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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10276
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00023-MHT-CSC-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALBERTO TREJO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(August 24, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Alberto Trejo appeals his 360-month sentence, imposed at the bottom of the
advisory guideline range, after pleading guilty to conspiring to possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Trejo argues that his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court erroneously believed it could
not downwardly vary from the methamphetamine guidelines based on a policy
disagreement with those guidelines. And he argues that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable because it is based on those guidelines, which are
unduly harsh and unsupported by empirical evidence. After careful review, we
affirm Trejo’s sentence.
I.
Trejo and four codefendants were indicted on one count of conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Trejo was
accused of organizing and leading the conspiracy while serving a 99-year sentence
for second-degree murder in Alabama state prison. Trejo pled guilty to the federal
charge without a plea agreement.
In the presentence investigation report, Trejo was held accountable for 12.44
kilograms of “Ice” methamphetamine and 27.7 grams of cocaine. To calculate a
single offense level, the probation officer converted these quantities into their
marijuana equivalents. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
2
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(“U.S.S.G.”) § 2D1.1 cmt. n.8(B). Under the Drug Equivalency Tables, one gram
of Ice is equivalent to twenty kilograms of marijuana.1 Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.8(D).
After conversion, Trejo was held accountable, in total, for the equivalent of
248,805.54 kilograms of marijuana, for a base offense level of 38. See id.
§ 2D1.1(c)(1) (involving 90,000 kilograms or more of marijuana). The Ice
equivalent accounted for all but 5.54 kilograms of the total amount.
With a four-level increase for Trejo’s leadership role and a three-level
reduction for his acceptance of responsibility, Trejo’s total offense level was 39.
Trejo was designated a career offender, under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, due to two prior
qualifying felony convictions (murder and transporting marijuana for sale), which
pushed his criminal history category from V to VI, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b),
resulting in a guideline range of 360 months to life imprisonment. 2 Due to the
prior felony drug conviction, Trejo faced a statutory minimum term of 20 years’
imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
1
“Ice” is defined as a mixture that is at least 80% pure methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c) n.(C). For comparison, one gram of methamphetamine that is not “methamphetamine
(actual)” or “Ice” is, under the Tables, equivalent to two kilograms of marijuana. Id. § 2D1.1
cmt. n.8(D).
2
Trejo’s guidelines range remained the same because his base offense level under §
2D1.1 (level 38) was higher than his offense level under the career-offender table (level 37), and
the career-offender guidelines provide that the higher level of the two applies. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(b). Had the career-offender offense level applied instead, his total offense level would
have been 38 instead of 39, resulting in the same guideline range of 360 months to life
imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A.
3
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Trejo requested a downward variance to the minimum of 20 years’
imprisonment, arguing that the methamphetamine guidelines overstated the
seriousness of his conduct. To illustrate the point, Trejo asserted in a sentencing
memorandum that his offense level would have been lower had he committed
second-degree murder or a drug offense involving 440 kilograms of cocaine. And
at sentencing, Trejo initially compared the current federal treatment of drug crimes
to alcohol prohibition and asserted that thirty years in prison was too much for any
drug crime.
In attempting to clarify Trejo’s arguments at sentencing, the court identified
two categories of variances district courts may impose: (1) the “typical 3553”
where “the defendant ha[s] certain individual characteristics that warrant a variance
downward”; and (2) where, “as a matter of policy, and regardless as to this
defendant, the Court should just not follow the sentencing commission’s views
about guidelines.” The court characterized Trejo’s argument as a policy
argument—not based on Trejo’s individual characteristics—and noted that it
“disagree[d] with the calculations of the sentencing commission.”
But, according to the court, sentencing courts “should be more reluctant” to
grant a variance based on policy disagreements. Further, the court stated, it had
only known courts to reject the crack-cocaine guidelines based on policy
disagreements. In response, Trejo, for the first time, asserted that his argument
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was based in part on a sentencing disparity based on methamphetamine purity.
The sentences for more pure methamphetamine, he asserted, were ten times more
severe than for an equivalent amount of less pure methamphetamine. The district
court suggested that even if there were problems with the methamphetamine
guidelines, in light of his prior murder conviction, Trejo was “a pretty, pretty
violent person” who may not deserve a downward variance on that basis alone.
The district court confirmed that the guideline range was 360 months to life
imprisonment, which was uncontested, and then recessed the hearing for the day,
noting that it needed additional time. When sentencing resumed the next day, the
court denied Trejo’s request for a variance. The court elaborated, “[W]hen you
talk[ed] about disparity involving meth, I wasn’t quite sure what type of disparity
you were talking about, whether it was . . . between the pure and nonpure or meth
versus other drugs or what?” The court directed Trejo’s counsel to the district
court decision of United States v. Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Iowa 2013),
which, according to the court, discussed the policy arguments against the
methamphetamine guidelines in more detail. “But,” the court stated, “I don’t find
any record here that supports a rejection of the policy.”
