UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4605
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CESAR MENDEZ-RAMIREZ, a/k/a Cesar Mendez Ramirez, a/k/a
Cesar Ramirez Mendez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00055-CCE-1)
Submitted: April 24, 2015 Decided: August 12, 2015
Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James E. Quander, Jr., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Ripley Eagles Rand, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cesar Mendez-Ramirez appeals his conviction and sentence
for unlawful reentry after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a) (2012). Mendez-Ramirez pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement and was sentenced to 18 months’
imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal,
counsel for Mendez-Ramirez filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but seeking review of the
reasonableness of Mendez-Ramirez’s sentence. Mendez-Ramirez did
not file a supplemental pro se brief, despite receiving notice
of his right to do so. The Government elected not to file a
response to the Anders brief. We affirm the district court’s
judgment.
We review a sentence for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first
ensure that the district court did not commit any “significant
procedural error,” such as failing to properly calculate the
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to consider the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. Id. The imposition of
supervised release on a removable alien is “appropriate . . . if
the district court finds that supervised release would provide
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an added measure of deterrence and protection based on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case.” United States v.
Aplicano-Oyuela, __ F.3d __, No. 14-4244, 2015 WL 4081258, at *6
(4th Cir. July 7, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If we find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we then
consider its substantive reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
We presume on appeal that a sentence within the properly
calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United
States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012); see
Aplicano-Oyuela, 2015 WL 4081258, at *8 (applying presumption to
term of supervised release). “Such a presumption can only be
rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
Upon review, we discern no procedural or substantive
sentencing error by the district court. The district court
correctly calculated Mendez-Ramirez’s advisory Guidelines range,
heard argument from counsel, provided Mendez-Ramirez an
opportunity to allocute, and provided an adequate,
individualized explanation of the within-Guidelines sentence.
The district court concluded that, based on the circumstances, a
term of supervised release was necessary as a deterrent to
further criminal activity. Nothing in the record rebuts the
presumption that the sentence is substantively reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This Court
requires that counsel inform Mendez-Ramirez, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Mendez-Ramirez requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this Court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Mendez-Ramirez.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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