FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 03 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM GRAY, No. 14-35087
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00321-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
M. GEISEL, Sergeant; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 21, 2015**
Before: CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Idaho state prisoner William Gray appeals pro se from the district court’s
order dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies her 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action alleging retaliation and unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly dismissed Gray’s action because Gray failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies under applicable regulations and failed to
establish that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to her. See
Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 821-24 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, proper exhaustion requires compliance with the
agency’s deadlines and procedural rules concerning grievances, and describing
limited circumstances where improper screening renders administrative remedies
unavailable); Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (standard of
review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Gray’s amended
complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)’s requirement of a short and plain
statement of the claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Carrigan v. Cal. State
Legislature, 263 F.2d 560, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1959) (standard of review); Nevijel v.
North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (Rule 8(a) is violated
when a complaint is excessively “verbose, confusing and almost entirely
conclusory”); see also Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058-59
(9th Cir. 2011) (district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
on the basis of a failure to comply with Rule 8(a)).
2 14-35087
The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting defendant Geisel
to join the remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss. S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch,
307 F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e will reverse a district court’s litigation
management decisions only if it abused its discretion, or if the procedures deprived
the litigant of due process of law within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments.” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gray’s motion to
compel discovery on the basis of her failure to comply with the local “meet and
confer” rule. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard
of review and describing court’s broad discretion to permit or deny discovery).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 14-35087