In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13-‐‑2359
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellee,
v.
DENNIS R. WILLIAMS and LESLIE ANN WILLIAMS,
Defendants-‐‑Appellants,
and
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE and CLARK COUNTY,
INDIANA,
Defendants-‐‑Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.
No. 4:11-‐‑cv-‐‑00084-‐‑RLY-‐‑DML — Richard L. Young, Chief Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED JANUARY 17, 2014 — DECIDED AUGUST 10, 2015
____________________
Before CUDAHY, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judg-‐‑
es.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. The first question in this ap-‐‑
peal, as in HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, No. 13-‐‑1017
2 No. 13-‐‑2359
(7th Cir. July 16, 2015), is whether an order of foreclosure is a
“final decision” for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction. We
deferred consideration of this appeal until HSBC Bank had
been issued. HSBC Bank holds that a mortgage foreclosure
governed by Illinois law is not final, and thus not appealable
under 28 U.S.C. §1291 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), because the
amount of a deficiency judgment (if any) depends on the
reasonableness of the price realized at the sale, and the va-‐‑
lidity of the sale itself is contestable under an open-‐‑ended
state standard calling on the judge to determine whether the
outcome is equitable. Moreover, HSBC Bank observes, Illi-‐‑
nois provides debtors with multiple opportunities to redeem
before a transfer takes effect.
Our case is governed by federal rather than state law. Be-‐‑
tween 2002 and 2008 the Internal Revenue Service assessed
tax deficiencies against Dennis Williams in connection with
his income tax for 1996 through 2005. These assessments, in-‐‑
cluding interest and penalties, come to about $1.3 million.
Dennis did not contest them, but neither did he pay, and the
IRS filed tax liens with the County Recorder for Clark Coun-‐‑
ty, Indiana, where Dennis and his wife Leslie Ann Williams
jointly own a parcel of land. The State of Indiana also filed
liens (it wants to collect about $415,000 from the couple joint-‐‑
ly and another $40,000 from Dennis individually), and the
County itself filed tax liens.
The district court entered an order that specifies how
much Dennis owes to each of the three taxing bodies, orders
the property to be sold and the net receipts applied to these
debts, and details how the money will be divided among the
United States, the State, the County, and Leslie. 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 185932 (S.D. Ind. May 3, 2013). The order states
No. 13-‐‑2359 3
that it is the district court’s final decision, resolving all is-‐‑
sues, and the Williamses appealed.
The foreclosure sale is authorized by §7403(c) of the In-‐‑
ternal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §7403(c). Section 7403 does
not provide for deficiency judgments, one of the post-‐‑sale
steps that made the order non-‐‑final in HSBC Bank, because
the debt is established independently by the judgment on
the IRS’s assessment. Net proceeds of the sale are applied to
the outstanding taxes; there is no separate judgment for a
difference between the proceeds and the tax debt.
Nor does federal law contain anything similar to 735
ILCS §5/15-‐‑1508(b)(iv), which permits a court to determine
whether “justice was otherwise not done” in the auction; the
foreclosure is self-‐‑executing, without any need for confirma-‐‑
tion by a court (though the sale is subject to the usual federal
doctrines that allow relief from a judgment). Section 7403(c)
also does not give the taxpayer a right of redemption. See
United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1960). We con-‐‑
clude, therefore, that a judgment foreclosing a federal tax
lien and specifying how the proceeds are to be applied is
appealable because it ends the litigation and leaves nothing
but execution of the court’s decision, the standard definition
of “final” under §1291. See, e.g., Gelboim v. Bank of America
Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015); Catlin v. United States, 324
U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
On the merits, the appeal is feeble. The Williamses’ lead
argument is that the suit should have been dismissed, be-‐‑
cause 26 U.S.C. §7401 provides that “[n]o civil action for the
collection or recovery of taxes … shall be commenced unless
the Secretary [of the Treasury] authorizes or sanctions the
proceedings and the Attorney General or his delegate directs
4 No. 13-‐‑2359
that the action be commenced.” The attorney representing
the United States filed a declaration, signed by an IRS offi-‐‑
cial, stating that the Secretary’s delegate has authorized the
suit—which is being prosecuted by the Department of Jus-‐‑
tice, demonstrating the approval of the Attorney General’s
delegate. The Williamses did not offer any contrary evi-‐‑
dence. Nor did they contend that there are logical or factual
flaws in the assessments. The Williamses deny liability but
sat on their hands in court. The district court rightly con-‐‑
cluded that this will not do.
Instead of joining issue on the amount of taxes owed, the
Williamses maintain that they did not receive adequate no-‐‑
tice of the deficiencies. This led the United States to supply
evidence about how notice was given; the record includes a
log showing certified mail to the correct address. To this the
Williamses replied by denying that their records contain any
relevant notices. That’s evasive. Their records would be
empty if they never picked up their mail or if, after receiving
the notices, they threw them away. But people who receive
formal notices cannot avoid liability by not opening the en-‐‑
velopes, or throwing the contents away after realizing that
they bring unwelcome news. See Ho v. Donovan, 569 F.3d
677, 680–81 (7th Cir. 2009). Mailing to the correct address
suffices. See, e.g., O’Rourke v. United States, 587 F.3d 537, 541–
42 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 784–85
(8th Cir. 1976).
The Williamses also contend that the state and county tax
claims are not properly part of the suit because they were
raised by the United States rather than by Indiana or Clark
County. We don’t see how taxpayers have any legal interest
in how state and municipal claims come before the court;
No. 13-‐‑2359 5
Indiana and Clark County themselves are not protesting.
And the reason the United States put these items in its com-‐‑
plaint is that §7403(c) gives the district court power to re-‐‑
solve all competing claims to a parcel of property. The state
and county claims belong in the proceeding, because the
State and the County assert liens on the same parcel as the
United States does.
Leslie maintains, however, that selling the parcel to col-‐‑
lect Dennis’s federal taxes impermissibly impinges on her
property interest. The Supreme Court held in United States v.
Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983), that a district court is entitled to
order an entire parcel sold even though an innocent person
may have an ownership interest. Before doing this, Rodgers
states, the court must consider all equitable arguments the
innocent owner offers. 461 U.S. at 709–11. The district judge
did just that, observing that Leslie’s interest, saddled by
three tax liens, probably would be worth less than the
amount she is likely to receive after a sale. The judge added
that neither Dennis nor Leslie lives on the parcel, so the sale
will not disrupt their household. That decision is sensible
and certainly not an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED