IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) Cr. ID. No. 1112016434
)
)
JONATAN RODRIGUEZ, )
)
Defendant. )
)
Submitted: May 22, 2015
Decided: August 3, 2015
COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
SHOULD BE DENIED
AND
COUNSELS’ MOTION TO WITHDRAW SHOULD BE GRANTED.
Josette D. Manning, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire and Albert J. Roop, V, Esquire, 716 North Tatnall Street,
Suite 300, Wilmington, Delaware, 19801, Attorneys for Defendant Jonatan Rodriguez.
PARKER, Commissioner
This 3rd day of August, 2015, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for
Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. On December 23, 2011, Defendant Jonatan Rodriguez was arrested and charged
with Murder by Abuse or Neglect First Degree. These charges stem from the death of
two year old Brianna Pritchett, who died as a result of brain injury and abdominal
bleeding after being in Defendant’s care.
2. On March 26, 2012, Defendant was indicted and charged with one count of
Murder by Abuse or Neglect First Degree and one count of Endangering the Welfare of a
Child. On September 24, 2012, Defendant was re-indicted and charged with Murder by
Abuse or Neglect First Degree (stemming from the death of two year old Brianna
Pritchett) and Assault by Abuse or Neglect (stemming from serious physical injuries to
Brianna’s sister nine-month-old Ta’Iona Turner).
3. There were no plea negotiations in this case until after the pre-trial conference
held on June 5, 2013. The trial was scheduled to begin on June 19, 2013. 1
4. On June 13, 2013, Defendant Rodriguez pled guilty to one count of Manslaughter
(Lesser included Offense of Murder by Abuse or Neglect First Degree) and one count of
Assault by Abuse or Neglect. 2 There was no sentencing agreement as part of the plea. 3
5. On September 6, 2013, following a pre-sentence investigation, Defendant was
sentenced. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years of unsuspended Level V time for the
Manslaughter charge, and 25 years of Level V time, suspended after 15 years, for the
Assault charge, followed by probation.
1
See, June 5, 2013 Transcript of Pre-trial Office Conference; June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 3-4.
2
June 13, 2013 Plea Agreement.
3
Id.
1
6. Defendant did not file a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.
7. Thereafter, on October 3, 2013, Defendant filed a motion for
modification/reduction of sentence. 4 In that motion, Defendant claimed, inter alia, that
his counsel was ineffective and he was misled as to his sentence. By Order dated
October 30, 2013, the Superior Court denied Defendant’s motion finding it to be without
merit. The Superior Court held that the sentence was appropriate for all the reasons
stated at the time of sentencing. 5 The Superior Court further held that the numerous
aggravating factors more than justified the lengthy sentence for the extremely violent
nature of the charges and the vulnerability of the victims, particularly considering
Defendant’s total lack of sincere remorse. 6
FACTS
8. On December 18, 2011, police were dispatched to an apartment complex in
Wilmington after receiving reports of an unresponsive two-year-old girl, Brianna
Pritchett. Brianna along with her two siblings, four-year-old Jabria and nine-month-old
Ta’Iona, were in Defendant’s care at the time of the incident. The children were the
daughters of Defendant’s girlfriend. Jabria informed police that Defendant had been
hitting Brianna because she had diarrhea. 7
9. EMS transported Brianna to A.I. duPont Hospital, where a CAT scan and x-rays
revealed several broken ribs and a lacerated liver. On December 20, 2011, Brianna was
4
Superior Court Docket No. 47.
5
Superior Court Docket No. 48.
6
Superior Court Docket No. 48.
7
Affidavit of Probable Cause, Exhibit B, attached to Justice of Peace Court 20 Commitment, Superior
Court Docket No. 1.
2
declared brain dead and removed from life support. Her death was caused by a brain
injury and abdominal bleeding caused by blunt force trauma. 8
10. On December 21, 2011, Ta’Iona’s aunt took her to the hospital after noticing that
she was having difficulty crawling and was not using her left arm properly. After
examining her, doctors reported a “child offense” to police due to the nature of the
injuries. X-rays revealed that Ta’Iona had sustained a liver laceration, acute fracture of
her left humerus, acute fracture of her right tibia, acute fracture of her left ulna and radius
and healing fracture in her right distal radius. 9
11. Defendant pled guilty on June 13, 2013 to the charges of Manslaughter and
Assault by Abuse/Neglect. During the plea colloquy, Defendant’s counsel explained that
Defendant had agreed to accept the plea given the likely result at trial and given the need
to accept responsibility in order to receive a favorable sentence. 10
12. At sentencing, the prosecutor discussed the severity of the injuries to Brianna and
Ta’Iona. The prosecutor represented that Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility was
given “great weight” in the State’s decision to extend a plea offer. Another consideration
that factored into the State’s decision to offer the plea was the reluctance to have four-
year-old Jabria testify at trial. 11
13. The prosecutor stated, however, that the Presentence Investigation revealed that
Defendant did not have remorse nor did he accept responsibility. The State then asked
8
Affidavit of Probable Cause, Exhibit B, attached to Justice of Peace Court 20 Commitment, Superior
Court Docket No. 1.
