908 P.2d 705, 706 (1995). Thus, Bingham & Snow properly brings a writ
petition to challenge the district court's denial of its motion to adjudicate.
We consider two issues raised in the writ petition and answer:
(1) whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider Bingham &
Snow's motion to adjudicate and (2) whether Bingham & Snow's attorney's
lien was enforceable. We review these issues de novo. Leventhal v. Black
& LoBello, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 50, 305 P.3d 907, 910 (2013) (stating that
we review de novo the construction of the statute authorizing an attorney's
charging lien); Argentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga Wirth
Woodbury & Standish, 125 Nev. 527, 531, 216 P.3d 779, 782 (2009)
(stating that we review de novo the district court's jurisdiction to resolve
an attorney's lien dispute).
The district court had jurisdiction to consider Bingham & Snow's motion
Premier argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider Bingham & Snow's motion to adjudicate the attorney's lien.
After a final judgment is entered, "the district court retains
jurisdiction to consider collateral matters." Emerson v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 61, 263 P.3d 224, 229 (2011). The
adjudication of an attorney's lien is a collateral matter over which the
district court has incidental jurisdiction because its enforceability arises
from the underlying litigation but does not directly concern the merits of
the case. See Argentena, 125 Nev. at 532-33, 216 P.3d at 783. Therefore,
the district court had jurisdiction to consider Bingham & Snow's motion to
adjudicate the attorney's lien.
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The attorney's lien was unenforceable because it was not perfected
Bingham & Snow argues that it perfected its attorney's lien by
serving a notice of the lien on an attorney who represented Premier and
another party in the underlying litigation.
NRS 18.015 establishes the requirements for an attorney's
charging lien. In relevant part, this statute provides that lain attorney
perfects a lien. . . by serving notice in writing. . . upon the party against
whom the client has a cause of action." NRS 18.015(3).
Notice provided to an attorney with regard to one client cannot
be imputed to a different client and does not create a duty for the attorney
to determine whether the notice is relevant to another client's interests.
See In re Perle, 725 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013); Maldonado v.
Ramirez, 757 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir. 1985); Bayne v. Jenkins, 593 S.W.2d 519,
533 (Mo. 1980); Ross v. Mayflower Drug Stores, 12 A.2d 569, 571 (Pa.
1940); Secord v. Chrysler Corp., 292 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
Premier was a party against whom Bingham & Snow's client
had a cause of action in the underlying litigation. Therefore, Bingham &
Snow had a duty to serve Premier with notice of the attorney's lien.
When serving the notice of its attorney's lien on the attorney
who represented Premier and the other party, Bingham & Snow produced
a certificate of service that identified that the notice was for the other
party and did not indicate that it was for Premier. The record does not
suggest that Bingham & Snow otherwise attempted to serve notice of the
attorney's lien on Premier. Thus, by not serving Premier, Bingham &
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Snow failed to perfect the attorney's lien. As a result, the district court
properly denied Bingham & Snow's motion to adjudicate.' Therefore, we
ORDER the petition DENIED.
,44.A , C.J.
Hardesty
Parraguirre
J.
Douglas
Saitta
'In light of Bingham & Snow's failure to perfect the attorney's lien,
we decline to address the remaining issues raised by the petition and
answer, including whether service of a party's attorney would fulfill NRS
18.015(3)'s notice requirement and whether various parties in the
underlying litigation had standing to contest the attorney's lien.
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cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge
Bingham Snow & Caldwell
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
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