The district court sentenced Trejo to serve 360 months in prison, to run
consecutive to the 99-year sentence he was serving. Following the hearing, the
court issued a written opinion denying Trejo’s motion for a downward variance. In
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the opinion, the court explained that Trejo “did not present clear or sufficient
evidence as to why the sentencing disparities produced by the methamphetamine
guidelines are unwarranted as applied to him,” and that “his arguments were
conclusory and superficial, and not substantive.” Trejo now appeals.
II.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 982 (11th Cir. 2015). In
reviewing for reasonableness, we “must first ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
Assuming the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, we will then
review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under the totality of the
circumstances. Id.; United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).
“A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it does not achieve the purposes of
sentencing stated in § 3553(a)[,]” Moran, 778 F.3d at 982 (internal quotation
marks omitted), which include the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
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deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal
conduct, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).3
We will overturn a sentence as substantively unreasonable only if “we are
left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that
lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
proving that his sentence is unreasonable. Moran, 778 F.3d at 982.
A.
Trejo contends that the district court erroneously treated the Sentencing
Guidelines as mandatory. For support, he highlights the court’s comment that
sentencing courts should be “reluctant” to reject guidelines based on policy
disagreements. He asserts that this statement is contrary to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009), and
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), and shows that
the court believed that it could not vary from the guideline range based on a policy
disagreement with the methamphetamine guidelines.
3
The district court must also take into account the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the
applicable guideline range, any pertinent policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(3)-(7).
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In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court recognized that “district courts are
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based
on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.” Spears, 555 U.S.at 266, 129 S.
Ct. at 844 (clarifying Kimbrough); see Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91, 128 S. Ct. at
564. Thus, Kimbrough recognized a more expansive view of district courts’
authority at sentencing, permitting courts “to vary from the crack cocaine
Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an
individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular
case.” Spears, 555 U.S. at 264, 129 S. Ct. at 843.
Several of our sister circuits have expressly held that Spears and Kimbrough
mean that district courts have broad authority to premise a variance on
disagreement with the policy of any guideline. See, e.g., United States v. Corner,
598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We understand Kimbrough and
Spears to mean that district judges are at liberty to reject any Guideline on policy
grounds—though they must act reasonably when using that power.”); United States
v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[A] district court may
vary from the Guidelines range based solely on a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines, even where that disagreement applies to a wide class of offenders or
offenses.”); United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 585 (6th Cir. 2009)
(collecting cases). Consistent with these circuits, in Irey this Court recognized that
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“Kimbrough allows a district court to vary from the guidelines based solely on its
judgment that the policies behind the guidelines are wrong.” Irey, 612 F.3d at
1212.
Here, the record contradicts Trejo’s contention that the district court treated
the guidelines as mandatory. 4 In addressing Trejo’s request for a variance—the
focus of the sentencing hearing—the court recognized its general authority to vary
where, “as a matter of policy, and regardless as to this defendant, the Court should
just not follow the sentencing commission’s views about guidelines.” While the
court may not have been familiar with policy-based variances outside of crack-
cocaine cases on the first day of sentencing, the court never suggested that it could
not grant a variance outside of those cases. And, after recessing the hearing for the
evening, the court appears to have conducted independent research regarding the
alleged flaws in the methamphetamine guidelines. When the hearing resumed, the
court denied the motion for a downward variance because Trejo had not
established a “record here that supports a rejection of the policy.”
Trejo places heavy emphasis on the district court’s statement that sentencing
courts “should be more reluctant” to grant variances based on policy disagreements
than variances based on individual circumstances. But the statement itself implies
4
Trejo does not contend that the district court failed to calculate the guideline range or to
consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and the record otherwise shows that the court did not
err in these respects. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
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that the court understood it had the authority to grant a policy-based variance.
Only if the court believed that it had that authority would it make sense to say the
authority should be used reluctantly.
The district court’s statement also is not inconsistent with Kimbrough and
Spears. Kimbrough explains that the Sentencing Commission and sentencing
courts have “discrete institutional strengths.” 552 U.S. at 109, 128 S. Ct. at 574.
Generally, the Commission “has the capacity courts lack to base its determinations
on empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with
appropriate expertise.” Id. Accordingly, “the Commission’s recommendation of a
sentencing range will reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might
achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
sentencing judge, on the other hand, has greater familiarity with the individual
circumstances of the defendant and case before her and therefore is in a superior
position to apply the § 3553(a) factors in a particular case. Id. The district court’s
comment about being more “reluctant” to grant a variance based on a policy
dispute with the Guidelines merely recognizes that a variance “based solely on the
judge’s view that the Guidelines range fails properly to reflect § 3553(a)
considerations even in a mine-run case,” Id. at 109, 128 S. Ct. at 575, falls outside
of the institutional strengths of a sentencing court.
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In short, the record shows that the district court understood it had the
discretion to vary downward based on a policy disagreement with the
methamphetamine guidelines but that it declined to exercise that discretion because
Trejo did not show that a variance was warranted. Trejo has not shown that the
district court procedurally erred by treating the methamphetamine guidelines as
mandatory.
B.
Trejo also contends that his sentence was substantively unreasonable
because the methamphetamine guidelines are not based on empirical evidence,
and, in his view, their application creates unjustly punitive sentences that are
greater than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). He asserts that the district court did not properly weigh and consider
these arguments at sentencing. Again, we disagree.
