IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-31226
Summary Calendar
MICHAEL J. BOWLER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. Attorney General; MARTHA JORDAN,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 00-CV-2511
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July 31, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Michael J. Bowler appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241
habeas corpus application. Bowler argues that the method used by
the United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for computing good-time
credits is contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) and the Equal
Protection Clause.
“Article III denies federal courts the power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-31226
-2-
before them . . . .” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.
472, 477 (1990)(citations omitted). The case-or-controversy
requirement subsists throughout all stages of the litigation,
from the trial-court level through the appellate process.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).
Bowler’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 application challenged the BOP’s
method of calculating his good-time credits. Specifically,
Bowler contended that he was entitled to 351 days of good-time
credits, rather than 305 days as computed by the BOP. Thus,
Bowler was seeking to be released from his confinement earlier
than allowed by the BOP. Because Bowler has already been
released from prison, this court can no longer grant him the
relief requested, and his appeal is moot. Bailey v. Southerland,
821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987).
Although Bowler argues that his case is not moot because he
is still on supervised release, even if Bowler were entitled to
more good-time credits than the BOP allowed, federal law provides
that those credits could not be used either to shorten the period
of his supervised release or to shorten the period of any future
imprisonment Bowler may be required to serve for violating the
conditions of his release. 28 C.F.R. § 2.35(b); see Bailey, 821
F.2d at 278-79; cf. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60
(2000)(holding that the length of a supervised release term may
not be reduced by reason of excess time served in prison).
Furthermore, Bowler’s claim for declaratory relief under 28
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U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201 also requires that there be “a case or
actual controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); Lawson v. Callahan,
111 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 1997). Because a judgment declaring
that the BOP’s method for computing good-time credits is unlawful
would have no effect on Bowler’s rights, Bowler’s argument that
jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 is unavailing. See
Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-79.
Bowler’s contention that his case falls within the exception
to the mootness doctrine for cases that are “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” is similarly without merit.
Bowler has not shown that the time between judicial review of the
BOP’s calculation of good-time credits and expiration of a
sentence is always so short as to evade review, nor has he
demonstrated a reasonable expectation that he will once again be
imprisoned and receive an insufficient amount of good-time
credits. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18.
Based on the foregoing, Bowler’s appeal is DISMISSED AS
MOOT.