UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4040
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER WILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4041
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER WILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:11-cr-00139-D-1; 5:11-cr-00140—D-1)
Submitted: July 28, 2015 Decided: August 13, 2015
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daniel K. Dorsey, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Thomas G.
Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Seth M.
Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Christopher Wilson appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his terms of supervised release and sentencing him to a
total of 36 months’ imprisonment. Wilson’s counsel initially
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that he found no meritorious grounds for appeal
but questioning whether Wilson’s sentence was reasonable.
Wilson filed a pro se supplemental brief asserting several
issues, including a claim that the district court erred by
classifying his supervised release violation as a Grade A
violation rather than as a Grade B violation. Finding that this
claim was potentially meritorious, we ordered supplemental
briefing on the issue of whether this error affected Wilson’s
substantial rights. See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1121, 1126 (2013) (discussing plain error standard of review).
After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
the judgment of the district court. ∗
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation
∗
Our review of the entire record leaves us with no doubt
that the claim raised in counsel’s Anders brief and the
remaining claims asserted in Wilson’s pro se supplemental brief
are without merit.
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sentence that is both within the applicable statutory maximum
and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).
In conducting this review, we assess the sentence for
reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and substantive
considerations” employed in evaluating an original criminal
sentence. Id. at 438. Only if a sentence is found procedurally
or substantively unreasonable will “we . . . then decide whether
the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
In his supplemental brief, relying on United States v.
Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2010), Wilson objects to the
application of the plain error standard of review, arguing that
he preserved his claims of procedural error at the revocation
hearing. However, “[t]o preserve an argument on appeal, the
defendant must object on the same basis below as he contends is
error on appeal.” United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 459
(4th Cir. 2014). Because Wilson did not challenge the
calculation of his advisory policy statement range before the
district court, we review the calculation of that range for
plain error. See Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 126.
As the Government correctly concedes, the district court
plainly erred by classifying Wilson’s violation as a Grade A
violation rather than as a Grade B violation. See id.; see also
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
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§ 7B1.1(a)(1), p.s. (2013). Although this error resulted in a
higher advisory policy statement range, the district court did
not rely on that range. Instead, the court imposed the
statutory maximum sentences based on its findings that Wilson’s
breach of the court’s trust was egregious and that, despite the
evidence of rehabilitation presented at the revocation hearing,
Wilson’s record indicated that continued criminal activity was
likely. Moreover, the record does not demonstrate any
nonspeculative basis for finding that the district court would
have imposed a lower sentence had it correctly calculated
Wilson’s advisory policy statement range. United States v.
Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard
for demonstrating effect on substantial right in context of
revocation sentencing); see also United States v. McLaurin, 764
F.3d 372, 388 (4th Cir. 2014) (requiring nonspeculative basis in
record to conclude lower sentence would have been imposed),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015). Accordingly, we conclude
that the error in calculating Wilson’s advisory policy statement
range did not affect his substantial rights.
We therefore affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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