9
September 6, 2013 Sentencing Transcript, at pgs. 5-7; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw
as Rule 61 Counsel, Superior Court Docket No. 66, at pgs. 4-5.
10
June 13, 2013 Plea Colloquy, at pg. 3.
11
September 6, 2013 Sentencing Transcript, at pgs. 10-12.
3
for 35 years of imprisonment because of Defendant’s continued refusal to accept
responsibility “for what he did to those little girls.” 12
14. At sentencing, defense counsel described the difficulties Defendant faced in
childhood, including abuse by his step-mother and the untimely death of his mother from
a drug overdose when Defendant was just an infant. 13 Defense counsel also noted that
Defendant suffered the traumatic loss of his 19-year-old brother, who was murdered
when Defendant was still a child. Trial counsel emphasized that Defendant demonstrated
acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty to counts which could lead up to 50 years
of imprisonment. 14
15. At sentencing, the Superior Court noted Defendant’s ‘horrific childhood”, but also
cited several aggravators including the vulnerability of the victims, child domestic
violence victims, offenses against children, need for correctional treatment, custody
status at the time of the offense and undue depreciation of the offense. 15
RULE 61 MOTION AND COUNSEL’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
16. On February 14, 2014, Defendant filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.
In Defendant Rodriguez’s pro se motion, he claimed that counsel was ineffective by
giving substandard advice and for failing to adequately advise the Defendant as to his
right to trial and the nature and extent of the State’s plea offer.
17. Defendant was thereafter assigned counsel. On December 30, 2014, assigned
counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as Postconviction Counsel pursuant to (pre-June
12
September 6, 2013 Sentencing Transcript, at pg. 11-13.
13
September 6, 2013 Sentencing Transcript, at pgs. 14-16.
14
Id.
15
September 6, 2013 Sentencing Transcript, at pgs. 16-18.
4
2014) Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(2), (post-June 2014) Superior Court Criminal
Rule 61(e)(6). 16
18. (Pre-June 2014) Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e) (2), (post-June 2014) Rule
61(e) (6) provides that:
If counsel considers the movant’s claim to be so lacking in
merit that counsel cannot ethically advocate it, and counsel is
not aware of any other substantial ground for relief available to
the movant, counsel may move to withdraw. The motion shall
explain the factual and legal basis for counsel’s opinion and
shall give notice that the movant may file a response to the
motion within 30 days of service of the motion upon the
movant.
19. In the motion to withdraw, Defendant’s Rule 61 counsel represented that, after
undertaking a thorough analysis of the Defendant’s claims, counsel has determined that
the claims are so lacking in merit that counsel cannot ethically advocate any of them. 17
Counsel further represented that, following a thorough review of the record, counsel was
not aware of any other substantial claim for relief available to Defendant Rodriguez.18
Defendant’s Rule 61 counsel represented to the court that there are no potential
meritorious grounds on which to base a Rule 61 motion and has therefore sought to
withdraw as counsel. 19
20. In response to Rule 61 counsels’ motion to withdraw, Defendant filed an
“amended Rule 61 motion” asserting for the first time a claim of actual innocence and
16
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e) was amended effective June 4, 2014. After June 4, 2014, Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(2) is now set forth at Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(6).
17
See, Superior Court Docket No. 65- Defendant’s Rule 61 counsel’s Motion to Withdraw along with the
accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw.
18
Id.
19
Id.
