[Cite as In re Adoption of A.L.H., 2015-Ohio-3317.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
: JUDGES:
:
: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J.
: Hon. John W. Wise, J.
IN RE ADOPTION OF A.L.H. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
:
: Case No. 15CA07
:
:
:
:
: OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court
of Common Pleas, Probate Division,
Case No. 20145014
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 18, 2015
APPEARANCES:
For Petitioners-Appellants: For Mother-Appellee:
CHARLES D. LYNCH No Appearance
6 West 3rd St. -- #200
Mansfield, OH 44902-1200
Richland County, Case No. 15CA07 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Petitioners-Appellants Paternal Grandparents appeal the January 8, 2015
judgment entry of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} Petitioners-Appellants Paternal Grandparents were given legal custody of
their grandchild, A.L.H. on March 1, 2013 by the Crawford County Court of Common
Pleas, Juvenile Division. A.L.H. had originally been placed with Paternal Grandparents
in June 2012. Mother-Appellee was determined unable to care for A.L.H. due to her
incarceration and heroin addiction. Pursuant to an order by the Crawford County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Maternal Grandmother was granted visitation with
A.L.H.
{¶3} On February 27, 2014, Paternal Grandparents filed a petition for adoption
of A.L.H. with the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division. The trial
court held a hearing on July 2, 2014 to determine whether consent to adoption was
required under R.C. 3107.07. Father of A.L.H. consented to adoption. Mother contested
the adoption. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated on the record
Mother's consent to adoption was not required pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A). The trial
court scheduled a second hearing to determine whether the adoption was in the best
interest of A.L.H.
{¶4} On December 3, 2014, a hearing was held before the trial court to
determine whether the adoption was in the best interest of A.L.H. Sarah Dean of the
Village Network Treatment Foster Care Agency testified at the hearing. On December
17, 2013, Dean conducted a home study pursuant to R.C. 3107.031 for the purpose of
Richland County, Case No. 15CA07 3
ascertaining whether Paternal Grandparents were suitable to adopt A.L.H. Dean
testified that Paternal Grandparents met the standards for adoption of A.L.H. Dean
testified, however, she was concerned that if visitation with Maternal Grandmother
terminated after the adoption, it would have a detrimental effect on A.L.H. Dean felt the
placement with Paternal Grandparents was appropriate but adoption by Paternal
Grandparents would not be the least detrimental thing for A.L.H.
{¶5} On January 8, 2015, the trial court issued its judgment. It stated:
The Court, upon a careful and thorough review of the evidence
submitted, taking into consideration the demeanor, veracity, and
truthfulness, of the witness testimony and upon a careful weighing of the
same determines that Petitioners [Paternal Grandparents] failed to prove
by the requisite standard that the adoption would be in the best interest of
the minor sought to be adopted. Accordingly, the Petition for Adoption of
Minor filed February 27, 2014 is hereby dismissed.
{¶6} It is from this judgment Paternal Grandparents now appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶7} Paternal Grandparents raise six Assignments of Error:
{¶8} "I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY APPLYING AN
INCORRECT BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED.
{¶9} "II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY GIVING UNDUE
CONSIDERATION TO THE CHILD'S VISITATION WITH HER MATERNAL
GRANDMOTHER.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA07 4
{¶10} "III. THE ASSESSOR'S INITIAL HOME STUDY REPORT DID NOT
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OHIO REVISED CODE §3107.031 AND
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE ASSESSOR TO REDO OR
SUPPLEMENT THE REPORT OR APPOINT A DIFFERENT ASSESSOR TO REDO
OR SUPPLEMENT THE REPORT.
{¶11} "IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT SETTING
FORTH ITS REASONS FOR DENYING THE ADOPTION PETITION AS REQUIRED
BY R.C. §3107.161.
{¶12} "V. THE DENIAL OF THE ADOPTION PETITION BY THE PROBATE
COURT OF RICHLAND COUNTY WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
{¶13} "VI. THE DENIAL OF THE ADOPTION PETITION BY THE PROBATE
COURT OF RICHLAND COUNTY OHIO WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION."
ANALYSIS
IV.
{¶14} We start our analysis with the fourth Assignment of Error because it is
dispositive of this appeal. Paternal Grandparents argue in the fourth Assignment of
Error that the trial court erred in not setting forth its reasons for denying the adoption
petition pursuant to R.C. 3107.161. We agree.
