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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RAMON CORNIEL,
Appellant No. 241 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 1, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0004316-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN AND OLSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2015
Appellant, Ramon Corniel, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on December 1, 2014, as made final by the denial of his post-
sentence motion on January 27, 2015. We affirm.
The factual background of this case is as follows. In April 2013, a
confidential informant (“CI”) told Officer Adam Bruckhart, a member of the
York County Drug Task Force, that he could obtain heroin. On April 29,
2013, the CI contacted Jose Virella (“Virella”) and ordered two bricks of
heroin. Officer Bruckhart provided the CI with $500.00 in marked currency
to purchase the heroin. When the CI arrived at a local Target, he entered a
black Acura. A man identified as Virella was seated in the driver’s seat.
Virella was the only person in the Acura at this time. Police later learned
that the Acura was owned by Appellant. The CI gave Virella the $500.00 in
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marked currency and received two bricks of heroin. After the CI exited the
vehicle, Appellant exited the Target and entered the driver’s seat of the
Acura. Appellant and Virella then left in the Acura.
On May 1, 2013, the CI again contacted Virella to purchase two bricks
of heroin. The deal was set to take place at a car wash. Instead of
permitting the transaction to occur, however, police arrested Appellant and
Virella when they arrived at the car wash. Upon searching Virella, police
found two bricks of heroin in his sock. No drugs were found on Appellant’s
person or in the vehicle. Appellant gave police permission to search his
residence. At Appellant’s residence, police recovered a substantial amount
of United States currency, including $460.00 of the $500.00 in marked
currency that was used in the April 29, 2013 transaction. Police also
recovered paraphernalia consistent with heroin dealing.
The procedural history of this case is as follows. On July 15, 2013,
Appellant was charged via criminal information with delivery of a controlled
substance (“delivery”)1, possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance (“PWID”)2 and conspiracy to commit deliver and PWID
(“conspiracy”).3 The delivery charge was for the April 29, 2013 incident
while the PWID charge was for the May 1, 2013 incident. The conspiracy
1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
2
Id.
3
Id.; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
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charge covered both the April 29 and May 1, 2013 incidents. On October 9,
2014, Appellant was convicted of PWID and conspiracy. He was found not
guilty of the delivery charge. On December 1, 2014, Appellant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 11½ to 23 months’ imprisonment. On
December 20, 2014, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion. On January 27,
2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. This timely
appeal followed.4
Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict as to [PWID] and criminal
conspiracy to commit that offense . . . [?]
2. Whether the jury’s verdict was against the greater weight of
the evidence . . . [?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (complete capitalization omitted).5
In his first issue, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of PWID and conspiracy. “Whether sufficient evidence exists to
support the verdict is a question of law; our standard of review is de novo
and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d
788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). In reviewing a sufficiency of
4
On February 3, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On February 17, 2015, Appellant filed his concise
statement. On March 25, 2015, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a)
opinion. Both issues raised on appeal were included in his concise
statement.
5
We have re-numbered the issues for ease of disposition.
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the evidence claim, we must determine whether “viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth
v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal alteration and
citation omitted). “The evidence does not need to disprove every possibility
of innocence, and doubts as to guilt, the credibility of witnesses, and the
weight of the evidence are for the fact-finder to decide.” Commonwealth
v. Forrey, 108 A.3d 895, 897 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
We begin by analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the
conspiracy conviction. “In order to sustain a conviction for criminal
conspiracy, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant entered into an
agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or
persons, with a shared criminal intent, and that an overt act was done in
furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186,
1197 (Pa. 2013). In this case, there was ample evidence that Appellant and
Virella entered into an agreement to commit an unlawful act, i.e., PWID.
Specifically, two days after police witnessed Appellant and Virella distribute
heroin to the CI, Appellant and Virella arrived at a pre-determined location in
the same Acura with Appellant driving. Virella possessed the exact amount
of heroin that he agreed to sell to the CI – 100 stamp bags. When appellant
was searched, he was found to have three cell phones and $276.00 in U.S.
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currency. A search of Appellant’s residence turned up $460.00 in marked
currency used in the April 29 transaction. When taken as a whole, and
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this was sufficient
to prove Appellant entered into an agreement with Virella to commit PWID.
Furthermore, Appellant and Virella driving to the car wash with the 100
stamp bags of heroin was an overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of conspiracy.