5
claiming that he only took a plea because he was assaulted and threatened with bodily
harm by another inmate. 20
21. By letter dated January 25, 2015, Rule 61 counsel requested that their motion to
withdraw as counsel be stayed so as to allow them the opportunity to investigate
Defendant’s new claim. 21 By Order dated February 6, 2015, counsels’ request was
granted. The motion to withdraw was stayed and Rule 61 counsel investigated
Defendant’s new claim. 22
22. In the investigation of Defendant’s new claim, Rule 61 counsel represented that
they obtained specifics of the claim from Defendant. Defendant responded that he was
attacked by a person he knows as Ray, who is related to the victim. According to
Defendant, the threat from Ray was that if he “wasn’t punished by the courts or did not
except [sic] a plea, that [Ray] would do everything in his power to kill [Defendant] and
that if [Defendant] was not accessible then harm would come to [Defendant’s] family.” 23
23. Upon obtaining the specifics of the claim, Rule 61 counsel subpoenaed records
from the Department of Corrections. According to the incident report, there was an
incident on January 11, 2012, in which Defendant was assaulted by Richard Ray.
Defendant was injured. 24 After the incident, Defendant requested a transfer to
administrative segregation. At the time of the incident, the reason stated by Defendant in
his request for a transfer was that: “I feel as if my life is at danger because he told me he
20
January 12, 2015 court submission by Defendant, Superior Court Docket No. 69.
21
Superior Court Docket No. 70.
22
Superior Court Docket No. 71.
23
Superior Court Docket No. 77, Rule 61 counsel’s May 22, 2015 submission to the court, at pg. 1; See
also, Exhibit C to the May 22, 2015 submission.
24
Superior Court Docket No. 77, Rule 61 counsel’s May 22, 2015 submission to the court, at pgs. 1-2; See
also, Exhibit D to the May 22, 2015 submission.
6
was going to shank me next time and that if I didn’t leave the pod it was going to happen
every day until I did get moved.” 25
24. In Defendant’s contemporaneous request, at the time the incident occurred,
Defendant makes no mention of being threatened to take a plea or get punished by the
courts. The attack seemed motivated by Mr. Ray’s desire to get Defendant off his pod.26
25. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that this incident occurred on January 11,
2012, and the issue of a possible plea offer was not even raised until after the pre-trial
conference on June 5, 2013, on the eve of trial, over one year and almost six months after
the incident. It is also important to point out that Defendant did not initiate the possibility
of a plea offer and, as later discussed, gave the plea offer much thought and consideration
after extensive discussions of the offer with his counsel, before agreeing to accept the
plea.
26. It is also important to note that the first time Defendant even raised the
voluntariness of his plea based on the alleged threat was not on direct appeal, not in his
motion for reduction of sentence filed in October 2013, not in his initial Rule 61 motion
filed in February 2014, but on January 7, 2015, in response to his Rule 61 counsels’
motion to withdraw as counsel. The first time Defendant raised this issue was about
three years after the alleged incident took place.
27. Defendant’s Rule 61 counsel concluded that although an incident did occur, it
could not be sufficiently corroborated that the purpose of the attack was to force
Defendant to take a plea. Moreover, Defendant’s Rule 61 counsel concluded that
25
Superior Court Docket No. 77, Rule 61 counsel’s May 22, 2015 submission to the court, at pg. 2; See
also, Exhibit E to the May 22, 2015 submission.
26
See, Superior Court Docket No. 77, Rule 61 counsel’s May 22, 2015 submission to the court, at pg. 2;
See also, Exhibit E to the May 22, 2015 submission.
7
Defendant’s representations at the plea colloquy further reveal that Defendant’s plea was
voluntary. 27
28. Defendant’s Rule 61 counsel advised the court that after investigating
Defendant’s new claim, they had decided that such claim lacks merit and they continue to
stand by their motion to withdraw. 28
29. In order to evaluate Defendant’s Rule 61 motion and to determine whether
Defendant’s Rule 61 counsels’ motion to withdraw should be granted, the court should be
satisfied that Rule 61 counsel made a conscientious examination of the record and the law
for claims that could arguable support Defendant’s Rule 61 motion. In addition, the court
should conduct its own review of the record in order to determine whether Defendant’s
Rule 61 motion is so totally devoid of any, at least, arguable postconviction claims. 29
DEFENDANT’S RULE 61 MOTION
30. The claims raised in the subject motion are procedurally barred, waived and
without merit.
A) Procedural Bars Preclude Consideration of Defendant’s Claims
31. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief,
the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements
of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. 30 If a procedural bar exists, then the claim is barred,
and the Court should not consider the merits of the postconviction claim. 31
27
Superior Court Docket No. 77, Rule 61 counsel’s May 22, 2015 submission to the court, at pg. 2.
