Filed 8/20/15 P. v. Anderson CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E063151
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI1301441)
STEPHANIE JEAN ANDERSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith,
Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Stephanie Jean Anderson appeals from an order denying
her petition to reduce her receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a))1
conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18. We find no error and will
affirm the order.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On March 5, 2013, the victim was at a gas station when he observed a white male
steal his red 1991 Mazda truck. The truck, which was found in the possession of an auto
mechanic, was recovered on May 20, 2013. The mechanic said defendant had sold the
truck to him. The victim did not know the white male who took his truck or defendant
and had never given defendant permission to drive or sell his truck. According to a
California Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) vehicle report dated March 5, 2013, the
victim last saw his truck on March 5, 2013, and estimated the value of his truck by
marking a preprinted box that listed a range of $301-$4,000.
In approximately March 2013, defendant sold the 1991 Mazda truck to Enrique
Chavez for $500. Defendant told Chavez that she did not have title to the truck but filled
out a bill of sale and forged the victim’s name to permit Chavez to obtain title for the
vehicle. Defendant claimed that she had obtained the truck from a friend and did not
know it had been stolen.
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2 The factual background is taken from the police reports.
2
In a DMV vehicle report dated May 20, 2013, an investigating officer estimated
the value of the truck to be $1,000, and described the truck as in “poor” condition.
On May 22, 2013, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant with forgery
(§ 470, subd. (d); count 1); unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a); count 2); and receiving a stolen motor vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a); count 3). The
complaint further alleged that defendant had suffered three prior prison terms within the
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On May 30, 2013, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled guilty
to count 3 and admitted that she had suffered two prior prison terms. In return, the
remaining allegations were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to a five-year split
sentence (the upper term of three years on the substantive offense, plus two consecutive
one-year terms for the prior prison term allegations), with 16 months to be served in
county jail and 44 months under mandatory supervision on various terms and conditions.
Defendant subsequently violated the terms and conditions of her mandatory
supervision. On June 24, 2014, defendant’s mandatory supervision was revoked and
terminated.
On September 16, 2014, defendant admitted to violating the terms and conditions
of her mandatory supervision. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to five years in county
jail, with 36 months to be served in local custody and 24 months under mandatory
supervision on various terms and conditions.
3
On November 4, 2014, voters enacted Proposition 47, entitled “the Safe
Neighborhoods and Schools Act” (hereafter Proposition 47). It went into effect the next
day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).) As of its effective date, Proposition 47
classifies as misdemeanors certain drug- and theft-related offenses that previously were
felonies or “wobblers,” unless they were committed by certain ineligible defendants.
(§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)
On December 22, 2014, defendant filed a petition to reduce her felony
receiving a stolen vehicle conviction to a misdemeanor and for resentencing pursuant
to section 1170.18.
On January 23, 2015, the trial court considered and denied defendant’s petition,
finding defendant did not satisfy the criteria under section 1170.18. Defendant filed a
timely notice of appeal from that order on March 17, 2015.
II
DISCUSSION
After defendant appealed, upon her request, this court appointed counsel to
represent her on appeal. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a
statement of the case, a summary of the facts and potential arguable issues, and
requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and she
has not done so.
4
The passage of Proposition 47 created section 1170.18, which provides for any
defendant “currently serving a sentence for a conviction . . . of a felony or felonies who
would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under [Proposition 47] had [it] been in effect at
the time of the offense [to] petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that
entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing . . .”
under the statutory framework as amended by the passage of Proposition 47. (§ 1170.18,
subd. (a).) If a defendant properly seeks recall and resentencing pursuant to
section 1170.18, subdivision (a), the trial court must grant resentencing unless, in its
discretion, it determines resentencing “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).) Among the crimes reduced to misdemeanors by
Proposition 47, rendering the person convicted of the crime eligible for resentencing, is
receiving stolen property where the property value does not exceed $950. (§ 496,
subd. (a).)
Here, defendant did not plead guilty to receiving stolen property in violation of
section 496, but receiving a stolen motor vehicle in violation of section 496d. As
such, defendant was ineligible. Even if we assume the Legislature contemplated that
section 496d apply as among one of the crimes under Proposition 47, the record
shows the value of the vehicle received exceeded $950.
Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have
independently reviewed the entire record for potential error and find no arguable error
that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
5
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
J.
CODRINGTON
J.
6