J-S49039-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
EDWARD VANCHEZ CHESNEY,
Appellant No. 77 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 11, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-MD-0002082-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN AND OLSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2015
Appellant, Edward Vanchez Chesney, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on December 11, 2014, following his bench trial conviction
for indirect criminal contempt1 based upon a finding Appellant violated a
final Protection from Abuse (PFA) order. We affirm.
We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as
follows. On May 7, 2014, the trial court entered the final PFA order at issue
upon mutual agreement of Appellant and the victim. The PFA order
prohibited contact with the victim and excluded Appellant from her
residence. On November 12, 2014, Appellant appeared at the victim’s
residence and refused to leave. The victim left the scene and Appellant then
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1
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6113.
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made numerous telephone calls to her. On December 11, 2014, the trial
court held a bench trial and convicted Appellant of indirect criminal
contempt. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 90 days of probation and a
fine of $300.00. This timely appeal resulted.2
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
The guilty verdict of [i]ndirect [c]riminal [c]ontempt is
contrary to the weight of the evidence in that the testimony
of the sole Commonwealth witness was not credible as the
witness testified that on a prior occasion she filed a petition
for a [PFA] [O]rder alleging misconduct by Appellant and
subsequently recanted all of the allegations set forth in the
petition.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant essentially argues that the trial court erred in crediting the
victim’s testimony over the testimony of the defense witnesses. More
specifically, Appellant argues that the victim filed a prior PFA petition against
Appellant in November 2012, but later recanted in a January 2013 sworn
affidavit. Id. at 19-20. Appellant contends that the prior recantation
rendered the victim not credible in the present case. Id. at 20. Thus,
Appellant argues “[t]he trial court abused its discretion in giving [the
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2
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on December 18, 2014. The
trial court denied relief by order entered on December 22, 2014. On January
7, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The trial court ordered Appellant
to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on January 15, 2015. Appellant complied timely. The
trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 23,
2015.
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victim’s] testimony more weight than that of” Appellant and his girlfriend.
Id. at 21.
Our Supreme Court summarized our standard of review as follows:
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be
granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or
because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at
a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge is
to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts
are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to
give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
It has often been stated that a new trial should be awarded
when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
imperative so that right may be given another opportunity
to prevail.
An appellate court's standard of review when presented with
a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard
of review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Because the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented,
an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court's determination
that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's
conviction that the verdict was or was not against
the weight of the evidence and that a new trial
should be granted in the interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the
trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial
based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
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unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court's
discretion, [our Supreme Court has] explained:
The term discretion imports the exercise of
judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a
dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the
law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving
effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be
exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to
prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary
actions. Discretion is abused where the course
pursued represents not merely an error of judgment,
but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable
or where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-1055 (Pa. 2013) (internal
citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, the trial court determined:
The victim testified, [Appellant] testified, [Appellant’s] prior
state parole officer testified, and [Appellant’s] long-time
girlfriend testified. [The trial court] weighed all of the
testimony and judged the credibility of each witness based
not only on his or her words but tone and body language.
[The trial court] found the victim’s testimony credible, and
[Appellant’s] testimony not credible.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/2015, at 2. The trial court was “satisfied that [the
victim] gave a credible answer to explain her previous recant[ation]” of
allegations of past abuse. Id. at 3. More specifically, the trial court believed
that the victim retracted the prior allegations of domestic abuse “under
some pressure from [Appellant] and [Appellant’s] family to do so[.]” Id.
Based upon our standard of review, we discern no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial on Appellant’s indirect criminal
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contempt conviction. The victim offered testimony that established
Appellant violated the terms of a final PFA order that was in effect during the
relevant time period. In rendering its verdict, the trial court made a
credibility determination in favor of the victim after weighing all the
evidence. Here, the victim testified that she had previously filed a PFA
petition against Appellant in 2012, but recanted because Appellant promised
to “rectify the situation” and because the victim “felt badly.” N.T.,
12/11/2014, at 18. The victim also received a threatening phone call from
Appellant’s brother. Id. Thus, the victim recanted in a sworn affidavit in
2013. Id. The victim testified, however, that the original allegations of
abuse in the 2012 PFA petition were truthful. Id. The trial court was free to
believe the victim over Appellant. The trial court also credited her testimony
that Appellant came to her residence, would not leave, and then called her
repeatedly afterwards in violation of the final PFA order at issue. The verdict
was not the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will against Appellant.
Accordingly, Appellant’s sole issue lacks merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/20/2015
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Com. v. Chesney, E.
Combined Opinion