28
Superior Court Docket No. 77, Rule 61 counsel’s May 22, 2015 submission to the court, at pg. 2.
29
See, for example, Roth v. State of Delaware, 2013 WL 5918509, at *1 (Del. 2013)(discussing standard
to be employed when deciding counsel’s motion to withdraw on a defendant’s direct appeal.).
30
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
31
Id.
8
32. Rule 61 (i), in effect at the time Defendant filed his Rule 61 motion, imposed
four procedural imperatives. 32 Rule 61(i) required that: (1) the motion must be filed
within one year of a final order of conviction; 33 (2) any basis for relief must have been
asserted previously in a prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must
have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules unless the
movant shows prejudice to his rights or cause for relief; and (4) any basis for relief must
not have been formally adjudicated in any proceeding. The bars to relief under (1), (2),
and (3), however, do not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a
colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional
violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. 34 Moreover, the procedural bars of
(2) and (4) may be overcome if “reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest
of justice.” 35
33. In accordance with the procedural mandates, Rule 61(i)(4) precludes the court’s
consideration of Defendant’s claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in the
handling of Defendant’s plea, since he already raised this claim in some fashion in his
prior motion for reduction/modification of sentence. In Defendant’s motion for
reduction/modification of sentence he claimed that due to his counsel’s ineffectiveness he
was not properly advised as to the outcome and sentence of the plea. In the subject
motion, Defendant again contends that he was not properly advised as to the State’s plea
32
Rule 61(i) was revised effective June 4, 2014. Defendant filed his motion on February 14, 2014, before
the effective date of the revisions.
33
If a final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005, the motion must be filed within one year.
See, Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(1)(July 1, 2005).
34
Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(5) (pre-June 4, 2014).
35
Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(4) (pre-June 4, 2014).
9
offer. This claim is procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4), since it was previously
adjudicated. The Superior Court already considered and denied Defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. It is now procedurally barred as previously adjudicated.
34. To the extent that Defendant has restated or refined this claim, the Superior Court
is not required to re-examine any claim that has received “substantive resolution” at an
earlier time simply because the claim is now refined or restated. 36
35. Turning now to Defendant’s new claim in response to his Rule 61 counsels’
motion to withdraw, that his plea was not voluntary because he was threatened, this claim
is procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(2) & (3). Defendant’s was required to, but failed to,
raise this claim on direct appeal. Defendant was required to raise any claim, with the
exception of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, on direct appeal. 37
36. Defendant’s claim that his plea was not voluntary was required to be raised on
direct appeal to be procedurally preserved. Nothing prevented Defendant from raising
this claim on direct appeal. Defendant was aware of, had time to, and the opportunity to
raise this claim on direct appeal, but failed to do so. It is now procedurally barred by
Rules 61(i)(2) and (3). 38
B) Defendant Waived His Claims Upon Entry of His Plea
37. In addition to Defendant’s claims being procedurally barred, Defendant’s claims
were also waived upon the entry of Defendant’s guilty plea.
36
Johnson v. State, 1992 WL 183069, *1 (Del.).
37
See, Malin v. State, 2009 WL 537060, at *5 (Del.Super. 2009); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829
(Del. 1994).
38
Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i), as revised effective June 4, 2014, would still operate to preclude the same claims
procedurally barred under the former rule.
10
38. A defendant is bound by his answers on the plea form and by his testimony at the
plea colloquy in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 39 In this
case, the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Plea Agreement and plea colloquy reveal
that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered a guilty plea to the
charges for which he was sentenced.
39. At the plea colloquy, the parties described the plea negotiations. 40 The plea
negotiations began on or about June 5, 2013. Defense counsel represented to the court
that discussions with Defendant had lead to acceptance of the plea agreement, given the
likely result of trial and the need to accept responsibility in order to receive a favorable
sentence. 41 Defense counsel further explained that he had two conversations with
Defendant regarding the decision as to whether or not to accept the plea offer. 42 The first
conversation was lengthy. After their discussion about the plea offer, Defendant wanted
to give the decision serious consideration and expressed a desire to have some time to
think about it. 43
40. The second conversation took place on June 12, 2013 (the day before Defendant
accepted the plea). Defense counsel, once again, discussed the possibilities at trial, the
ramifications of a plea offer versus counsel’s opinion of the likely outcome at trial, and
how acceptance of responsibility would favorably impact sentencing proceedings in the
event of a plea. 44
39
State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, *5 (Del. Super.); State v. Stuart, 2008 WL 4868658, *3 (Del. Super.
