testified that the driver of the car did the same. The victim heard the
sliding screen door move. The victim then heard three loud bangs on the
front door. She saw the men drive off in the car and police cars chase after
it. When she went downstairs, the victim noticed the front door was
cracked open, the casing and lock had come off, and there was wood all
over the floor. Additionally, there were shoeprints left on the door that a
crime scene analyst visually compared to the shoes recovered from
Mezgebe and found them to have a similar pattern and structure. When
Mezgebe was picked up by police near an accident involving a car
matching the victim's description, he told them he had been in the car and
had gone to the house to buy weed. A pair of batting gloves was found on
the passenger side.
We conclude that a rational juror could reasonably infer from
this evidence that Mezgebe attempted invasion of the home. See NRS
193.330; NRS 205.067; Thomas v. State, 114 Nev. 1127, 1143, 967 P.2d
111, 1122 (1998) (concluding that "a coordinated series of acts furthering
the underlying offense is sufficient to infer the existence of an agreement,"
and thus is sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of conspiracy
(internal quotation marks omitted)). It is for the jury to determine the
weight and credibility to give conflicting testimony, and the jury's verdict
will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial evidence
supports the verdict. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20
(1981).
Second, Mezgebe contends that the district court erred by
ruling that the State could impeach him with a limited question as to
whether he was aware that upon conviction his immigration status could
be affected and could result in removal. The district court determined that
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a limited question would be permissible as it went to bias or a motive to
fabricate. Mezgebe argues that the evidence was not relevant, was more
prejudicial than probative, and that it invaded the attorney-client
privilege. We review the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion.
See Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008).
"Although district courts have wide discretion to control cross-
examination that attacks a witness's general credibility, a trial court's
discretion is . . . narrow[ed] where bias [motive] is the object to be shown,
and an examiner must be permitted to elicit any facts which might color a
witness's testimony." Lobato v. State, 120 Nev. 512, 520, 96 P.3d 765, 771
(2004) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
district court acknowledged that impeachment evidence by its very nature
is often prejudicial, but ultimately ruled that the question was relevant
and more probative than unfairly prejudicial. We discern no abuse of
discretion. See Baltazar-Monterrosa v. State, 122 Nev. 606, 619, 137 P.3d
1137, 1145-46 (2006) (concluding that the district court erred by
disallowing the opportunity to impeach a witness with adverse
immigration consequences); Honeycutt v. State, 118 Nev. 660, 674, 56 P.3d
362, 371 (2002) ("[T]he State is entitled to test the credibility of the
defendant."), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759,
121 P.3d 592 (2005); see also United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1507
(10th Cir. 1993) ("Defendant's knowledge that he would be deported if
convicted is relevant to impeach Defendant's credibility.").
Mezgebe also argues that the question would have invaded the
attorney-client privilege as he would have been forced to waive the
privilege on redirect examination in order to present evidence that he
realized the potential for removal only after talking to the police. Mezgebe
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concedes that his answer to the State's question would not have disclosed
confidential communications, and the district court determined that it was
irrelevant how Mezgebe knew the information and that the attorney-client
privilege was not implicated so long as no one asked the source of the
information. We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court.
Third, Mezgebe contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his proposed jury instructions and corresponding
verdict form for the lesser-related offenses of malicious destruction of
private property and trespass. Mezgebe acknowledges that defendants are
no longer entitled to, nor are district courts required to give, lesser-
related-offense jury instructions, see Peck v. State, 116 Nev. 840, 845, 7
P.3d 470, 473 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Rosas v. State, 122
Nev. 1258, 147 P.3d 1101 (2006), but argues that he gave ample notice of
his intent to seek the instructions and verdict form and that the
instructions also served as theory-of-defense instructions. The district
court indicated that it would give an instruction on Mezgebe's theory of
defense—that he committed other crimes the State didn't charge and
therefore must be acquittedl—but refused a verdict form that contained
uncharged offenses and jury instructions that stated Mezgebe could be
found guilty of uncharged, lesser-related offenses. Mezgebe fails to
demonstrate the district court abused its discretion by denying his lesser-
related-offense jury instructions and verdict form. See Ouanbengboune v.
1 JuryInstruction No. 27 informed the jury that, while it may have
heard evidence• that Mezgebe committed uncharged crimes, its verdict
should not be impacted by any belief in his guilt for the uncharged crimes
and that a not guilty verdict must be returned if the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed a charged offense.
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State, 125 Nev. 763, 774, 220 P.3d 1122, 1129 (2009) ("This court reviews a
district court's decision to issue or not to issue a particular jury instruction
for an abuse of discretion.").
Having considered Mezgebe's claims and concluded that no
relief is warranted, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
Citat ,
Gibbons
J.
cc: Chief Judge, The Eighth Judicial District Court
Eighth Judicial District Court Dept. 15
Hon. Nancy Becker, Senior Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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