{¶15} In Ohio, an adoption proceeding is a two-step process involving a
“consent” phase and a “best-interest” phase. In re Adoption of A.M.L., 12th Dist. Warren
No. CA2015-01-004, 2015-Ohio-2224, ¶ 8 citing In re Adoption of Jordan, 72 Ohio
App.3d 638, 645, 595 N.E.2d 963 (12th Dist.1991). The trial court in this case found
Richland County, Case No. 15CA07 5
Mother's consent to the adoption was not necessary. Mother has not appealed that
finding. Paternal Grandparents' arguments in this appeal concern the trial court's best
interest finding.
{¶16} We review a probate court's decision to grant or deny an adoption petition
under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Adoption of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319,
320, 574 N.E.2d 1055 (1991). An abuse of discretion implies a decision that is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,
219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶17} A trial court's determination of what is in the best interest of a child in a
contested adoption proceeding must be made after consideration of the factors provided
in R.C. 3107.161(B). In re Adaption of A.M.L., supra, citing In re Adoption of Cotner,
12th Dist. Fayette Nos. CA2002–02–004 and CA2002–02–005, 2002–Ohio–5145, ¶ 6;
In re Adoption of Kat. P., 5th Dist. Fairfield Nos. 10CA16, 10CA17, 2010-Ohio-3623.
R.C. 3107.161(B) reads:
(B) When a court makes a determination in a contested adoption
concerning the best interest of a child, the court shall consider all relevant
factors including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(1) The least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's
growth and development;
(2) The age and health of the child at the time the best interest
determination is made and, if applicable, at the time the child was
removed from the home;
Richland County, Case No. 15CA07 6
(3) The wishes of the child in any case in which the child's age and
maturity makes this feasible;
(4) The duration of the separation of the child from a parent;
(5) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and
permanent family relationship, taking into account the conditions of the
child's current placement, the likelihood of future placements, and the
results of prior placements;
(6) The likelihood of safe reunification with a parent within a reasonable
period of time;
(7) The importance of providing permanency, stability, and continuity of
relationships for the child;
(8) The child's interaction and interrelationship with the child's parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest;
(9) The child's adjustment to the child's current home, school, and
community;
(10) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
situation;
(11) Whether any person involved in the situation has been convicted of,
pleaded guilty to, or accused of any criminal offense involving any act that
resulted in a child being abused or neglected; whether the person, in a
case in which a child has been adjudicated to be an abused or neglected
child, has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or
Richland County, Case No. 15CA07 7
neglectful act that is the basis of the adjudication; whether the person has
been convicted of, pleaded guilty to, or accused of a violation of section
2919.25 of the Revised Code involving a victim who at the time of the
commission of the offense was a member of the person's family or
household; and whether the person has been convicted of, pleaded guilty
to, or accused of any offense involving a victim who at the time of the
commission of the offense was a member of the person's family or
household and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of
the offense.
{¶18} The January 8, 2015 judgment entry of the Richland County Court of
Common Pleas, Probate Division, states:
The Court, upon a careful and thorough review of the evidence submitted,
taking into consideration the demeanor, veracity, and truthfulness, of the
witness testimony and upon a careful weighing of the same determines
that Petitioners [Paternal Grandparents] failed to prove by the requisite
standard that the adoption would be in the best interest of the minor
sought to be adopted. Accordingly, the Petition for Adoption of Minor filed
February 27, 2014 is hereby dismissed.
"When a court makes a determination concerning the best interest of the child during an
adoption proceeding, the legislature provided 11 non-exclusive factors the trial court
must consider." In re Adoption of K.R.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100252, 100253,
2014-Ohio-2532, ¶ 10. In this case, there is no indication in the January 8, 2015
judgment entry that the trial court considered the mandatory R.C. 3107.161(B) factors
Richland County, Case No. 15CA07 8
before finding adoption was not in the best interests of A.L.H. See In re Adoption of
K.R.T., 2014-Ohio-2532, ¶ 11. The December 3, 2014 hearing does not reflect any
discussion by the trial court of the R.C. 3107.161(B) factors.
{¶19} In light of the trial court's failure to indicate that it considered the statutory
factors, we find the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition for adoption.
The January 8, 2015 judgment entry is hereby reversed and remanded. On remand, the
trial court is to reconsider its decision as to whether the adoption is in the best interests
of A.L.H. If the trial court reaches the same conclusion, it is to demonstrate it considered
the factors set forth in R.C. 3107.161(B).
I.-III. and V.-VI.
{¶20} Based on our finding as to the fourth Assignment of Error, we find it is
premature to rule on the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth Assignments of Error.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA07 9
CONCLUSION
{¶21} The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Probate
Division, is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
and law.
By: Delaney, J.,
Farmer, P.J. and
Wise, J., concur.