2008).
40
June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 2-4.
41
June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 3-4.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
11
41. Defense counsel also discussed the potential penalties that Defendant would be
facing if he accepted the plea offer. Defense counsel discussed the various trial rights
that Defendant would be waiving by pleading guilty and discussed the disabilities that
would accrue to a convicted felon. Defense counsel represented to the court that after
their lengthy and thorough discussions, he believed that Defendant understand all the
parameters of the plea offer and was accepting the plea knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently. 45
42. Defendant then personally represented to the court that he had read the truth-in
sentencing guilty plea form and the plea agreement. Defendant represented that he had
discussed these forms with his counsel. 46 Defendant represented that nobody was forcing
him to enter his plea. 47 Defendant represented that he was freely and voluntarily pleading
guilty to the charges listed in the plea agreement. Defendant represented that he was not
being threatened or forced to do so by his attorney, by the State, or by anyone else. 48
43. In the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and during his plea colloquy,
Defendant represented that he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving his
constitutional rights: to have a trial; to be presumed innocent until the State proves each
and every part of the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt; to a trial by jury; to
cross-examine witnesses against him; to present evidence in his defense; to testify or not
testify; and to appeal, if convicted. 49 Defendant also represented that he understood that
45
Id.
46
June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pg. 4.
47
Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form dated June 13, 2013.
48
Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form dated June 13, 2013.
49
June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 5-6; Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form dated June 13, 2013.
12
as a convicted felon he was losing his right to vote, to be a juror, to hold public office and
to own a gun or any other deadly weapon, including knives. 50
44. Defendant represented that his counsel had fully advised him of his rights, that he
understood the consequences of entering into his guilty plea, and that he was satisfied
with his counsel’s representation. 51
45. Defendant represented to the court that he understood that he could be sentenced
up to 50 years in prison on the charges for he was pleading guilty and that nobody
promised him what his sentence would be. 52
46. Defendant also admitted his guilt as to both charges for which he pled guilty. 53
Only after finding that Defendant’s plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily, did the court accept the plea. 54
47. Defendant has not presented any clear, contrary evidence to call into question his
prior testimony at the plea colloquy, Plea Agreement or answers on the Truth-In
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. As confirmed by the plea colloquy, Plea Agreement and
the Truth-In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Defendant entered his plea knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily.
48. Since Defendant’s plea was entered into voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly,
Defendant waived his right to challenge any alleged errors or defects occurring prior to
the entry of his plea, even those of constitutional proportions. 55
50
Id.
51
Truth-In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form dated June 13, 2013; June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 4-5.
52
June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pg. 5.
53
June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pg. 6.
54
June 13, 2013 Plea Transcript, at pg. 6.
55
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); Modjica v. State, 2009 WL 2426675 (Del. 2009);
Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2004).
13
49. The claims that Defendant seeks to raise in his Rule 61 motion were waived when
Defendant voluntarily entered his plea. Indeed, both of Defendant’s claims, the claim
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea stage and the claim alleging that his
plea was not entered into voluntarily, stem from allegations of defects, errors, misconduct
and deficiencies which occurred prior to the entry of the plea, and were both waived
when Defendant knowingly, freely and intelligently entered his plea.
C) Defendant’s Claims Are Without Merit
50. In addition to Defendant’s claims being procedurally barred and waived, the
claims are also without merit.
51. Defendant claimed that his counsel was ineffective by giving him substandard
advice as to the plea offer and failing to advise him adequately as to his right to trial and
the State’s offer.
52. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of a
plea challenge, it is not sufficient for the defendant to simply claim that his counsel was
deficient. The Defendant must also establish that counsel’s actions were so prejudicial
that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiencies, the defendant
would not have taken a plea but would have insisted on going to trial. 56 Mere allegations
of ineffectiveness will not suffice; instead, a defendant must make and substantiate
concrete allegations of actual prejudice. 57
56
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631
(Del. 1997); Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739-744 (2011).
57
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
14
53. The United States Supreme Court has reiterated the high bar that must be
surmounted to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 58 The United States
Supreme Court cautioned that in reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the
context of a plea bargain, the court must be mindful of the fact that “[p]lea bargains are
the result of complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty, and defense attorneys must
make careful strategic choices in balancing opportunities and risks.” 59
54. Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.
