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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JEFFREY L. BLAND,
Appellant No. 1304 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 14, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0305581-1984
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2015
Appellant, Jeffrey L. Bland, appeals pro se from the order denying his
sixth petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows:
On October 18, 1984, a jury found [Appellant] guilty of
second degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and
possessing an instrument of crime. Thereafter, [Appellant] was
sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction2 and two
consecutive, [sic] terms [of] 2.5 to 5 years for the remaining
convictions. Post sentence motions were filed and denied.
[Appellant] filed an appeal to the Superior Court which affirmed
the judgment of sentence on March 23, 1987, the Supreme
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Court of Pennsylvania denied [Appellant’s petition for allowance
of appeal] on November 17, 1987.
2
For sentences [sic] purposes the robbery conviction
merged with the murder conviction.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/14/14, at 1.
On June 18, 2013, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his sixth.
On February 7, 2014, the PCRA court issued a dismissal notice pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant filed a response, and the PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s PCRA petition by order entered April 14, 2014. Appellant timely
appealed.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we
reproduce verbatim:
A. Should not this case be remanded for a hearing on the
allegation of trial, appellate and post conviction counsel
ineffectiveness.
1. Was not trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the
erroneous and improper jury instruction in that the trial court
committed error, instruction in that the trial court committed
error when giving and expounding on the law to sustain a felony
murder, there was a complete lack of instruction on the issue of
proof of corpus delicti before a jury can consider an accused and
or an accomplice confession.
2. Petitioner was further denied due process of law and
effective representation in that prior trial counsel failed to
request these points of charge that were imperative to the case
at hand, furthermore Petitioner suffered layered ineffectiveness
of counsels given none of these attorneys that this court
appointed conducted any factual review of the record or lower
courts (i.e. trial and jury instruction) and file an amended
petition citing prior trial counsels of ineffectiveness as cited
herein.
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Appellant’ Brief at 3 (unnumbered) (full capitalization omitted). 1
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the
record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA
court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31
A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877
A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA court’s findings will not be
disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super.
2001)).
We must first address whether Appellant satisfied the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA. The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a
jurisdictional threshold and may not be disregarded in order to reach the
merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is untimely.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing
Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000)). Effective
January 16, 1996, the PCRA was amended to require a petitioner to file any
PCRA petition within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes
final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence “becomes final at
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1
We note with disapproval that despite the Commonwealth’s request for an
extension of time within which to file its brief, and our entry of an order
granting the Commonwealth an extension of time until April 20, 2015, to file
a brief, (Order, 3/9/15), the Commonwealth has failed to submit a brief in
this matter.
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the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(3). Where a petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final on or
before the effective date of the amendment, a special grace proviso allowed
first PCRA petitions to be filed by January 16, 1997. See Commonwealth
v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056-1057 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining
application of PCRA timeliness proviso).
However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to
the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii),
and (iii), is met.2 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed
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2
The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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within sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the
PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove
specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time
frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Carr, 768 A.2d at 1167.
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on January 18, 1988,3 sixty days after the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s appeal and the time for filing a petition for
review with the United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20.1.4 Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final prior to the effective date of the PCRA amendments.
Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, filed on June 18, 2013, does not qualify for
the grace proviso as it was neither Appellant’s first PCRA petition, nor was it
filed before January 16, 1997. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is patently
untimely.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
3
We note that because January 16, 1988 fell on a Saturday, Appellant had
until January 18, 1988, to file his petition for review. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908
(stating that, for computations of time, whenever the last day of any such
period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be
omitted from the computation.); see also Commonwealth v. Green, 862
A.2d 613, 618 (Pa. Super. 2004).
4
We observe that the Rules of the United States Supreme Court pertaining
to the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari have been renumbered and the
time-period altered several times since the applicable Rule in this case.
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As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA
petition, his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three
limited exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file his
petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be asserted.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant has attempted to
invoke the third exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements, i.e., “the
right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the
time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b)(1)(iii). Appellant relies upon the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309
(2012). However, Appellant’s reliance upon Martinez is misplaced and
entitles him to no relief.
In Martinez, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized, for
purposes of federal habeas corpus relief, that “[i]nadequate assistance of
counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a
prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”
Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. Moreover, the Martinez Court specifically
cast its holding as “equitable” rather than “constitutional,” stating “[t]his is
not the case … to resolve whether that exception exists as a constitutional
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matter.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. Therefore, Martinez does not
provide a basis for Appellant to assert the section 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception
to the PCRA’s jurisdictional timeliness requirements. See Commonwealth
v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that “[w]hile
Martinez represents a significant development in federal habeas corpus law,
it is of no moment with respect to the way Pennsylvania courts apply the
plain language of the time bar set forth in section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA”).
Accordingly, the ruling in Martinez fails to provide Appellant an exception to
the time bar of the PCRA. Thus, the PCRA court did not err in denying
Appellant’s untimely sixth PCRA petition.
Consequently, because the PCRA petition was untimely and no
exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the claims
presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d
396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to
hear untimely petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the
merits of any substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007)
(“[J]urisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency to adjudicate
a controversy.”).
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/7/2015
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