J-A11018-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TYRONE JEFFERSON,
Appellant No. 776 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of October 28, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008441-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND WECHT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2015
Appellant, Tyrone Jefferson, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on October 28, 2013 in the Criminal Division of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, as made final by the denial of post-
sentence motions on March 4, 2014. We affirm.
Following a fatal shooting in Philadelphia, a jury convicted Appellant of
third degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possessing instruments of
crime.1 On October 28, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of 25 to 54 years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed post-
sentence motions on November 5, 2013, which the trial court denied on
March 4, 2014. Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c), 903(a), and 907(a).
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March 13, 2014 and a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on
March 28, 2014. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 22,
2014.
Appellant’s brief to this court raises the following questions for our
review:
Were the convictions for [m]urder of the [t]hird [d]egree (18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c)), [c]riminal [c]onspiracy to [c]ommit
[m]urder (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903), and [p]ossession of an
[i]nstrument of crime [“PIC”] (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907), not
supported by sufficient evidence? Was the evidence and
testimony so conflicting that the evidence was only speculative
in nature, thereby causing the verdicts not to be supported by
sufficient evidence?
Were the convictions for [m]urder of the [t]hird [d]egree,
[c]riminal conspiracy to [c]ommit [m]urder, and [PIC] against
the weight of the evidence? Should the conflicting and
speculative nature of the evidence shock the conscience and
require the reversal of the aforementioned convictions?
Did the [a]ssistant [d]istrict [a]ttorney err in his opening and
closing speeches by making inflammatory statements,
statements of personal opinion, improperly vouching for
witnesses, and suggesting the Appellant was related to a drug
gang? Did [the trial court] err in denying the mistrial request?
Did [the trial court] err and tarnish [defense counsel] in front of
the jury wherein [it] criticized him for making a valid objection
during the [d]istrict [a]ttorney’s opening statement?
Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.
Appellant’s first claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence offered
in support of his convictions. We evaluate such claims under a familiar
standard:
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Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a
question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. We review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find every element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note
that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be
evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered.
Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792-793 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Appellant’s sufficiency challenge asserts that the Commonwealth failed
to prove that Appellant participated in the killing. Specifically, Appellant
relies on his own testimony, alibi testimony, character testimony, and the
testimony of others who said that Appellant was not present and did not
commit the killing. See Appellant’s Brief at 42-43. Appellant also points to
alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the Commonwealth’s two
eyewitness in claiming that “delays and contradictions [in this evidence]
create[d] the kind of speculation that is prohibited by” prior Pennsylvania
case law. Id. at 43.
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Appellant’s sufficiency challenge merits no relief. At trial, the
Commonwealth offered the testimony of two witnesses who identified
Appellant and his co-defendant as the individuals who participated in the
killing of the victim. In particular, the Commonwealth’s witnesses testified
that Appellant handed a revolver to his co-defendant, who then shot the
victim in the forehead. Both witnesses observed these events from a
distance of less than ten feet. This evidence was more than sufficient to
establish Appellant’s role as a participant in the victim’s shooting death.
Since the jury credited this version of events over that offered by witnesses
for the defense, and since we are forbidden to re-weigh the jury’s credibility
assessments, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.
Appellant’s second claim asserts that he is entitled to a new trial since
the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. This claim, too,
lacks merit.
We review a weight of the evidence claim according to the following
standard:
A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial
court's discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled
that the [jury] is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial
based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where
the [jury's] verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks
one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has
been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's
discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted
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where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable
abuse of discretion.
Tejada, 107 A.3d at 795-796.
Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying a
request for a new trial because his conviction on charges of third degree
murder and related offenses was against the weight of the evidence.
Largely, Appellant’s weight claim mirrors the contentions offered in support
of his sufficiency challenge. See Appellant’s Brief at 46 (“the same
arguments made in the sufficiency of evidence argument section go to the
weight of evidence argument due to the conjecture and conflicting and
speculative evidence”). Here, again, Appellant maintains that that the
testimony adduced by the Commonwealth to establish Appellant’s
participation in the killing was unreliable and, for this reason, he is entitled
to a new trial.
The trial court found that the jury's verdict was supported by the
evidence and did not shock its sense of justice. Trial Court Opinion,
7/22/14, at 4-7. In reviewing Appellant’s weight claim, the court carefully
considered the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and concluded
that, “[d]espite the evidence in support of [Appellant’s] position that he was
not involved with this crime, the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to
substantiate the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 6. We find no abuse of discretion in
this determination. As such, Appellant is due no relief on this issue.
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Appellant’s third and fourth issues are interrelated; hence, we consider
them together. Here, Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial on grounds that: 1) the assistant
district attorney’s opening and closing statements wrongly accused Appellant
of participating in drug-related activity; 2) the assistant district attorney
improperly suggested to the jury that the defense had an obligation to
obtain statements from witnesses; 3) the assistant district attorney offered
personal opinions about the evidence introduced at trial; and, 4) the court
chastised and denigrated defense counsel in the eyes of the jury. The trial
court rejected these claims, concluding, respectively, that: 1) the
prosecutor’s references to prior bad acts evidence constituted fair assertions
based on the evidence (id. at 14); 2) the prosecutor’s references to the
passage of time between the victim’s murder and the statements given by
the witnesses constituted oratorical flair based upon the evidence (id. at 15-
16); 3) the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections, warned the
prosecutor to avoid inserting his personal opinions, and instructed the jury
to disregard the prosecutor’s opinions and base the verdict on the evidence
(id. at 17-19); and, 4) the court’s interjections regarding defense counsel
were made to expedite trial and insure orderly proceedings (id. at 20 n.16).
After careful review of the certified record and the submissions of the
parties, we concur in the trial court’s determinations and discern no error or
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abuse of discretion. Hence, we conclude, for the reasons expressed by the
trial court, that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his final claims.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/18/2015
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