IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1610
Filed August 19, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL DARYL MARSHALL-LIMOGES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Steven J.
Andreason, Judge.
Juvenile defendant challenges his sentence as cruel and unusual
punishment. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Linda J. Hines,
Assistant Attorneys General, Patrick A. Jennings, County Attorney, and Terry
Ganzel and Mark Campbell, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, J.
The United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. While there is authority standing for the
proposition that the Eighth Amendment was only meant to limit the methods of
punishment, the Supreme Court has concluded the Eighth Amendment is
available to challenge “sentences for terms of years.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 72 (2003). The Eighth Amendment “is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344–45
(1981). Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution also prohibits the infliction of
“cruel and unusual punishment.” In State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa
2014), our supreme court held the Iowa Constitution forbade the imposition of
mandatory minimum sentences on juveniles. The defendant Michael Marshall-
Limoges challenges his sentences on two grounds. He seeks an extension of
Lyle to “all prison sentences for juveniles regardless of whether they are
statutorily mandated or a minimum required term of incarceration.” He also
contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentences.
The record establishes on March 13, 2013, the defendant was charged
with the following: theft in the second degree, two counts of theft in the third
degree, and theft in the fourth degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections
714.1(1), 714.2(2)-(4); eleven counts of burglary in the third degree, in violation
of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.6A; possession of burglar’s tools, in
violation of Iowa Code section 713.7; and criminal mischief in the fourth degree,
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in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.6. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of theft in the second
degree and burglary in the third degree, and the remaining charges were
dismissed. The defendant received a deferred judgment and was placed on
probation under the supervision of the department of correctional services. The
defendant was sixteen years of age at the time he committed the offenses.
On December 16, 2013, the defendant was charged with theft in the
second degree. At the same time, the State filed an application to revoke the
defendant’s deferred judgment and probation. The defendant pleaded guilty to
the new charge and stipulated that he violated his probation. The district court
revoked the defendant’s deferred judgment and probation. The district court
sentenced the defendant to indeterminate terms of incarceration not to exceed
five years for the theft convictions and two years for the burglary conviction, said
sentences to run concurrent to each other. At the time he committed the new
theft offense, the defendant was not yet eighteen years of age. The defendant
timely filed this appeal.
On de novo review, we conclude the defendant’s constitutional challenge
to his sentences is unavailing. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 382 (“[W]e review an
allegedly unconstitutional sentence de novo.”). Lyle is inapplicable; none of the
sentences here involve mandatory minimum terms of incarceration. The
defendant implicitly concedes this but argues Lyle should be extended to require
the district court to consider each of the factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 2465-69 (2012), and State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa
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2013), before imposing any sentence on a juvenile defendant. We do not
interpret Lyle to require or support such an extension. Further, “[a]s a general
rule, the task of materially altering substantive or procedural rights is best left to
the General Assembly or the Supreme Court of Iowa.” Spencer v. Philipp, No.
13-1887, 2014 WL 4230223, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2014). We decline to
extend Lyle.
We also conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing the defendant. “An abuse of discretion is found only when the
sentencing court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d
223, 225 (Iowa 1996). “In exercising its discretion, the district court is to weigh all
pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the
offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and
propensities or chances for reform.” State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719
(Iowa 1994). Although “a sentencing court has a duty to consider all the
circumstances of a particular case,” it is not “required to specifically acknowledge
each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant.” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11
(Iowa Ct. App.1995). Furthermore, “the failure to acknowledge a particular
sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.” Id.
Here, the district court’s stated reasons for imposition of the sentence were
thoughtful and not in any way improper. Contrary to the defendant’s assertion,
the district court did, in fact, “take into consideration . . . those particular
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characteristics of youth as described in recent Iowa case law.” We conclude the
district court properly exercised its sentencing discretion.
AFFIRMED.
State of Iowa v. Michael Daryl Marshall-Limoges
Combined Opinion