NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
BRYANT KEITH WILLIAMS, No. 11-57255
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-04053-AG-OP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 4, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, NOONAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
On October 23, 2014, we filed an opinion reversing the district court’s
denial of Williams’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and directing the district
court to grant the writ. See Williams v. Swarthout, 771 F.3d 501, 509–10 (9th Cir.
2014). We stayed the mandate while the Supreme Court considered Davis v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Ayala, No. 13-1428. The Supreme Court has since issued its opinion in Ayala. See
135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
withdraw our former opinion and affirm the district court.
According to Williams, the California Court of Appeal determined that the
trial court committed constitutional error by instructing the jury that Williams had
pled guilty, but concluded that the error was harmless. Williams misreads the state
court’s opinion. Under California law, an alleged improper influence on the jury
rises to a due process violation only if it was “‘inherently and substantially likely
to have influenced a juror.’” People v. Ramos, 101 P.3d 478, 497 (Cal. 2004)
(quoting People v. Nesler, 941 P.2d 87, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)). Here, the state
court of appeal concluded that the trial court’s erroneous instruction was not
inherently likely to influence the jury against Williams, and therefore that the error
did not rise to a due process violation.
Even if the California Court of Appeal had found a constitutional violation,
its conclusion that the superior court’s error did not prejudice Williams was neither
an unreasonable determination of the facts nor contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Davis v.
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198–99 (2015). When a juror announced during
deliberations that the trial court’s erroneous statement that the defendant had pled
guilty might have biased the juror, the court dismissed the juror and replaced him
with an alternate. Otherwise, the court took pains to ensure that its misstatement
had not affected any other juror’s ability to consider the evidence impartially.
“‘Fairminded jurists could disagree’” as to whether the district court’s efforts cured
any improper influence that its earlier misstatement may have had on the jurors.
See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
AFFIRMED.
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.