14-50
Cheong v. Lynch
BIA
Straus, IJ
A077 933 350
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 13th day of August, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
8 Chief Judge,
9 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
10 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 SIEW LENG CHEONG,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 14-50
18 NAC
19 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL*,
21 Respondent.
22
23
24
25
26 ___________________________________________________________
27 *Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney
28 General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for former
29 Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.
30
31
1 FOR PETITIONER: Jon E. Jessen, Stamford, Ct.
2
3 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
4 General; John S. Hogan, Senior
5 Litigation Counsel; Andrea N. Gevas,
6 Trial Attorney, Office of
7 Immigration Litigation, United
8 States Department of Justice,
9 Washington, D.C.
10
11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
12 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
13 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
14 is DENIED.
15 Siew Leng Cheong, a native and citizen of Malaysia,
16 seeks review of a December 16, 2013, decision of the BIA
17 affirming the July 1, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge
18 denying her applications for withholding of removal and
19 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
20 Siew Leng Cheong, No. A077 933 350 (B.I.A. Dec. 16, 2013),
21 aff’g No. A077 933 350 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 1, 2013).
22 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
23 facts, procedural history, and issues presented for review.
24 Under the circumstances of this case, we have
25 considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
26 sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237
27 (2d Cir. 2008). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), we
28 lack jurisdiction to review any final order of removal
2
1 against an alien who, like Cheong, is removable by reason of
2 having committed an aggravated felony unless the petition
3 raises constitutional claims or questions of law. See
4 Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2015); see
5 Santana v. Holder, 714 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2013).
6 With regard to withholding of removal, Cheong
7 challenges only the agency’s conclusion that the past harm
8 she endured did not rise to the level of persecution. Her
9 challenge raises a reviewable question of law. See Hui Lin
10 Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2012).
11 The record supports the agency’s conclusion that, when
12 viewed either as isolated events or in the aggregate, Cheong
13 was not harmed to the degree necessary to reach the high
14 threshold of persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of
15 Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006)(elaborating on the
16 meaning of persecution). Cheong testified that on
17 approximately three or four occasions in Malaysia, during
18 school, after school, or when she was on the bus, Muslim
19 boys touched her body with their hands. She was never
20 subjected to serious physical or mental harm to the degree
21 that her life or freedom was actively threatened, and the
22 three or four incidents, considered in the aggregate, do not
3
1 rise to the level of persecution. See id.; cf. Manzur v.
2 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 290 (2d Cir. 2007)
3 (“[A]ccumulation of harm from the individual incidents may
4 rise to the level necessary for persecution even though an
5 individual incident may not.”).
6 Assuming jurisdiction to review Cheong’s CAT claim,
7 see Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2004),
8 substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that she
9 did not establish that she would be more likely than not
10 tortured if removed. Cheong presented no evidence that
11 anyone sought to harm her specifically, and there is no
12 evidence of conduct that would rise to the level of torture.
13 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17; Lecaj v. Holder, 616
14 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010); Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t
15 of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2005).
16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
17 DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this
18 petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
19 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
20 34.1(b).
21 FOR THE COURT:
22 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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