substantial evidence supports the arbitrator's award, which is not
arbitrary or capricious. The Town opposes that argument and also argues
that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law of employment
arbitration.
The common law grounds under which a court may review
private binding arbitration awards are "(1) whether the award is
arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the agreement; and (2) whether
the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law." 1 Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass'n
v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. (CCEA), 122 Nev. 337, 341, 131 P.3d 5, 8 (2006).
Under the first ground, a court's "review is limited to whether the
arbitrator's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record."
Id. at 344, 131 P.3d at 9-10. "Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable person would deem adequate to support a decision." City of
Reno u. Reno Police Protective Ass'n, 118 Nev. 889, 899, 59 P.3d 1212, 1219
(2002).
Here, the issue is whether Van Leuven was dishonest when he
stated that he applied the brakes but that the brakes failed. Evidence was
presented that the ambulance's brakes were in good working condition
and that there were skid marks on the road consistent with the
ambulance's path of travel. A person in the back of the ambulance
testified that he felt some braking deceleration. 2 Testimony was also
'Neither party advocates any statutory grounds under NRS
38.241(1).
2 The arbitration hearing was not recorded and, thus, transcripts are
not available. In the absence of transcripts, we have no option but to rely
upon the arbitrator's detailed factual findings concerning the testimony
elicited at the arbitration• hearing. Wichinsky v. Mosa, 109 Nev. 84, 87,
847 P.2d 727, 729 (1993); see Gittings v. Hartz, 116 Nev. 386, 393 n.6, 996
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presented that the skid marks were old and could not be attributed to the
ambulance. Van Leuven steadfastly testified that he attempted to apply
the brakes before reaching a stop sign, but that nothing happened. The
arbitrator found that, while the brakes did not fail and Van Leuven was
negligent for not stopping, Van Leuven was also not dishonest because he
honestly believed that he applied the brakes and they failed.
While the district court found irreconcilable differences
between the findings that the brakes were in operable condition and that
Van Leuven believed that he applied the brakes, making factual
conclusions from this conflicting evidence is reserved for the arbitrator.
See CCEA, 122 Nev. at 344, 131 P.3d at 9-10. In this regard, a finding
that the brakes were in operable condition does not exclude the possibility
that Van Leuven honestly believed that he applied the brakes; the brakes
may not have been applied due to operator error or some other problem.
Conflicting evidence was presented and the arbitrator's determination
that Van Leuven was not dishonest was supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the district court erred by vacating the arbitration
award.
As to the Town's manifest disregard of the law argument, the
arbitrator did not ignore the Town's argument, based on Southwest Gas
Corp. v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064, 901 P.2d 693 (1995), that termination was
warranted based upon its reasonable, good faith belief that Van Leuven
...continued
P.2d 898, 902 n.6 (2000) (suggesting that an arbitrator's detailed factual
findings might be sufficient to support a finding even without a transcript
of the arbitration hearing or an NRAP 9(c) (previously NRAP 9(d)) type of
statement).
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was dishonest. Instead, the arbitrator considered and rejected the
argument. Under the manifest disregard of the law standard, "the issue is
not whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the law, but whether the
arbitrator, knowing the law and recognizing that the law required a
particular result, simply disregarded the law." CCEA, 122 Nev. at 342,
131 P.3d at 8 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, "we may not concern
ourselves with the correctness of the arbitrator's" application of the law
and must allow the arbitrator's conclusions on this issue to stand. Id. at
345, 131 P.3d at 10. Nevertheless, we also agree with the district court
and the arbitrator that while an employer's reasonable, good faith belief
that an employee was dishonest may shield the employer from claims for
wrongful termination, see Sw. Gas Corp., 111 Nev. at 1073-74, 901 P.2d at
698-99, this is not the standard applied in arbitration matters pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement, IBEW Local 396 v. Cent. Tel, Co., 94
Nev. 491, 493, 581 P.2d 865,867 (1978) ("[A]n arbitrator's award must be
based on the collective bargaining agreement . . . .").
Accordingly, the arbitration award must stand, and we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED.
Saitta
J
Pickering
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cc: Hon. Robert W. Lane, District Judge
Kathleen M. Paustian, Settlement Judge
McGannon Law Office, P.C.
Rourke Law Firm
Armstrong Teasdale, LLP/Reno
Nye County Clerk
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