Section 2D1.1’s Drug Quantity Table reflects a 10-to-1 sentencing disparity
between pure methamphetamine and mixture or non-pure methamphetamine. For
example, to receive a base offense level of 38 under the current Guidelines, the
offense must involve 45 kilograms or more of mixture methamphetamine or 4.5
kilograms of more pure methamphetamine—“Methamphetamine (actual)” or
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“Ice.” 5 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (Nov. 2014). The Drug Equivalency Tables
likewise reflect a 10-to-1 disparity between pure and non-pure methamphetamine.
See id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.8(D). The commentary to § 2D1.1 explains that drug purity
“is probative of the defendant’s role or position in the chain of distribution” and
“[s]ince controlled substances are often diluted and combined with other
substances as they pass down the chain of distribution, the fact that a defendant is
in possession of unusually pure narcotics may indicate a prominent role in the
criminal enterprise and proximity to the source of the drugs.” Id. § 2D1.1 cmt.
n.27(C).
In Hayes, which Trejo principally relies upon, a district judge found that the
methamphetamine guidelines were not based on empirical evidence, were
excessive, and failed to promote the purposes of sentencing under § 3553(a).
Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1025-29. With respect to the drug-purity disparity, the
judge found that, “[w]hile it may seem logical to punish a pure substance more
than mixed substance, there is no support in the legislative history to explain the
formula underlying greater methamphetamine purity to greater months of
imprisonment.” Id. at 1025. The methamphetamine guidelines can, therefore,
create an unwarranted disparity, particularly where the offender is “merely a
5
“Methamphetamine (actual)’ refer[s] to the weight of the controlled substance, itself,
contained in the mixture or substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) n.(B). “Ice” is at least 80% pure
methamphetamine. See id. § 2D1.1(c) n.(C).
12
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courier or mule who has no knowledge of the purity of the methamphetamine he or
she is transporting.” Id. Similarly, the judge concluded, because the Guidelines
for drug-trafficking offenses in general are tied to drug quantity—on the
assumption that larger amounts indicate greater responsibility—quantity may be a
poor proxy for culpability in the case of minor participants in a drug enterprise. Id.
at 1027-29.
Assuming arguendo that the methamphetamine guidelines in general and the
10-to-1 mixture-to-pure methamphetamine ratio in particular are not supported by
empirical evidence, cf. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 95, 128 S. Ct. at 567 (noting that
the drug-trafficking guidelines were not developed using an “empirical approach
based on data about past sentencing practices,” but were instead based on the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986’s “weight-driven scheme”), this fact alone would not
make Trejo’s sentence unreasonable. The lack of empirical evidence is “one
factor” that a district court can consider in exercising its authority to vary from the
Guidelines. See United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 870 (11th Cir. 2010).
While Kimbrough and Spears “empowered” district courts with discretion to vary
downward based on a policy disagreement with the applicable guidelines, they did
not “command” district courts to exercise this discretion. Dell v. United States,
710 F.3d 1267, 1279 (11th Cir. 2013).
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Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vary
downward and by imposing a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range.
Significantly, many of the primary concerns identified in Hayes do not apply here
because Trejo was not a minor participant in the methamphetamine distribution
conspiracy. Despite being in prison at the time, he was the conspiracy’s organizer
and leader, with connections to the source of supply in California. Thus, in this
case, drug purity in fact “indicate[s] a prominent role in the criminal enterprise and
proximity to the source of the drugs.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.27(C).
Moreover, we are satisfied that the district judge “considered the parties’
arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority.” United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We find no merit in Trejo’s contention that the
district court failed to understand or consider his arguments challenging the
methamphetamine guidelines. The judge’s initial confusion with Trejo’s disparity
arguments is understandable, given that, in the sentencing memorandum, Trejo’s
counsel focused on the disparities between drug crimes and violent crimes and
between methamphetamine crimes and other drug crimes, but at the sentencing
hearing, Trejo’s counsel shifted the focus to the drug-purity disparity.
Notwithstanding some initial confusion, the record reflects that the judge gave
extensive consideration to all of Trejo’s arguments, going beyond even what Trejo
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presented. Indeed, it was the district judge who brought Hayes—the focus of
Trejo’s briefing on appeal—to defense counsel’s attention, not the other way
around. Regarding the drug-purity disparity argument in particular, the judge
issued a written opinion explaining why he found this argument unavailing.
Overall, the district court recognized that it had the authority to vary
downward based on a policy disagreement with the methamphetamine Guidelines
but exercised its discretion not to do so because Trejo had not shown that the drug-
purity disparity was unwarranted in his case. Trejo had a prior conviction for
second-degree murder and was operating this drug conspiracy while serving the
sentence for that offense. Also, the 360-month sentence was imposed at the
bottom of the guideline range, and we expect that a sentence within the guideline
range is reasonable.6 United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 735 (11th
Cir. 2010). Under these circumstances, Trejo’s sentence is reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
6
We note that, even if the district court had found the methamphetamine guideline range
excessive, Trejo does not challenge his status as a career offender, and his guideline range based
on the career-offender offense table, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), was also 360 months to life
imprisonment.
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