims
one, two, four, and five because they were included in the grievances he
2 Indeed, requiring greater specificity would undermine the purpose
of a notice pleading standard for grievances. See Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120
("The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem
and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.").
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
5
(0) I947A
submitted, and the associate warden's letter made continued efforts at
exhaustion futile.
Abarra failed to state a due process claim
Due process requires that, at a minimum, "some evidence"
supports disciplinary findings. Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771,
775 (9th Cir. 1999). Abarra failed to state a due process claim because
some evidence supports the disciplinary findings against him. Abarra was
found guilty of providing legal services for a fee based on his possession of
another inmate's W-2 and a note stating that an unspecified item would be
"the usual price." Although the conclusion that the note and W-2 were
related is tenuous, it cannot be said that these facts do not constitute some
evidence. The district court properly dismissed claim four because the
State presented some evidence to support the disciplinary findings.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order dismissing
Abarra's complaint in part and affirm in part; we remand this matter for
further proceedings.
J.
Parraguirre
We concur:
J.
Saitta
J.
Pickering
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
6
(0) 1947A