Defendant has not established that his counsel was deficient in any regard nor has he
established that he suffered any actual prejudice as a result thereof.
55. Defendant claim in the subject motion is directly at odds with the representations
Defendant made to the court at the time he accepted his plea. Indeed, at the time that
Defendant accepted the plea, Defendant represented, inter alia, that nobody was forcing
him to enter his plea, that he was aware that he was giving up his trial rights, and that he
understood he could be sentenced to up to 50 years incarceration. In addition, Defendant
represented that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, that his counsel fully
advised him of his rights, and that he understood the consequences of entering into his
guilty plea.
56. Defendant’s trial counsel had two discussions with Defendant regarding the
decision as to whether or not to plead guilty. During those discussions, defense counsel
discussed the strength of the State’s case, the possibilities and risks at trial, the
ramifications of a plea offer versus the likely outcome at trial, the consequences of
accepting a plea, and the trial rights that would be waived if Defendant accepted the plea.
58
Premo v Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739-744 (2011).
59
Id., at pg. 741.
15
57. Defendant confirmed on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form that he was
waiving enumerated trial rights. The form also confirmed that counsel had fully advised
him of his trial rights, that he had discussed the form with counsel, and that he was
satisfied with his counsel’s representation.
58. As previously discussed, a defendant is bound by his answers on the plea form
and by his testimony at the plea colloquy in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. 60 Defendant has not presented any clear, contrary evidence to call into
question his prior testimony at the plea colloquy or answers on the Truth-In Sentencing
Guilty Plea Form. Defendant’s claim that his counsel provided him with ineffective
assistance during the plea negotiations is not supported by the record and is without
merit.
59. Turning to Defendant’s second claim, that his plea was not voluntary because he
was threatened, this claim is also directly at odds with the representations Defendant
made to the court at the time he accepted his plea.
60. At the time that Defendant accepted the plea, Defendant represented at the plea
colloquy or answers on the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea From that nobody was
forcing him to enter his plea, that he was not being threatened or forced to enter his guilty
plea by his attorney, by the State, or by anyone else.
61. Defendant did not raise this claim until almost three years after the incident with
Richard Ray occurred. At the time of the incident, Defendant reported that Richard Ray
wanted Defendant off his pod and that Ray threatened to attack Defendant every day until
60
State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, *5 (Del. Super.); State v. Stuart, 2008 WL 4868658, *3 (Del. Super.
2008).
16
he was moved off the pod. Defendant never claimed that the incident had anything to do
with Richard Ray’s desire to have Defendant take a plea.
62. Neither Defendant’s words (his report contemporaneous with the incident) nor
Defendant’s actions at the time of the incident support Defendant’s present claim that he
was threatened to take a plea. The incident occurred on January 11, 2012, and following
the incident, Defendant never sought to take a plea. The first time plea discussions were
initiated was following the pre-trial conference on June 5, 2013, over one year and five
months after the incident took place. The plea discussions were not initiated by
Defendant. In fact, Defendant was hesitant to accept a plea and only did so after lengthy
and thorough discussions with his counsel fully discussing the parameters of the plea.
Defendant never alleged he was threatened to take a plea at the time of the incident
(January 11, 2012), nor at the time of the plea negotiations and resulting plea (June
2013), nor on direct appeal, nor in his motion for modification of sentence (October
2013), nor in his initial Rule 61 motion (February 2014).
63. There is nothing in the record to support Defendant’s new claim, let alone clear,
contrary evidence to call into question Defendant’s prior testimony at his plea colloquy
and in his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. Defendant entered into
the plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Defendant is bound by his
representations to the court during the plea colloquy and in his answers on the Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. This claim is without merit.
64. As discussed above, Defendant’s guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently entered. Defendant cannot now seek to contest the alleged shortcomings of
his counsel during the pre-trial and plea process or the voluntariness of his plea.
17
Defendant’s claims were waived when he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
accepted the plea offer. Defendant’s claims are without merit.
65. The court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that Defendant’s
Rule 61 motion is without merit and devoid of any other substantial claims for relief.
The court is also satisfied that Defendant’s Rule 61 counsel made a conscientious effort
to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Defendant does not
have a meritorious claim to be raised in his Rule 61 motion.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief
should be denied and Defendant’s counsels’ motion to withdraw should be granted.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
__________/s/______________
Commissioner Lynne M. Parker
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Mr. Jonatan Rodriguez
18
State of Delaware v. Rodriguez.
Combined Opinion