Next, we turn to the sufficiency of the evidence for Appellant’s PWID
conviction. “In order to convict an accused of PWID under 35 P.S. § 780–
113(a)(30), the Commonwealth must prove that he both possessed the
controlled substance and had an intent to deliver that substance.”
Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996 (Pa. Super. 2011), aff’d by equally
divided court, 106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Appellant argues that he did not possess the heroin because no heroin
was found on Appellant’s person, in his car, or in his house. Instead, heroin
was found in Virella’s sock. We need not directly address this argument
because there was sufficient evidence Appellant was guilty under an
accomplice liability theory.6 The Crimes Code defines accomplice liability, in
relevant part, as follows:
6
Although there was also sufficient evidence to convict Appellant under a
co-conspirator liability theory, the trial court did not charge the jury on co-
conspirator liability. See N.T., 10/9/14, at 288-292.
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(a) General rule.--A person is guilty of an offense if it is
committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another
person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
(b) Conduct of another.--A person is legally accountable for the
conduct of another person when:
***
(3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the
commission of the offense.
(c) Accomplice defined.--A person is an accomplice of another
person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense, he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other
person in planning or committing it; or
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306.
In this case, there was sufficient evidence that Appellant aided Virella
in PWID. Specifically, Appellant drove Virella to and from both transactions.
Appellant also was in possession of $460.00 of the $500.00 in marked
currency used during the April 29 transaction. When viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence proved Appellant was
an accomplice in Virella’s possession of the heroin.
Furthermore, even if Appellant were not guilty under an accomplice
liability theory, he constructively possessed the heroin. “In narcotics
possession cases, the Commonwealth may meet its burden by showing
actual, constructive, or joint constructive possession of the contraband.”
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Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc). In this case, the Commonwealth proceeded on a joint constructive
possession theory.
“Our Supreme Court has defined constructive possession as the ability
to exercise a conscious dominion over the illegal substance: the power to
control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control.” Id. at 868
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is well-settled that an
individual can constructively possess contraband found on another
individual’s person. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 105 A.3d 1194, 1198
(Pa. 2014) (defendant constructively possessed a firearm found on co-
defendant’s person).
In this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence that Appellant controlled the
drugs and, therefore, constructively possessed the contraband. Specifically,
92% of the April 29 drug transaction proceeds was found in Appellant’s
residence. Appellant and Virella were in Appellant’s vehicle on both April 29
and May 1. Following the April 29 drug transaction between the CI and
Virella, Virella exited the driver’s seat of the Acura when Appellant
approached the vehicle, and Appellant entered the driver’s side. As for the
May 1 transaction at the car wash, Virella had the exact amount of heroin
that the CI agreed to purchase. Appellant and Virella arrived at the location
agreed upon for the transaction, with Appellant driving the vehicle. The
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heroin found in Virella’s sock was packed in a manner consistent with
distribution and inconsistent with personal use. The rubber bands found at
Appellant’s house were consistent with those used to package heroin.
Finally, an expert testified that drug dealers occasionally use third-parties to
conduct the actual transactions. This evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, showed that Appellant constructively
possessed the heroin. All of Appellant’s arguments to the contrary merely
go to the weight of the evidence, and not its sufficiency. Accordingly, there
was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of PWID.
Finally, Appellant contends that his convictions are against the weight
of the evidence. A challenge to the weight of the evidence must first be
raised at the trial level “(1) orally, on the record, at any time before
sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a
post-sentence motion.” In re J.B., 106 A.3d 76, 97 (Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted). Appellant properly preserved his weight of the evidence claim by
raising the issue in his post-sentence motion.
“[A] new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is only
warranted where the factfinder’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it
shocks ones sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694,
699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal alteration and citation omitted). “[W]e do
not reach the underlying question of whether the verdict was, in fact,
against the weight of the evidence. . . . Instead, this Court determines
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whether the trial court abused its discretion in reaching whatever decision it
made on the motion[.]” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206, 213
(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
Appellant essentially makes the same arguments as to the weight of
the evidence as he did with respect to its sufficiency. In its Rule 1925(a)
opinion the trial court stated that despite the fact that “the case against the
Appellant was notably weak,” “Appellant’s argument that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is incorrect.” Trial Court Opinion,
3/25/15, at 4. After careful review of the certified record, we find no abuse
of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the verdict in this case did
not shock its sense of justice. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief
on his weight of the evidence claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/20/2015
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Com. v. Corniel, R.
Combined Opinion