TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-14-00342-CV
Sam Houston and Meera Singh, Appellants
v.
Ally Financial, Inc., Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 368TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 13-0936-C368, HONORABLE RICK J. KENNON, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee Ally Financial, Inc., sued William G. Houston for breaching his
payment obligations under an automobile lease agreement. In addition to seeking money damages
and attorney’s fees from Houston, Ally sought to foreclose its security interest in and recover
possession of the vehicle.1 Ally subsequently obtained a default judgment on these claims, which
was later merged into the final judgment, and eventually recovered possession of the vehicle as well.
William Houston has not appealed this judgment and is not a party to this proceeding.
In the interim, Ally had asserted additional claims seeking possession of the vehicle as
against two of William Houston’s relatives, Sam Houston and Meera Singh (a/k/a Meera Houston),
appellants here. In contrast to William Houston, appellants were quite vigorous in litigating against
1
A 2011 Cadillac SRX. Houston had entered into the lease with Covert Buick, Inc., and
Covert assigned the lease to Ally.
Ally, interposing myriad pro se filings and asserting counterclaims. Both Ally and appellants moved
for summary judgment. While the motions were pending before the district court, Ally non-suited
its claims against appellants, leaving at issue only appellants’ affirmative claims. The district court
granted final summary judgment that appellants take nothing on their claims, and they perfected
this appeal.
As best we can understand appellants’ briefing on appeal, they attempt to complain
of the district court’s rendition of judgment against William Houston and various persons and
disputes not before the district court, or raise contentions that were not preserved below.
Appellants also claim that a visiting judge initially denied Ally’s summary-judgment motion before
the presiding judge later granted it, suggesting such circumstances imply some sort of error or
impropriety. We find no reversible error in the district court’s judgment against appellants, and
we affirm.2
__________________________________________
Bob Pemberton, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Bourland
Affirmed
Filed: August 18, 2015
2
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; see also id. R. 33.1 (error-preservation requirements), R. 38.1(i)
(briefing requirements). While appellants have acted pro se, we are bound to apply the same
procedural and substantive standards to them as with litigants represented by counsel, lest we give
them an unfair advantage. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978).
2