UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4732
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOHN ROBERT MULLEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:12-cr-00043-RLV-DCK-1)
Submitted: July 31, 2015 Decided: August 14, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ross Richardson, Executive Director, Anne L. Hester, FEDERAL
DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, Acting United
States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Robert Mullen appeals from the sentence imposed after
he pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) (2012). Mullen contends that the district court
plainly erred in ordering him to pay restitution to a police
officer and the Hickory Police Department based on losses
incurred while pursuing and apprehending him after the bank
robbery. Finding no plain error, we affirm.
Mullen argues for the first time on appeal that the losses
caused by his flight and arrest were not specific conduct that
was the basis for his conviction of bank robbery. The Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”) requires a court, when
sentencing a defendant for a crime where an identifiable victim
has suffered a pecuniary loss, to order “that the defendant make
restitution to the victim of the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii), (B) (2012). For purposes of the
MVRA, a victim is:
a person directly and proximately harmed as a result
of the commission of an offense for which restitution
may be ordered including, in the case of an offense
that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern of criminal activity, any person directly
harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
Id. § 3663A(a)(2) (2012). Thus, “to be considered a victim[,]
. . . the act that harms the individual must be either conduct
underlying an element of the offense of conviction, or an act
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taken in furtherance of a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of
criminal activity that is specifically included as an element of
the offense of conviction.” United States v. Davis, 714 F.3d
809, 813 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (2012) (setting forth definition in
Victim and Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), a precursor of the
MVRA); Davis, 714 F.3d at 813 n.1 (noting similarity of MVRA’s
and VWPA’s definitions). “A restitution order that exceeds the
authority of the statutory source is no less illegal than a
sentence of imprisonment that exceeds the statutory maximum.”
Davis, 714 F.3d at 812 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Mullen failed to object to the restitution order,
this court reviews for plain error only. See id. at 815-16. To
establish plain error, Mullen must demonstrate “that the
district court erred, that the error was plain, and that it
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Robinson,
627 F.3d 941, 954 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal alterations and
quotation marks omitted). This court has discretion to correct
such error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted).
The Government argues that the officer and police
department were “directly and proximately harmed as a result of”
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the bank robbery offense, contending that Mullen’s conduct in
robbing the bank led directly to his attempt to evade the police
officers and the damages were incurred during the flight. See
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (MVRA definition of victim).
We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in
ordering Mullen to pay restitution to an arresting officer for
damage to his uniform and to the police department for damage to
another officer’s service weapon. See United States v.
Washington, 434 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006) (no error in a
restitution award to a police department for damage to property
caused during the defendant’s flight following his commission of
a bank robbery); United States v. Reichow, 416 F.3d 802, 805
(2005) (no error in order to pay restitution after defendant
convicted of armed robbery for damage to police cars,
destruction of uniforms, and medical bills incurred by an
injured sheriff’s deputy, where damage “occurred ‘during’ the
robbery”); United States v. Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046, 1051-55 (7th
Cir. 2003) (bank robbery directly and proximately caused the
damage to a police vehicle that occurred during the flight from
the crime scene).
Finding no plain error, we affirm the sentence and
restitution imposed by the district court. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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